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In the media there are two common explanations for terrorist attacks: Those who 
commit these acts are either described as mentally ill or as religious fundamentalists. For 
example, when Anders Breivik killed 77 teenagers he was declared insane suffering from 
paranoid and schizophrenia, whereas the perpetrators of 9/11 attacks were described as 
religious zealots. Unfortunately, the scientific literature also simplifies radicalization and 
terrorism in a similar fashion; the field is divided between person and situation 
explanations of terrorism and radicalization. However, to understand terrorism and 
radicalization adequately the dichotomy of person-situation needs to be readdressed. This 
dissertation begins to explore the premises that the potential for participating in 
asymmetrical collective violence must be understood as interplay between intra-
individual, social psychological and external/societal factors. Broadly speaking, this 
dissertation aims to answer the following question: What are the social and psychological 
factors and processes that contribute to the motivations behind the radicalization of first, 
second and third generation of Muslim Europeans? This dissertation first addressees the 
dichotomy of person and situation and proposes an integrated model of terrorism and 
radicalization. Second, integrating perspectives from various line of research I 
demonstrate how factors from the different domains of research relate, and more 
importantly, complement each other in shaping circumstances, which will make 
radicalization more or less likely to occur. Finally, I explore the influence of person 
factors such as personality traits. While previous research on extremism and violent has 
overlooked the potential role of non-pathological personality differences, it is proposed 
here that non-pathological personality characteristics would predict both violent and non-
violent behavioral intentions and actual behavior among Muslims in defense of their 
group. Therefore, this work aims to extend knowledge on terrorism beyond existing 
literature, which tends to focus exclusively on either situational factors or 
psychopathology.  
Keywords: Homegrown Terrorism and Radicalization, Social Psychology, Personality, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Terrorism  
 
Brief background and aims 
On the evening of November 13th of 2015 three suicide bombers detonated their 
explosives near The Stade de Francein, Saint-Denis in the suburb of Paris. These attacks 
were coordinated with mass shootings at cafés, restaurants and a music venue in central 
Paris by the suicide bombers’ accomplices. During these carefully planned and 
coordinated attacks, the perpetrators managed to kill 130 people and injured over 300. 
Seven of the perpetrators were also killed during the standoff between the French police 
and the perpetrators. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) later claimed 
responsibility for the attacks as retribution for the French airstrikes on ISIS targets in 
Syria and Iraq, and gradually, it became clear that the perpetrators were European 
nationals with Muslim backgrounds.  
The Paris attacks of November 13th are but one example of terrorist attacks 
committed by European Muslims with migrant backgrounds against their home societies 
and fellow citizens in the recent years. To mention a few, since the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks 
the West has witnessed the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings, the 2014 shootings 
at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, the 2015 attacks on the Charlie Hebdo magazine and 
on a Jewish supermarket in Paris, on the Jewish synagogue and on a discussion event of 
free speech and satirical cartoons in Copenhagen, on a right-wing cartoon competition in 
Texas, an attempted attack on a Paris-bound passenger train and recently the killings in 
San Bernardino, California. In the aftermath of these attacks many wanted to know what 
mechanisms drove the perpetrators to engage in killing of innocent people.  
Thus, the pressing question is: what are the causes and mechanisms behind the 
motivation of some first, second and third generation of Muslim Europeans with migrant 
backgrounds to commit act of asymmetrical political violence against their home 
societies? The starting point of this dissertation is that a prevention, or at least reduction 




the overall aim of the current dissertation is to explore the social psychological factors 
behind the motivation of some Muslim Europeans with migrant background to support 
and commit terrorism against Europe. 
The simplicity of the above question can be deceiving, and few scholars, security 
experts and policy makers seem to know the answer. However, the answer to above 
question is urgent, as with emergence of ISIS the threat of terrorism to Europe seems to 
have increased in recent years. Five of the 2015 terrorist attacks coincide with the rise of 
ISIS. Therefore, knowledge of what drives some to commit terrorism is crucial in light of 
recent threats to Europe, and in light of at times harsh public debate about Muslim 
Europeans of migrant and refugee backgrounds that may potentially contribute to 
recruiting participants for terrorism against the West. Thus, the radicalization of Muslim 
minorities can potentially lead to polarization and vicious circle of outgroup hostility and 
negativity between Muslim and non-Muslim Europeans.  
The existing answers to the above question are plentiful, but a problem with many 
of them is that they are not based on any empirical evidence, but rather armchair 
argumentation. In fact, a review conducted by Lum and colleagues revealed that 96% of 
articles on terrorism from peer-reviewed sources were thought pieces, and only 3% 
included empirical analysis (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2008, see also Ranstorp, 2006 & 
2009; Sageman, 2014; Silke, 2004). Furthermore, in a number of cases there is also 
evidence available that seems to directly contradict the proposed explanations.  
One conventional answer to why people do these kinds of deeds is that the 
perpetrators have fallen prey to fundamentalist religious ideas and doctrines (e.g., Ginges, 
Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009; see also Harris, 2004; Dawkins, 2007). But evidence 
indicates that those who get drawn to radicalism are “far from being religious zealots, a 
large number of those involved in terrorism do not practice their faith regularly” (Travis, 
2008). For example, only 21% of Lebanese suicide bombers had a strong adherence to 
Islamist religious beliefs while the majority had strong communist and socialist 
ideological orientation (Pape, 2005). Further, Pape & Feldman (2010) examined more 
than 2200 cases of suicide attacks worldwide since 1980 and their research revealed that 
half of the attackers were secular. Hence, religion and religious fundamentalism do not 




So another suggestion has been that if it is not religious fundamentalism per se 
then they must be bad, evil or suffer from mental illness (Laqueur, 2003; Lankford, 2014). 
However, the prevalence of mental illness and psychopathology is no more common 
among radicalized individuals than the general population (Travis, 2008; Bhui, Warfa & 
Jones, 2014). A third common assumption is that they are disadvantaged, poor and poorly 
integrated into Western societies (e.g., Kahn & Weiner, 2002). Nevertheless, evidence 
shows no link between poverty and terrorism (see, Piazza, 2006). On the contrary 
evidence from several studies illustrate that individuals who commit act of terrorism tend 
to be at least as educated or more advantaged compared to the general population they 
belong to (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Sageman, 2004). In fact, individuals in full time 
education rather than employment and high earners are more likely to support and 
sympathize with violent protest and act of terrorism (Bhui, Warfa & Jones, 2014).  
Against this background it would seem that the research community knows less 
about Islam-related terrorism than we would like to admit. The aim of this dissertation is 
to fill some of the holes in our psychological understanding of this phenomenon. This 
dissertation begins to explore the idea that the potential for participating in extremist 
behavior must be understood as interplay between intra-individual, external and societal 
factors. My goal is to explore 1) when and why some Muslim Europeans with migrant 
backgrounds may be drawn to extremist behavior 2) and how individual psychological 
characteristics, external and relational structures relate to each other in explaining 
extremist behavior.    
Before, embarking on this journey it is important to note that in this dissertation I 
do not claim that terrorism is something endemic to Muslims (or any other particular 
group for that matter). This dissertation is neither an attempt to isolate Islam related 
violence from other forms of violence. In fact, Islamist terrorism shares many features 
and commonalities with other non-Islamist terrorist organizations and groups as it is 
outlined below. The aim is to understand the roots of group-based violence, and I use 
Islamist violence as an example of this. The case of Islamist violence is also informative 
because of the status, power, and demographic dynamics surrounding Muslims living in 




Further, as illustrated in study III outgroup hostility and the endorsement of 
radical attitudes and intentions can be explained by same social-psychological factor 
among both Muslims and non-Muslim Europeans. For example, the motivation behind 
Anders Breivik’s massacre is not so different from Mohammed Merah’s who murdered 
four men and three children in Toulouse, France in 2012. Threat perception to cherished 
values was central in both cases. A recent study in France showed that the pervasive 
Islamophobia was the result of Muslims being perceived as threatening, based in large 
part on cultural differences between the native French and the Muslim population of the 
country (Adida, Laitin & Valfort, 2016). Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
certain social or political factors can set the scene for the radicalization of certain 
individuals. For example, Western foreign policy is often mentioned as a cause of 
terrorism among the Muslim population. The former head of MI5, Baroness 
Manningham-Buller attributes the UK's participation in the 2001 military invasion of 
Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq to increased terrorist threat to the UK. Further, 
she claims that the UK’s involvement in these wars has radicalized a whole generation of 
European Muslim youth (NEWS, BBC, 2010). Thus, person, group-based, social and 
political grievances together may lead to endorsement of terrorism (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008). Therefore, personal, local and global grievances are important in 
understanding terrorism and various forms of terrorist actions should be seen as an 
individual process that occurs within particular social and political context rather then 














Terrorism, Radicalization and Extremism  
 
Definitions  
Terrorism conducted by Western born individuals with Muslim background is 
perceived to pose a significant threat to Western societies. Nevertheless, an objective and 
universally accepted definition of terrorism does not exist (Silke, 2004). In fact, in 1988 
Schmid and Jongman enumerated as many as 109 different definitions of terrorism. This 
is clearly reflected in the way different agencies and departments within the same 
governmental apparatus use different definition of terrorism. For example, the 
Department of State1, the US Department of Defense2 and the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI)3 have differing definition of the concept, which emphasize various 
defining properties. The proposed definitions vary in their emphasis on properties such as 
the characteristics of intended victims, the characteristics of the terrorists, the motivation, 
the form and intensity of the violence, the legal issues, and the aims and effects of the 
terrorist acts (della Porta, 2013). For example, the United States Department of State 
defines terrorism as “premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated in a 
clandestine manner against noncombatants”. Noncombatants, in this sense, understood as 
civilians and noncombatant military personnel, as oppose to combatants. Thus, this 
definition does not include terrorism against military unites and combatant military 
personnel. However, many Islamist terror organizations do not differentiate between 
civilians and military combatant and noncombatant personnel. For example, Bin Laden 
declared in a fatwa that “The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies, civilians and 
military, is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Department of State uses the definition of terrorism defined by Title 22 of the U.S. Code as: 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by 
subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” 
2 The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as the unlawful -- or threatened use of –force 
or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often 
to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.  
3 The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian 




is possible to do it in” (PBS Newshours, 1998; see also Tausch et al., 2011). Thus, based 
on this Bin Laden claims that civilian and military targets should not be differentiated.  
 One of the fundamental challenges in defining terrorism is the lack of specifying 
what we really refer to when we use the term terrorism (Taylor, 2010). As Taylor puts it 
“Are we concerned with violence (including murder), aggressive behaviors, or 
challenging behavior that gains meaning from some political context? Are we to 
understand terrorism from an individual perspective, a social perspective, state 
perspective, or a global perspective? Are we concerned with the potential to commit 
violence (as in the contemporary emphasis on radicalization processes) or is terrorism 
something very focused; related to the expression of actual, rather than potential, 
violence?” (Taylor, 2010, p.122). The term terrorism seems to oversimplify various 
forms of violence, actors, warfare and motives and lump them together as a single unit 
creating a difficult challenge for an adequate scientific injury of the phenomenon.  
Further, to make matters worse, the diversity of the terrorist groups and their 
activities make it even more difficult to distinguish terrorism from political violence, 
national liberation, revolutionary, conventional and guerrilla warfare (Stevens, 2005). 
These concepts are often used interchangeably or lumped together under same category 
(Monahan, 2012). Nonetheless, fundamental differences exist between these various 
categories and terrorism. For example, Guerrilla warfare is often organized in a large 
group, including a large number of individuals who identify themselves as soldiers 
belonging to a form of military unit, which often seize and hold territory (Crenshaw, 
1997; Laqueur, 1999). Terrorists, in contrast, do not attempt to hold or seize territories 
(ISIS aside)4 and they operate in small cells or as lone wolf outside any chain of 
commend. Further, the question is who defines a particular behavior as act of terrorism.  
For instance, the perpetrators themselves may not perceive act of national liberation 
against an occupying power as terrorism.  
Moreover, no agreement has been reached concerning who can be identified as a 
terrorist. The concept becomes more contested when it is defined in a manner that 
complies with the interests of specific agencies involved. For example many government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Some claim that ISIS is not a terrorist group. To what extent ISIS can be described as a terrorist 




agencies do not include state-based and state-sponsored violence as act of terrorism. The 
definition endorsed by the United States Department of State excludes state-based and 
state-sponsored terrorism (Crenshaw,1997; Hoffman,1998). Crimes committed by 
authoritarian regimes against their citizens according to the United States Department of 
State could not be described as act of terrorism. Therefore, a unifying definition of 
terrorism has been a contested source of disagreement and debate not only among 
scholars, but also security experts and policy makers (Schmid, 1993). As such Richard 
Baxter (1974) expressed concerns about the usefulness of the terrorism concept 
altogether -  “We have cause to regret that a legal concept of "terrorism" was ever 
inflicted upon us. The term is imprecise; it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no 
operative legal purpose” (Baxter, 1974, p. 380). della Porta (2013) agreed, stating that 
terrorism is a much-contested term and proposes, “[….] it too plagued by conceptual 
stretching to be kept as a social science concept” (della Porta, 2013, p. 7).  
In sum, it is clear that a comprehensive and universally accepted definition of 
terrorism does not exist yet. Policy makers, and scholars disagree about what constitutes 
terrorism. However, many (e.g.,AIVD, 2006; Borum, 2004; Hoffman, 1998; Pet, 2006; 
Stern & Berger, 2015) agree that the core elements in terrorism involve a deliberate act of 
force, violence or threat of violence against civilians or noncombatants with intent to 
create fear in the pursuit of political change and to achieve political goals. Further, act of 
terrorism is meant to have psychological effects not only on the intended victims but a 
particular audience at large. Hence, in this dissertation terrorism is perceived as a weapon 
of weak against the strong used to create far-reaching psychological effects and to create 
fear beyond the intended victims (e.g., civilians and combatant and noncombatant 
military personnel) with deliberate aim to achieve certain political and societal changes.  
 
Radicalization and extremism  
To narrow the focus of this dissertation it is important to distinguish between 
terrorism and radicalization. Terrorism is a phenomenon, a set of observable behaviors, 
but radicalization is a process, a psychological transformation that the person goes 
through (e.g., Taylor & Horgan, 2006; McCauley & Moskalenko; 2008). The term 




just like the terrorism term, many scholars and agencies have added their own nuances to 
the concept. Nonetheless, Kühle & Lindekilde (2010) found that one of the core defining 
property of radicalization is a gradual process that follows a linear process. This 
definition is in line with so called radicalization theories or path models/pathways (see 
e.g., Borum, 2003; Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, 2009; Moghaddam, 2005; 
Wiktrowicz, 2005; for more comprehensive and sophisticated process models of 
terrorism see McCauley & Moskalenko; 2008; Taylor & Horgan, 2006).  
Theories and path models of radicalization try to identify the alleged steps, or 
phases of “violent” radicalization by retroactively tracing the alleged phases, which led to 
a terrorist act (e.g., Klausen, Campion, Needle, Nguyen & Libertti, 2015). These theories 
and models have been helpful to guide the thinking about radicalization, but they also 
suffer from a selection bias that they focus only on “violent” cases of radicalization (For 
methodological discussion see, King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). Focusing solely on 
violent cases of radicalization implies that the path to radicalization always leads to 
violent outcomes, and this leaves no room for alternative outcomes (For a comprehensive 
critique of phase models see Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Some people may radicalize in a 
non-violent way or withdraw from radicalization all together. Thus, in current 
dissertation radicalization can be seen as a psychological transformation where an 
individual increasingly adopts an extremist belief system, regardless if it ultimately 
results in actual violence or not. Radicalization as such does not necessarily have to result 
in terrorism. The perspective I take here is rather that when people endorse a certain 
belief system, with goals for what society should look like, the ways to realize those 
beliefs can fork into different paths that involve violence or not. Analogously, a socialist 
belief system is often described as branching into a social democratic direction (when 
violence is not endorsed) or communism (when violence is seen as justified).  
Islamism can be defined as a political and religious belief system that aims to 
establish a caliphate and conquer the world. It strives to implement a holistic 
interpretation of Islam in accordance with religious doctrine and Sharia law with or 
without use of violence to achieve its objectives. Islamism, as such, does not necessarily 





In this dissertation I also distinguish between (a) “virtual radicalization”, a 
process by which people may express support and willingness to commit terrorism or 
encourage others to do so (attitudinal transformation and growing behavioral intentions to 
commit terrorism, AIDA, 2004) and (b) actual violent radicalization, a process by which 
people de facto commit violence against fellow individuals (PET, 2009). Since the 
outburst of vioent radicalization is rare In this dissertation I will mainly deal with 
radicalization in the first sense – that is support for terrorism and behavioral intentions to 
commit terrorism. I focus on virtual radicalization because support for terrorism and 
behavioral intentions to commit terrorism are more accessible to scientific inquiry than 
the actual act of terrorism (due to practical and ethical reasons). 
Finally, it is worth noting most of the literature on Islamic terrorism has focused 
on attitudinal outcomes (e.g., Ansari, 2013; Cherney  & Povey, 2013; Cinnirella  et al., 
2013; Fair  & Shepherd, 2006; Levin, Henry, Pratto, & Sidanius, 2003; Tausch, et al., 
2011; Yougov, 2005). In contrast, this dissertation moves beyond the issue of attitudes 
towards terrorism and focuses on those predicting violent as well as non-violent 
behavioral intentions to defend and support Muslims and/or Islam. This is an important 
move forward because behavioral intentions are often better predictors of actual behavior 
than are attitudes (e.g., De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Klandermans et al., 2002; see 
also Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Thus, I empirically distinguish between violent and non-
violent outcomes, and include behavioral intentions for both. It is possible that some 
antecedents are common to both types of intentions, whereas other antecedents are 
unique to one or the other. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that “many of the 
claims regularly deployed to explain terrorism apply to far wider, non-violent populations” 
(Bartlett  & Miller, 2012, p. 16). Therefore, by focusing on both violent and non-violent 
behavioral intentions, this dissertation seek to establish the crucial factors that lead some 
to endorse violent and others to endorse non-violent means of improving the conditions 
of their group. 
To define violent as well as non-violent radicalization I follow the definition 
developed by the Dutch intelligence services (AIVD, 2004), describing it as “the (active) 
pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a 




involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the 
democratic legal order (effect). [….] a person's (growing) willingness to pursue and/or 
support such changes himself (in an undemocratic way or otherwise), or his encouraging 
others to do so” (AIVD, 2004, pp. 13-14). I am using this definition to encompass both 
violent and non-violent radicalizations, which cover both actual behavior, attitudinal 
transformation, but also willingness to encourage others to pursue far-reaching changes in 
society (paper V).  
A related concept to radicalization is the word extremism. In fact, the word 
extremism or extremist violence often appears in the literature of terrorism and 
radicalization, but it is rarely defined (e.g., Silber & Bhatt 2007). In this dissertation I 
follow Mandel’s definition of extremism as a political term, which encompasses actual or 
attitudinal properties such as behavior, belief system, ideas, intentions, attitudes and 
values that are not in accordance with norms of the society and fall far outside of what 
society considers normal. Extremist behavior, ideas, intentions and attitudes can be 
expressed in various ways and may - or may not lead to use of violence to achieve certain 
political goals (Kühle & Lindekilde, 2010). Further, to provide a clear definition of 
violent radicalization in particular I follow the Danish intelligence services’ (PET) 
definition, according to which violent radicalisation is described as “a process, by which 
a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, 
including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective” (PET, 
2009, p. 1).  
 
Islamist “Homegrown” Radicalization  
The perception in the West has always been that threat of Islamist terrorism and 
radicalization came from outside the Western world. The common belief was that the 
threat of terrorism came from Jihadists abroad - individuals with close ties to networks 
such as Al Qaeda and transnational extremist networks, primarily originating from North 
Africa and the Middle East (Precht, 2007). Concepts such as domestic, self-radicalized, 
and self-trained entered recently into the academic terminology and mainstream public 
debate. It was first with the London bombings of 2005 and then with the murder of Dutch 




introduced into scientific circles and public debate: namely “homegrown” radicalization 
(Precht, 2007; Crone & Harrow, 2011). Scholars, policy makers and public alike quickly 
adopted the term “homegrown”. But what does it mean to be homegrown and who can be 
called homegrown? In the following section I will discuss the definitional ambiguities 
related to the concept of homegrown.  
 
The Concept of Homegrown and Definitional Issues  
While few radical groups can fulfill all suggested criteria associated with 
homegrown, several key overlapping themes emerge when researchers and policy-makers 
define the term (e.g., Kirby, 2007; Kohlmann, 2008; Krueger, 2008; Precht, 2007; Silber  
and Bhatt 2007; Vidino, 2007). Two distinct features lie at the core of the term: a) the 
quintessential idea that homegrown groups are composed of individuals born and raised 
in the West: b) and evolved independently with marginal ties to other radical groups. 
Nevertheless scholars differ in what they mean by the West or Western countries. For 
example, Precht (2007) suggests that, a “distinctive factor of homegrown terrorism is that 
it is carried out by persons who have had their formative phase of upbringing and cultural 
influence in the Western world” (Precht, 2007, p. 15). As Crone  & Harrow (2011) note, 
Nesser (2008) proposes a more strict definition, which only includes individuals who are 
born and raised in Europe. Nesser’s definition excludes individuals who are born outside 
and who have had their formative phase of upbringing and cultural influence outside the 
Western world. However, a review of homegrown terrorism in the West demonstrated 
that only a minority of those involved in terrorist plots was born and raised in the West 
(Crone & Harrow, 2011). In reality radical networks and autonomous individuals 
involved in radical activities show a great deal of diversity in terms of their birthplaces 
and upbringings. For example in the Glasvej case in Denmark, one of the alleged radicals 
was a Danish citizen - because he was born in Denmark. He was, however, raised in 
Pakistan. He moved to Denmark when he was 18 years old. According to the above 
criteria, he would not be considered as a homegrown radical.   
Further, the aforementioned criteria are intertwined with the second core feature 
of homegrown radicalization - the autonomy of radical groups. That is, in order to be 




without having any specific identifiable ties to transnational terrorist groups. Some argue 
that the new wave of jihadis that emerged in the aftermath of 9/11 is self-starters who 
have little or no affiliation with other radical networks (Kirby, 2007; Andersen, 2009; 
Vidino, 2009b). Nevertheless, in many cases of Islam-related terrorism, the alleged 
radicals seemed to have had some form of contact with international groups, have 
traveled abroad or attended training camps (Precht, 2007; Crone & Harrow, 2011).  
Several cases of radical activities in the West, which originally were perceived to have 
had been carried out by autonomous individuals with no discernable links to external 
radical organizations were later shown to be linked to foreign radical groups outside 
Europe. For example, the Hofstad5 group was originally seen as a self-recruited and 
autonomous network of individuals who operated without any direct foreign (non-
Western) international support. However, later it emerged that the group had links to 
militants in Europe and North Africa, and three members of the network had attended 
training camps in Pakistan (Nesser, 2005). Hence, the increasing amount of evidence 
illustrates that many individuals who were initially believed to be autonomous 
homegrown radicals in fact had ties with Islamist militants abroad. In sum, the idea that 
homegrown radicals in Europe operate independently without any discernable ties to 
external terror networks is questionable, as the mounting evidence seems to predict the 
opposite. As Kohlman (2008) puts it, “While these young men (and, increasingly, 
women) may have no formal contact with any terrorist organization, they can become 
virtual partners of al Qaeda by carefully studying its online knowledge base and 
executing terrorist attacks against its enemies […] contemporary homegrown terrorist 
networks do not emerge merely as the result of coincidence or happenstance but, rather, 
with the active support and endorsement of particular high-ranking al Qaeda spokesmen 
and military commanders” (p. 98). The mere reliance of homegrown networks on al 
Qaeda’s narrative, and al Qaeda jihad-related guidelines should be seen as an extensive 
connectedness to external radical networks outside the Western world. 
 A third core criterion of homegrown proposes that in order to be considered a 
homegrown one should be radicalized within the Western countries (Krueger 2008; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5Al Qaeda inspired militant Islamist group in the Netherlands composed of Ducth-born, mainly 
second-generation Muslim immigrants of North African origin (Nesser, 2005). 




Vidino, 2009a) and the terrorist plot has to be conceived in the target country and has to 
be planned by the residents of that particular country (Krueger, 2008), Therefore, the first 
attack on the World Trade Center (1993) is considered homegrown as it involved a 
substantial number of U.S residents6. In contrast, the second attack (2001), which was 
planned abroad, is not considered homegrown (Krueger, 2008, pp. 2-3). Here, the focus is 
not on the place of birth and upbringing, but rather where the process of radicalization 
has taken place. It is the geographical component that determines who is a homegrown 
radical.  
 At the other end of the continuum we have those who emphasize to a lesser extent 
that radicalization should emanate from within the Western countries (Bjelopera, 2011; 
Pregulman & Burke, 2012). According to Bjelopera (2011), the term ‘homegrown’ refers 
to those activities, which are committed “within the United States or abroad by American 
citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States” 
(Bjelopera, 2011, p. 6). This suggests a looser definition of homegrown, which can be 
applied to many types of radical groups and radical individuals with a variety of 
characteristics and backgrounds. According to this definition, both David Headly and 
Colleen LaRose would be perceived as homegrown despite the fact that their activities 
were mainly conducted outside the U.S. For example, Colleen LaRose, soon after her 
conversion, established contact with an extremist group and joined a plot to kill Lars 
Vilks, a Swedish cartoonist who was perceived by some radical Muslims to have insulted 
the profit Muhammad (Johnson, 2010). Nevertheless, the definition stands in sharp 
contrast with the idea - suggested by some - that in order to be considered a homegrown 
radical, the attacks must have been planned and carried out in the host societies – that is, 
the threat should come from within the borders of the Western countries (Vidino, 2009b 
& 2007). This implies that the choice of target must be domestic, such as the 
assassination of filmmaker Theo von Gogh and the London bombings of 2005. This also 
implies that the choice of targets should be motivated by domestic grievances as opposed 
to 1980s jihadists who were mainly motivated by the grievances originating from their 
country of origin (Roy, 2004). According to this criterion, Colleen LaRose and David 
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citizens, legal permanent residents or visitors. For example, Ramzi Yousef was born in Kuwait to 




Headly would not be considered homegrown. 
The current review of the literature concerning the term homegrown shows that 
researchers and policy-makers tend to rely on different denominators in defining the 
concept homegrown (Andersen, 2009; Bjelopera, 2011; Kirby, 2007; Kohlman, 2008; 
Mullins, 2011; Nesser, 2008; Precht 2007; Pregulman & Burke , 2012 Vidino, 2009a, 
2009b). The assumption that a homegrown radical must have been born or brought up, 
self-generated and radicalized in the Western world, in fact, has frequently proved to be 
inadequate. Various plots have shown that people have different degrees of belonging to 
the West and different degrees of autonomy in regard to militant networks outside the 
Western world.  
Further, the term homegrown bears a Western-centric connotation with it. 
Homegrown in this sense implies the West and excludes the idea that a Palestinian “lone-
wolf” extremist, who self-radicalized through internet reading about Jihad, while having 
no ties to extremist groups, could be considered a homegrown terrorist. According to 
Merriam Webster dictionary homegrown means, “grown or produced at home or in a 
particular local area”. According to this a self-radicalized Palestinian “lone-wolf” 
extremist with or no ties to extremist groups can be defined as homegrown.  
In sum, the core features of homegrown are contradictory, misleading and lack 
clarity and structure in the connotations of the concept. The various defining properties 
seem to be inadequate to capturing the variety of backgrounds and belongingness many 
radicalized individuals have exhibited. There is a need to broaden the definition – a 
definition that takes the diversity of radical groups into consideration as the jihadist 
networks in the West have proved to be extremely diverse (Crone & Harrow, 2011).  
By now it should be evident that there are some ironic and contradictory features 
of the existing definitions. Nevertheless, I will adopt the term homegrown in the lack of a 
better term. Since this dissertation is a psychological one I define homegrown in a 
broader sense and irrespective of any demographic component. This is because the 
Muslim population in Europe is not a homogenous entity. Muslims come from variety of 
ethnic, religious, educational and societal backgrounds. Further, in general Muslims are 
divided between those who are born and raised in Europe (native-born) and those who 




distinction is important. For example, the degree to which perceived relative deprivation 
predict anti-western violence should differ between native and foreign-born Muslims. 
Based on self-categorization principles (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 
1987) native-born Muslims would feel more deprived since they may see themselves as 
Europeans and part of Europe, while nonetheless having experiences of exclusion and 
group-based inequality and this may have implication for attitudes toward violence 
against the West (paper IV). Therefore, this dissertation adopts a definition of 
homegrown relying on a psychological definition, which emphasizes the sense of 
belongingness irrespective of country of birth, upbringing, citizenship or any discernable 
ties to extremist groups. My definition necessitates a sense of belonging to the host 
country. That is, in order to be perceived homegrown one needs to have ties to the host 
country. Further, homegrown will include persons involved in radical activities within the 
Western boundaries. They may have ties to transnational militant groups and they may 
have been in infamous terrorist camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but the core idea is 
that they have been radicalized in the West prior to their journey to terrorist camps and 
conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq. As Roy puts it, although the London bombers had 
been to Pakistan and trained in training camps, they were radicalized prior to their 
departure. This indicates that their conduct was already part of their indoctrination. Their 
mind was made up within the Western country (Roy, 2008 & 2010). 	  
 
The History of Homegrown Terrorism  
The 2004 bombings of Madrid and the 2005 London bombings appeared to differ 
from previous Islamist related terrorism in Western world. Individuals born and raised in 
the West staged these attacks, and they appeared to be inspired by al-Qaeda’s global 
Jihad ideology, rather than transnational extremist networks. Yet despite the seeming new 
pattern of these attacks the phenomenon of domestic homegrown radicalization is not 
unknown to the Western world. Anarchist groups of the late 19th and early 20th century 
that carried a number of political assassinations and other less discriminate attacks mainly 
orchestrated in Europe can be described as domestic homegrown radicals. These groups 
were responsible for the murder of many state leaders, including the assassinations of 




prime minister of Spain, Antonio Cánovas in 1897, the Empress Elizabeth of Austria in 
1898 and King Humbert of Italy in 1900 (Marone, 2015). While politically different from 
Islamists of today, their anger, discontent, alienation and their tactics to achieve their 
goals bore resemblance to Islamist groups of today.  
However more recent and Islam inspired homegrown networks have long existed 
in the United States. Incidents of homegrown Islamist radicalization have been recorded 
in the U.S. since late ‘70s (Vidino, 2009a). Like the United States, Europe also has a 
relatively recent history of homegrown terrorist activities dating back to the 60s and 70s. 
These earlier terrorist attacks bore similar trademarks to todays’ homegrown Islamist 
radical activities, but they were orchestrated by secular left-wing nationalist and 
separatist groups. Several left-wing nationalist and separatist groups managed to carry a 
series of lethal attacks in Europe mainly for secular ideological reasons. The most 
prominent left-wing groups within Europe included, the West German Red Army Faction 
(RAF), the Italian Red Brigades, the French Action Directe (AD), the Basque Separatist 
Group (ETA) in Spain, the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) and the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA). However, the homegrown radicals of today – sometimes also 
called new terrorism or religious terrorism- differ significantly from the left-wing groups 
of the ‘60s, ‘70s and 80’s in terms of motives, organization, convictions, goals and 
methods (see della Porta, 1995; Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur, 1999).  
Ideologically, many left-wing terrorists, emphasized idealism and they were 
heavily influenced by revolutionary political ideology such as Marxism or Communism. 
They were also anti-imperialistic. The ruling government was, in general, perceived as 
authoritarian, repressive and corrupt. Therefore, their main goal was to destabilize society 
and overthrown the regime in power in order to achieve a classless society (Precht, 2007). 
The path to realize their motives and ideologies was through aggression, force and 
undemocratic means (della Porta, 1995). Whereas the left-wing groups of the ‘60s, ‘70s 
and 80’s were ideologically motivated and sought short-term and immediate political 
influence, the homegrown radicals of today are motivated by religious beliefs and 
imperatives which seek to achieve large-scale and long-lasting social changes. Religious 
terrorism mainly reflects a shift from secular political ideology to religious ideology, 




Despite the differences several parallels exist between the ultra-left and the 
contemporary Islamist radical groups. While left extremists were fighting for a 
communist revolution, religious extremists of today fight the holy war to establish a 
worldwide caliphate. They appear to be motivated by al Qaeda’s narrative - that is, a 
global, indistinct suffering of ummah (Roy, 2008 & 2010), which can be paralleled with 
left-wing extremists’ struggle to create an equal society based on Marxist ideology. For 
example, a deep-seated aversion towards US imperialism and symbolism of globalization 
can be identified as a common denominator for both groups (Roy, 2008). Further, by 
looking at the core feature of Islamist rhetoric we discover the same disparagement and 
critique of the existing social order, Western dominance and materialism that once was 
one of the driving forces behind ultra-left groups of the ‘60s, ‘70s and 80’s (Hemmingsen, 
2006, Hemmingsen in Aagaard, 2009). For example, an analysis of all documented 
suicide attacks between 1980 and 2003 showed that Islamist terrorist attacks were 
primarily set in motion as a consequence of foreign occupation, domination, and 
frustrated aspirations for autonomy (Pape, 2005). Indeed, Sidanius, Henry, Pratto, & 
Levin, 2004 found that Lebanese Muslim students largely attributed the cause of the 9/11 
attacks to American and Israeli oppression. Moreover, attributing the cause of the attacks 
to anti-dominance motives was highly linked with strong support for the violent actions. 
Henry, Sidanius, Levin, and Pratto (2005) observed that Arabs in Lebanon who endorsed 
anti-Western aggression were driven by a motivation to equalize perceived realistic 
power differences between the subordinate (Arab) and dominant (Western) groups.  
Although the so-called new terrorism can be characterized as religious terrorism, 
a closer look at Islamist radicals reveals that they are not in possession of ideological 
manifestos, Islamist literature or intellectual ideological books, but in possession of 
videos of combat and handbooks to make a bomb (Roy, 2008; Hemmingsen, 2006). As 
della Porta notes “even though the language of these groups [suicide bombers] might be 
archaic, their rationale tends to be secular (della Porta, 2013, p. 4). 
Further, homegrown radicals of today are not characterized by a clear chain of 
command and structure with a clearly defined set of economic, social, and political 
objectives.  In contrast to ultra left activists of the ‘60s and ‘70s Islamist homegrown 




structure or chain of command with the exception of ISIS. They tend to operate in small 
groups and in many cases without any help from the militant groups, which have inspired 
them. “They usually remain aloof from communal group” (Roy, 2008, p. 17; Roy, 2007).  
A number of recent terrorist plots in the West have been mainly self-radicalized and 
carried out by so-called lone wolves. There are many examples thereof, such as the 
terrorist attack in Toulouse, France by Mohmamed Merah who killed four men and three 
children; the case of Faisal Shahzad in May 2010 who tried to blow up a car bomb in 
Times Square in New York and Major Nidal Malik Hasan, who shot and killed 13 and 
injured 32 at the military base Fort Hood in Texas in November 2009.   
In sum, the so called new terrorism and left-wing extremism differ in many 
aspects, but perhaps the most important difference is that while political extremism may 
rely on a global proletariat (similar to the Jihadist interpretation of ummah) the quests 
have always been carried out within a state (except for the West German Red Army 
Faction that later became an international organization). This is simply not true for 
Islamist terrorism. Islamist extremists operate as members of social groups belonging to a 
broad community that cuts across national borders, and their quest is not within a state, 
but globally. Many recent terrorist attacks by radicalized Muslim Europeans share two 
main themes. First, the motivation to commit an act of terrorism did not seem to be 
anchored in direct, personally experienced adversity, but is rather explained by intense 
anger and outrage at Western countries’ foreign policy towards other Muslims. Second, 
the terrorists did not act as individuals, but rather as members of a social group belonging 
to a broad community that cuts across national borders. Thus, Western foreign policy and 
military interventions in Islamic countries are seen as general injustices against Muslims 











Proposed explanations of radicalization 
Identifying and understanding the main explanations of Islamist radicalization is 
an important question that has occupied the attentions of academics and the public alike. 
Indeed, interest in this question intensified after the September 11th, 2001. Scholars have 
proposed a variety of factors that can facilitate the emergence of radicalization. In this 
dissertation I will discuss these factors as clustered into three broad research traditions. 
The first research tradition focuses mainly on external factors such as economic, political, 
cultural and religious issues, also called the root cause factors. The second line of 
research was developed around collective action and mainly draws upon social 
psychological models and theories. The third line of research focuses on intra-individual 
causes of radicalization.  
Each line of research focuses on different causal factors that can make a person 
receptive to engage in extremism. However, none of the factors have been adequate in 
themselves to explain the process of radicalization. It is important to note that 
radicalization is a multidimensional phenomenon and its causes can vary individually 
across different context (for overviews, see Bjørgo, 2005; Borum, 2004; Nesser, 2004; 
Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Taylor & Horgan, 2006; Victoroff, 2005). Therefore, a more 
comprehensive model of radicalization is needed that integrates the different line of 
research – a model that provides a framework for how different factors at different level 
of analysis may all shape conditions that push some individuals to radicalize. Below I 
will describe each line of research briefly and propose an integrated model of 
radicalization as a framework with which the different factors of radicalisation from 
various line of research can be analysed. The aim is to identify how factors from the 
different domains relate, and more importantly, complement each other in shaping 
circumstances, which will make radicalization more or less likely to occur. 
 
The Root Cause Model 
  The first line of research focuses on external factors as the main causes of 
extremism and terrorism.  In this case, researchers have suggested that the cause of 
extremism can be traced back to specific material conditions (Khosrokhavar, 2009; 




mobilization is a response to an objective state of disadvantage. The two main academic 
fields that mainly focus on objective factors as root cause of violence are sociology and 
social and political science A review of the literature dealing with the topic of terrorism 
and extremism within this line of research showed that the themes often cited as causal 
factors of radicalization and terrorism could broadly be categorized between social, 
cultural, and political and economic factors. However, it is important to note that some 
overlaps exist and some factors can tap onto more than one category.  
Political and economic factors include Western foreign policy (e.g., Pape , 2005 
& 2006) political instability (Piazza, 2008; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justensen & Klemmensen, 
2006) oppressive governments (Li, 2005) and poor political and socioeconomic 
opportunities (Mullins, 2007; Gurr, 1971; Kahn & Weiner, 2002). Cultural factors 
include religion and religiosity (Gartenstein-Ross & Gorssman, 2009; Hassan, 2001) 
religious fundamentalism (Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009; Harris, 2004; Dawkins, 
2007) civilizational and cultural related incompatibilities and clashes as it is expressed in 
Orientalist notion and “clash of civilization thesis” (Huntington, 1996; Lewis, 1990) and 
moral commitments and communal values (Ginges & Atran, 2009). The final category 
includes social factors such as search for social support (Sageman, 2004) sense of 
obligations and duty to one’s family, community, values and religion (Hafez, 2006) 
globalization and modernization (Roy, 2004) and various demographic factors (Li, 2005; 
Fair & Shepherd, 2006). A common feature of these factors is that they can be 
categorized as societal preconditions or instigators. Preconditions may create an 
environment rendering a person receptive to extremist ideology, but radicalization and 
terrorism cannot solely be explained by preconditions (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). For 
example, many people (e.g., Muslim Europeans with migrant backgrounds) experience 
injustice, alienation and discrimination on a daily basis; however, only a fraction of these 
people get involved in extremist behavior. For example, Krueger & Maleckova (2003) 
and Piazza (2006) found no evidence suggesting that poverty generates terrorism (see 
also, Atran, 2003). This is supported by available research among members of Militant 
groups in the Middle East and Palestinian suicide bombers showing that support for 
violent attacks does not decrease among those with higher living standards and higher 




correlation between higher levels of educational attainment and better economic 
conditions and terrorism.  
Although, objective conditions are certainly important as contributing factors in 
predicting radicalization and terrorism, nevertheless this line of inquiry has been 
criticized from a number of angles (McPhail, 1971; Gurney & Tierney, 1982; Finkel & 
Rule, 1975). The main point of criticism is that objective conditions’ often have low 
predictive power regarding any type of collective action (e.g., Green, Glaser, & Rich, 
1998). Social psychological research demonstrates that disadvantaged individuals often 
unconsciously internalize, justify and even defend the status quo (Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 
2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Therefore, it is possible that they don't recognize and 
perceive the disadvantage they are exposed to, which may explain the poor predictive 
power of objective grievances on violent extremism. Further people endure high levels of 
discrimination before they embark on the path to collective action (Wright, Taylor, 
Moghaddam, 1990). The second point of criticism concerns the fact that subjective 
(psychological) feelings may not necessarily mirror objective conditions, suggesting a 
role for perceived relative deprivation. Nevertheless, this does not imply that 
preconditions such as perceived social injustice, or poverty are irrelevant to radicalization. 
Specifically, these factors may not be sufficient conditions for radicalization in 
themselves, but they may still serve as contributing factors under certain conditions 
(Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006).  
 
The Social Psychological Model of Collective Action 
Following the criticism of root cause models, research on causes of radicalization 
and terrorism has seemed to shift towards social psychological models of collective 
action. The different focus here is analogous to the classic distinction in psychology 
between physical and psychological environments (e.g., Lewin, 1936). Physical 
environment refers to external world outside the organism, and includes social variables, 
whereas psychological environment refers to subjective world, and includes person’s 
psychological perception of the objective world (e.g., Ekehammar, 1974). 	  
According to van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears (2008) the literature on collective 




on different subjective factors, as potential cause of collective action, which include 
perceived injustice, perceived efficacy and identity. The analyses by van Zomeran et al. 
(2008) suggests that social identity directly affects collective action, but that it is also 
indirectly related to this outcome through perceived injustice and efficacy. Both among 
high and low power groups ingroup identity would be a reliable predictor of collective 
action. Several theoretical models in social psychological research suggest that 
identification with highly-valued social groups is a key predictor of engagement in 
collective protest on behalf of those groups (e.g., Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Phalet, Baysu, 
& Verkuyten, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Mummendey, 
Kessler, Klink, and Mielke, 1999; Simon & Sturmer, 2004). Nevertheless, only some 
identities carry the necessary ingredients for collective action (Sturmer & Simon, 2004), 
such as those involving identification with a social movement. For example, identifying 
with a gay movement was shown to be an important predictor of collective action rather 
than the mere identification with the wider social group (gay people) (Simon et al., 1998). 
As van Zomeren et al., (2008) also pointed out in their meta analysis “ultimately, it may 
not necessarily be social identity or identification per se that prepares people for 
collective action, but rather the content of social identity” (van Zomeren et al., 2008, p. 
522). 
 Further, based on the literature linking relative deprivation to collective action 
van Zomeren et al., (2008) proposed that group-based injustice was more likely to be 
related to collective action rather than the feeling of personal deprivation (Smith & Ortiz, 
2002). Furthermore, they emphasized the distinction between cognitive (e.g., awareness 
of injustice, Kawakami & Dion, 1993) and affective components of injustice (e.g., group-
based emotion such as anger, resentment and contempt; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & 
Leach, 2004), and suggested that cognitive appraisals precede emotions where “group-
based emotions such as anger form a conceptual bridge between group based appraisal 
and specific action tendencies” (van Zomeren et al., 2008 p. 506). Based on this 
reasoning they further proposed that the affective component of injustice was a better 
predictor of collective action than the cognitive component, because emotions are the 
intermediate variables that connect cognition with behavior. Furthermore, emotions 




render the effect of identification as irrelevant since identification according to van 
Zomeren et al., (2008) also has a direct effect on the outcome variable.  
Most models of radicalization do not distinguish between affective and cognitive 
components of injustice, and they often neglect to include the affective component. In 
this dissertation we address this shortcomings and extend this work by focusing on both 
components of relative deprivation (paper IV).  
The last pillar in the model is perceived group efficacy. In the formulation of their 
model of collective action, van, Zomeren, et al. (2008) highlighted the importance of 
perceived group efficacy in collective action. They operationalized perceived efficacy as 
a group-based belief that one’s group can resolve group-based problems through unified 
effort. However, more recent research by Tausch et al., (2011) suggests that perceived 
group efficacy beliefs may be less important, or inversely related, to nonnormative 
(including violent) collective action tendencies.  
Although, the social psychological model of collective action has received a lot of 
support (e.g., Phalet, Baysu, & Verkuyten, 2010; Ricolfi, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Stern, 
2003; Tausch et al., 2011; Victoroff, Adelman & Matthews, 2012), it is not without its 
limitations. Similar to root cause model the social psychological models of collective 
action has been criticized for the lack of predictive power, which many have called the 
“specificity problem”: That is why some, but not others, get involved in extremism 
(Horgan, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Taylor, 1998). However, it is important to note that the 
so-called “specificity problem” is not exclusive to social psychological models of 
collective action, but this is true for most any psychological model. From pragmatic point 
of view the best models of human behavior are simply the ones, which explain most 
variance in the dependent variable. As long as there is variance in the independent 
variable that is unrelated to the dependent variable one could make the argument that the 
particular model falls short of explaining why some people get involved in certain 
behavior while others may not. In this sense, it is fruitless to discard the root cause 
models or social psychological models of collective action because any model can suffer 
from “specificity problem”. This also suggests that none of the lines of research into 
terrorism can take precedence over one other with reference to this problem. Instead, a 




analysis to explain most variance in radicalization, terrorism or extremism. Therefore, it 
is important that the current models of collective action extend beyond the effects of 
social psychological variables and include individual level variables such as personality 
traits and external factors to bring us closer in explaining who is more or less likely to get 
pulled into extremism.  
If social psychological models of collective action explain 20-30% of variance in 
extremism (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011), then stable individual difference measures could 
help to fill (some of) the gap. Yet social psychological models of collective action have 
so far neglected the role of stabile individual psychological variables, which are not so 
malleable to sudden social changes. For example, certain social context may provide an 
opportunity for people to be violent such as membership in violent terrorist networks. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that some people who join violent terrorist networks 
might be more violent in general than others (Buss & Perry, 1992). Therefore, the role of 
individual psychological processes may provide us with additional insight into why some 
individuals, but not others become involved in extremist violent.   
 
Individual Psychological Variables  
The third tradition of inquiry into extremism has emphasized individual level 
factors such as mindsets, cognitive dispositions or ideological belief systems as the 
psychological basis of extremism (Borum, 2014). Certain mindsets, cognitive disposition 
or ideological belief system are often adopted by people because they satisfy certain 
psychological needs and motives such as need for closure, order, structure and need for 
avoiding uncertainty and ambiguity. For example, some suggest that extremist ideology 
is often appealing to people with heightened need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & 
Orehek, 2013) and various studies have linked heightened need for closure with attitudes 
such as racism (Roets & Van Hiel, 2006) and stereotyping (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001).  
Work on psychological uncertainty also demonstrates a link between feelings of 
uncertainty and increased conservative attitudes, worldviews and convictions (McGregor, 
Zanna, Holmes & Spencer, 2001). A plethora of research also suggests that individual 
differences in ideological beliefs are associated with attitudes towards terrorism (Doosje  




& Matthews, 2012; Henry, Sidanius, Levn, Pratto, 2005; Hogg & Adelman, 2013; Hogg, 
Meehan & Farquharson, 2010; Pyszczynski et al. 2006; Routledge & Arndt, 2008). A 
study of support for terrorism among Lebanese Muslims and Christians found that low 
degree of social dominance orientation (SDO) in combination with identification with 
less powerful groups strongly predicted support for militant organizations and feelings 
that the September 11 attacks were justified (Levin, Henry, Pratto and Sidanius, 2003, see 
also Henry, Sidanius, Levin & Pratto, 2005).  
Individual personality characteristics and psychological needs and motivations 
may influence the sort of reactions one is likely to exhibit in particular situations. That is, 
many social factors that lead to violence could be analyzed as triggering certain 
psychological responses, and ultimately behaviors, within particular individuals. More 
broadly, it is well established that personality predispositions and psychological motives 
can be sensitive to changes in the social environment (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & 
Sulloway, 2003; Hogg & Blaylock, 2012). For example, people with a low level of 
tolerance for fear and uncertainty might be particularly vulnerable to indoctrination into 
radicalized groups (e.g., Doosje et al., 2013). Still, although this line of work might be 
useful in distinguishing radicals from non-radicals, it is important to recall that these 
variables cannot account for the whole picture of what explains extremism and collective 
action. 
 
Toward a Comprehensive Model of Radicalization  
By now it should be evident that a more parsimonious model of radicalization 
should take many levels of analysis, and a multitude of unique predictors into 
consideration. To fully understand Islam-related radicalization we need to focus not only 
on the individual characteristics, (e.g., personality traits, characteristics, needs and 
motivations), or the situational (e.g., social conditions and settings) or social factors (e.g., 
intergroup relations). Instead, it would be advantageous to consider all of them, rather 
than debating if one is better than the other.  
The current dissertation starts from the premise that radicalization is best 
understood as an interplay between the person, group and environment. Each level of 




for the causes of violent radical behavior. The aim is to identify how factors from the 
different domains relate, and more importantly, complement each other in shaping 
circumstances, which will make radicalization more or less likely to occur. In figure 1 I 
present a conceptual model of radicalization, which encompasses different factors from 
three line of research on terrorism and radicalization, and I will elaborate and illustrate 
how each line of research complement each other.  
First, following a long line of psychological theorizing (e.g., Kruglanski, 1975; 
Miller, Smith & Uleman, 1981; Ross, 1977) I distinguish between external and internal 
explanatory factors. External factors refer to contextual variables affecting the person and 
these include, among others, demographic, political, socioeconomic and cultural 
variables that can be described as preconditions for extremist behavior. At the opposite 
side, the model presents the internal psychological variables and these include stable 
psychological variables such as personality traits. The third part of the model indicated in 
large elliptical mid circle constitutes the social psychological variables and they include 
factors such perceived injustice, social identity, group-based emotions and cognition and 
group processes. The social psychological component is presented between the external 
and internal components of the model because the social psychological variables can be 
divided or categorized into externally social (objective) and psychological (subjective) 
factors. Therefore, the social psychological component of the model incorporates 
variables that are shaped by both external and internal components of the model. The mid 
component of the figure by doted lines illustrates this. 
 Further, social psychological component of the model distinguishes between 
social cognition and social emotions, again following a long line of psychological 
theorizing on this point (see e.g., van Zomeran, et al., 2008). The last part of the model at 
the bottom of the figure presents the various outcome variables, which include attitudes 
























































The overarching ideas of the model are theoretically elaborated in connection to a 
review of the literature, as reflected in paper I of dissertation. A critical point here is that 
scholars of terrorism have traditionally approached terrorism as either involving 
individual or social factors, but rarely as a combination of the two. More specifically, in 
much of the early work on extremism, researchers relied mainly on models of 
psychopathology as explanations (Cooper, 1978; Johnson & Feldmann, 1992; Pearlstein, 
1991; Pearce, 1977; Post, 1987). This tradition has fallen out of favor overall, but since 
the terrorist attacks of September 11th there has been a renewed interest in 
psychopathology as a cause of extremism (e.g., Gottschalk & Gottschalk, 2004; Lankfort, 
2014; Razzaque, 2008; Sprinzak, 2001). In paper II I address this and argue that violent 
radicalization cannot be reduced to only involve mental illnesses or external situational 
factors; it is also necessary to consider the role of non-clinical individual differences. 
Paper II focuses on the right corner of the conceptual model (individual factors) and here 
it is argued that terrorism is more than mental illness and make a case for importance of 
individual differences in making some to be drawn to radicalism.  
As discussed in the introduction social psychological model of collective action 
can be quite useful in explaining radical behavior. In paper III, involving seven 
correlational and experimental studies, I combine different social psychological variables 
to investigate violent attitudes and behavioral intentions to commit terrorism against the 
West among Muslims in Europe and Arabs in the Levant. Here, the focus is on social 
identity and perceived symbolic and realistic group threat, which is illustrated by the mid 
circles of the integrated model. That is social cognition (perceived symbolic and realistic 
threats) mediate the role of social identity (Muslims identification) on attitudes toward 
anti-western violence and behavioral intentions to commit terrorism. In addition we 
demonstrate that while a specific group of people with adherence to specific ideology, 
religion, culture, values and morality, radical behavior is not endemic to certain social 
context. Specifically, we show that the occurrence of extremism is neither exclusive to 
social status such as high nor low power groups. We propose that during times of 
intergroup conflict people from all walks of life regardless of any social, political, 
cultural and religious background come to perceive each other as threats, and as a 




that outgroup hostility among both non-Muslims and Muslims in Europe and Arabs in the 
Levant is driven by perceived intergroup threat, and symbolic threat in particular.  
 In order to explain why some individuals are likely to radicalize, while others not, 
it is nonetheless important to also consider the effect of preconditions in relation to the 
relational make-up of social structure that surrounds individuals prone to radicalization, 
and further how these individuals perceive and respond to their social circumstances. 
Paper IV in this dissertation addresses this issue. Here, we investigate how objective 
factors relate to social psychological ones leading some to endorse behavioral intention to 
commit terrorism. Here, across two studies among Danish Muslims we tested if 
victimization-by-proxy processes motivate behavioral intentions to commit acts of 
terrorism. We used Muslim identification, perceived injustice of Western foreign policies, 
and group-based anger (social psychological variables) to predict violent and non-violent 
behavioral intentions. More importantly, we compared path models of those Muslims 
who did and did not have personal experience of Western-led occupation (objective 
factors).  
Finally, individual personality characteristics and psychological needs and 
motivations may influence the sort of reactions one is likely to exhibit in particular 
situations. That is, many social factors that lead to violence could be analyzed as 
triggering certain psychological responses, and ultimately behaviors, within particular 
individuals. Thus, at the individual level, factors such as personality traits, “normal” 
psychological and individual characteristics are therefore assumed here to be valuable in 
explaining why some people are more or less prone to radicalize. This would be the focus 
of Paper V in this dissertation. The aim of this paper was to examine to what extent non-
clinical personality variables predict violent as well as non-violent behavioral intentions 









Aims and overview of papers 
The general aim of the current dissertation is to investigate the social 
psychological factors behind the motivation of some first, second and third generation of 
Muslim Europeans with migrant background to support and commit terrorism. In 
essence, the dissertation raises the question of why and when some Muslim Europeans 
may want to support and commit terrorism against Europe and how different causal 
factors at different level of analysis can explain this. 
The current dissertation is based on two theoretical and three empirical papers. 
The empirical papers comprise together twelve empirical studies conducted in three 
different contexts and among Muslim Europeans (Denmark and Sweden), Arabs in 
Lebanon and non-Muslim Europeans. As the hypotheses, methods and results for each 
study are described in the following chapters, here I will briefly describe the aim for each 
chapter, which includes various theoretical and empirical papers. 
 Since the attacks on world trade center in 2001 there has been a significant 
increase in academic work Islamist terrorism. Despite this, scholars to enduring degree 
struggle to solve the puzzle of violent radicalization. Even more the field has failed to 
develop adequate theory to explain the phenomena. One of the specific aims of this 
dissertation is to propose an integrated model of radicalization as a framework with 
which the different factors of radicalization from various line of research can be analyzed. 
Paper I reviews the field of psychology of terrorism to identify possible pitfalls that make 
the task of theory building difficult. First, a widespread adaptation of an interactionist 
approach for understanding terrorism is encouraged. Evidence from social psychological 
research is reviewed and presented to make a case for an approach that emphasizes the 
interplay between personal, situational and right societal factors. Further, paper I argues 
that an interactionist approach - besides serving as a framework for research - will 
provide us with avenues to understand how relevant traits and situational factors interact 
causing some to radicalize; help researchers to better understand differences among 
radicals; and to identify why some Muslim youth become radicalized, but not others; or 
why some might participate in terrorism in a certain context, whereas others will refrain 




 The field of psychology of terrorism is divided between personal and situational 
explanation of terrorism. Paper II is a response to Lankford’s book (2012) “The myth of 
Martyrdom: what really drives suicide bomber, rampage shooters, and other self-
destructive killer”. By responding to Lankford we do not only address the long existing 
“either or” rhetoric concerning psychology of terrorism, but also the reemerging 
assumption that mental health is the core explanation of terrorism. Hence, Paper II offers 
a complementary argument and empirically supported theoretical perspective suggesting 
that in understanding terrorism and radicalization we must go beyond the dichotomy of 
person and situation and broaden our focus by including not only intra-individual level 
factors, but also social, ideological, relational and political.  
 The second specific aim of the dissertation was to examine how various causal 
variables from different line of research could complement and relate to each other in 
explaining radicalization and terrorism. Paper III, focuses specifically on social 
psychological variables of collective action in explaining attitudes and behavioral 
intentions to commit terrorism in defense of Muslims. I mainly focused on social 
psychological demission of the integrated model including social (social identity) and 
psychological (social cognition) variables, which included perceived symbolic and 
realistic threats as potential explanation for anti-western violence.  
Paper IV examines how social psychological variables of collective action relate 
to objective factors in explaining behavioral intentions among Danish Muslims to commit 
terrorism against Europe. More important was the question of whether victimization-by-
proxy processes motivate behavioral intentions to commit acts of terrorism by comparing 
Muslims born in Denmark with those who immigrated to Denmark from Muslim 
countries targeted by Western countries foreign policy and military interventions. Here, 
we mainly focus on social psychological demission of the integrated model including 
social (social identity) and psychological (cognitive and affective components, namely 
perceived injustice and group-based anger) variables.  
The final specific aim was to examine whether personality traits predict 
behavioral intentions to commit terrorism among Muslims. Paper V goes beyond the 
situational and mental health models of terrorism and proposes a third and overlooked 




normal in a clinical sense, but not necessarily random individuals. We propose that they 
could have non-pathological personality signatures. In two studies we test whether non-
clinical personality variables predict violent as well as non-violent behavioral intentions 
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Through this paper, we argue that in order to understand violent radicalization 
researchers have to adopt a multifaceted approach, reflecting on the intra-individual level 
variables and social and contextual factors alike. We argue that in addition to 
psychological proclivities, a comprehensive understanding of violent radicalization 
requires the recognition of the interaction between intra-individual, social psychological 
and external/societal factors. We demonstrate this in a three-fold approach. First, we 
examine the literature on the current terrorism research. We will examine the existing 
polarizing dichotomy between person-oriented and situation-oriented approaches and its 
implications for understanding terrorism. In the second part, we argue that intra-
individual psychological variables have tremendous merit in explaining violent 
radicalization. We suggest that personality traits, psychological needs, motivations, 
feelings, wants, thoughts and desires are important in predicting why some people join 
militant organizations, but not others. Finally, we conclude this paper with the 
presentation of some empirical evidence from the literature supporting our argument that 
intra-individual level factors can be useful in explaining a great deal of variance in 
violent radicalization. By recognizing merits from various sides, we will view these 
accounts as complementary rather than contradictive. 
 
Keywords: Terrorism and Radicalization, Person-situation dichotomy, Individual 





Background and Aim  
In the wake of the Paris, Beirut and Sinai attacks many have begun to pose a 
familiar, but yet a complex question. That is, what drives some people to kill their own 
fellow citizens? To disentangle the factors that drive this kind of violence is not simple. 
This task has been proved to be a challenge.  
We see one main reason for why scholars to enduring degree struggle to solve the 
puzzle of violent radicalization and terrorism. Many argue that the controversy 
surrounding the person-situation debate within the field of psychology seems to have 
long been resolved (e.g., Funder, 2006). A plethora of research provides evidence 
demonstrating that both sides of the debate are right (Webster, 2009). Nevertheless the 
dichotomy of person and situation is not fully resolved when it concerns to the 
psychology of terrorism. Indeed, the person-situation dichotomy continues to strongly 
influence the way we understand terrorism and radicalization today. It seems that 
scholars in the field, be it homegrown or suicide terrorism, have often fallen prey to the 
temptation to polarize the field between the personal and situational determinants of 
radical behavior.  
This paper focuses on theoretical approaches in psychology of terrorism. Here, we 
call for the integration of internal (nonpathological factors) and situational factors in 
understanding terrorism, as opposed to an exclusive adherence to either 
psychopathologies or external factors as a source of explanation. 
The objective is threefold. First, the aim is to review the litterateur on terrorism 
and to address the existing dichotomy that continues to polarize the academic field of 
psychology of violent radicalization in person-and situation-oriented approaches. Further, 
to highlight the implications of this dichotomy for understanding violent radicalization. 
Second, we will argue that it is a fallacy to assume that intra-individual psychological 
variables have less merit in explaining violent radicalization. We will propose that non-
pathological psychological factors have a great utility in explaining violent radicalization 
and suggest that in interaction with situational factors our general psychological 
characteristics and proclivities found, and shared among all of us may account for why 
some people from a given social group in a specific context endorse violence, while 




Finally, we will present resent empirical evidence from various disciplines of 
individual psychological literature illustrating that normal psychological variables have 
great potential in explaining violent radicalization, and that a comprehensive 
understanding of violent radicalization requires the recognition of psychological 
proclivities and the dynamic interaction between intra-individual and social 
psychological variables on the one hand, and contextual processes on the other. 
 
Previous and Current Approaches to Study of Terrorism  
Despite many efforts to understand violent radicalization as a multifaceted 
phenomenon (e.g., Crenshaw, 1990a; Crenshaw,1990b; della Porta, 1995; Horgan, 2005; 
Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Taylor & Horgan, 2006; Thomsen, Obaidi, Sheehy-
Skeffington, Kteily & Sidanius, 2014), scholars of terrorism often explain terrorism as 
either an individual or a group and social phenomenon (for an overview see Victoroff, 
2005).  
Earlier psychological approaches to understanding terrorism mainly focused on 
individual explanations, proposing a variety of psychopathological theories (For reviews, 
see Victorof, 2005; Borum, 2003). Indeed, many analysts argued that terrorism was a 
manifestation of psychopathology (e.g. Cooper, 1978; Pearce, 1977; Johnson & 
Feldmann, 1992; Post, 1987; Pearlstein, 1991). Although initially appealing, a model in 
which psychopathology forms the basis of terrorism has since fallen out of favor (see, 
Atran, 2003; Corrado, 1981; Hoffman,1999; Horgan, 2005 & 2003; Kruglanski & 
Fishman, 2006 & 2009; Pape, 2005 & 2003; Post 2005; Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, 
Victoroff & Weine, 2009; Sageman , 2004; Silke 2003 & 2008a; Shaw, 1986). Put this 
differently, some work suggest that terrorists do not have any diagnosable 
psychopathological conditions (see Corrado, 1981; Bond, 2004). However, some suggest 
that this observation may only apply to member of terrorist organizations, also called 
group-based terrorism (Spaaij, 2010). Recent studies of lone-wolf terrorists show that 
odds of mental health prevalence are much higher among this sub-population compared 





 Once it became apparent that the cause of terrorism could not be attributed to 
mental illness, the scientific focus turned to the idea of “normalcy” viewing terrorists as 
‘‘normal’’ people (e.g., Crenshaw, 1981; Ferguson, Burgess, & Hollywood, 2008; 
Horgan, 2005; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006; Zimbardo, 2007). More emphasis was given 
to group-oriented and organizational factors (e.g., Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009; 
Merari, 2002; Pedahzur, 2005; Post, 2005; Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff, 
Weine 2009). For example, Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, and Medin (2011) noted that “in 
sum, a key difference between terrorists and most other people in the world may lie not 
so much in individual pathologies, personality, education, income, or any other 
demographic factor but in small-group dynamics where the relevant trait just happens to 
be jihad” (p. 517). This consensus has prevailed for over four decades, and has shifted 
focus away from individual level factors. As a result, social scientists began to 
overemphasize the role of group and contextual factors as the primary cause of terrorism. 
According to the current approach, violent behavior is the product of social influence, 
primarily caused by external factors, also referred to as “the power of the situation” (Ross 
& Nisbett, 1991, p. 27).  
The widespread emphasize on situational factors resulted that the role of 
individual psychology was downplayed. Many began to agree that individual psychology 
had no merit in explaining terrorism. One clear example of this development is the link 
between personality and terrorism, where influential researchers also adopted 
downplaying person factors and the link between personality and terrorism is rejected all 
together (e.g., Horgan, 2003; McCormick, 2003; Silke, 2003). However, data presumably 
confirming this is indeed limited, both in quantity and quality. Studies often cited as 
evidence of non-existence link between personality and terrorism are characterized by 
highly speculative nature, drawing their conclusion from biographical or circumstantial 
details. For example, most often they either lack data (e.g., Morf , 1970; Heskin, 1980) or 
fail to report the measures (e.g., Lyons  and Harbinson, 1986) and the methods by which 
personality is assessed with (e.g., Rasch, 1979). Nevertheless, it does not refrain scholars 
from referring to these studies to discards the potential role of personality in explaining 
terrorism (e.g., Horgan, 2003). Further, many studies rely on non-standardized, ad hoc 




Gottschalk  & Gottschalk 2004, Merari et al., 2010). Taken all these studies together one 
commonality emerges: Terrorism is manifestation of personality defect, assuming that 
terrorist behavior is the result of pathological dysfunction rooted in certain traits. Here, 
we would like to emphasize two mains points. First, it is important to note that 
psychological variables are more than psychopathology. Therefore, we need to 
distinguish between normal personality traits and psychopathological abnormalities. It is 
our understanding that most researchers do not distinguish between these two and 
personality is often confounded with psychopathology. Second, because of the enduring 
argument that terrorists do not suffer from psychopathology it should not imply that 
personality traits are irrelevant to terrorism. We shouldn’t through the baby out with 
bathwater. Third, no convincing evidence yet exists confirming the common assumption 
that personality traits are not linked to terrorism. As Merari puts it the idea that terrorists 
do not share personality characteristics “rests on the absence of research rather than on 
direct findings [….] such studies have not been published, the only scientifically sound 
conclusion for now is that we do not know whether terrorists share common traits, but we 
cannot be sure that such traits do not exist” (Merari, 2010, p. 253).  
For these reasons, it is premature to exclude non-clinical personality variables as 
potential factors in explaining extremist behavior because certain personality traits may 
increase the likelihood of engaging in extremist violent. In other areas of psychology 
personality variables are included in predicting people’s attitudes and behavior (e.g., 
Ajzen & Fishben, 1980) and it is widely acknowledged that personality and situational 
factors influence people’s behavior and feelings (e.g., Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 
2003; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). Further, the idea that 
personality and situational variables interact to cause behavior is also widely accepted 
(Webster, 2009). Research on personality traits of extraversion, conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, openness to experience and neuroticism (McCrae & Costa, 1987) shows 
that certain traits predict a wide range of psychological phenomena (e.g., Ekehammar, 
Akrami, 2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). For example, a large body of research shows that 
the above traits are associated with political mobilization and normative collective protest 
(e.g., Ha, Kim, & Jo, 2013; Opp & Brandstätter, 2010). Despite this, to our knowledge, at 




normal personality traits (e.g., big five factors mentioned above) and terrorism (see paper 
V). Paper V in this dissertation shows that non-clinical personality traits predict 
behavioral intentions among Muslims to support their group with violence. For example, 
violent behavioral intentions were associated with low emotionality and openness. On the 
other hand non-violent behavioral intentions were predicted by higher degrees of 
altruism/empathy. These results indicate, some personality traits might increase the 
probability that some individuals may engaging in extremist violence and those who 
engage in violence might have discernible personality traits.   
 
The Influence of Situationism on the Field of Psychology 
The dichotomy of person-situation is not exclusive to theories of radicalization. It 
echoes an old controversy in psychology, dividing the field between those who view 
situational factors as the determinant of human behavior and those who attribute human 
behavior to personality traits (Funder, 1997). Since this dichotomy influences the 
research on radicalization and terrorism today, we will give a brief historical overview of 
person-situation debate.  
Walter Mischel was the first to initiate the person-situation debate with the 
publication of Personality Assessment (1968). Mischel argued that personality traits play 
a minor role in predicting behavior. He argued that the differences within individual 
behavior across different contexts and settings are greater than those that exist between 
different people facing similar contexts and situations. The publication of this work led to 
a significant decline in focus on traits in academic circles (for a historical review, see 
Swann & Seyle, 2005), and the situationist perspective has since become the favored 
model in explaining human behavior. Support for Mischel’s critique came from a large 
number of social psychological studies in the years to follow (e.g., Haney, Banks & 
Zimbardo, 1973) demonstrating the tremendous impact that immediate situational 
contexts have on people.  
By the 1960s, the psychology of collective violence was dominated by 
situationism (Berkowitz, 1999). This development influenced how collective violence 
was broadly perceived and the academic approach to collective violence has since been 




& Zimbardo, 1973). The situationist perspective influenced not only how violent 
behavior was understood in general, but also had a great impact on how terrorism is 
understood today. 
The situationist perspective often explains deviant behavior as the product of 
social influence. It implies that people become involved in collective violence because 
their circumstances turn them into evildoers. In his book, Vetlesen (2005, p. 20) citing 
Bauman (1989) captures the core idea of the situationist perspective in accounting for 
deviant behavior: “cruelty correlates with certain patterns of social interaction than it 
does with personality features or other individual idiosyncrasies of the perpetrators”. 
Hence, “cruelty is social in its origin much more than it is characterological”.  
The widespread focus on external factors as the primary determinate of collective 
violence can be traced back to four major studies, which have shaped academic 
perspectives and popular understandings of violent behavior. In the following section, we 
will briefly review each work in a chronological order, focusing on their implications for 
understanding human potential for violence.  
 
The Holocaust Studies, the Banality of Evil and Classical Social Psychological 
Studies  
In the landmark study of the Holocaust, The Destruction of the European Jews, 
the historian Hilberg (1961) argues that the Holocaust was the result of a huge 
bureaucratic machinery involving perpetrators, who “were not different in their moral 
makeup from the rest of the population. The German perpetrator was not a special kind of 
German.” (Hilberg, 1985, p. 1011). Hilberg hypothesizes that the bureaucratic system, a 
systematically implemented program, played a vital role in turning an otherwise average 
and unremarkable group of individuals into cruel evildoers. According to Hilberg’s view, 
the perpetrators were not outcasts, but rather a representative group of people originating 
from the general German population, and as such they reflected its values and morals. 
Hence, according to Hilberg our focus should be on the larger system within which 
ordinary men perform horrific acts. The social conditions are perceived as the driving 
force while individual psychological characteristics are downplayed.  




report on the banality of evil”, in which she described Eichmann as an average man with 
ordinary motives; a man who did not operate out of any ideological conviction. She 
depicted Eichmann as a thoughtless, unimaginative, career-seeking official who blindly 
obeyed orders. In line with Hilberg, Arendt reaches a similar conclusion that 
unremarkable people are capable of remarkably inhuman acts once placed in a context 
conducive of harmful acts. In her account, deviant behavior is the product of social 
circumstances, independent of psychological proclivities.  
 In his experiments, Milgram (1963, 1974) demonstrated that ordinary people 
could be led to harm fellow individuals as long as an authoritative person asked them to 
do so. The main idea behind the experiments was to demonstrate the power of the 
immediate situation. The experiments showed that the immediate situation had 
tremendous influence on people’s feelings, thoughts and behaviors. The role of 
dispositional factors was generally neglected in these experiments. In the words of 
Milgram: “the disposition a person brings to the experiment is probably less important a 
cause of his behavior than most readers assume” (Milgram, 1974, p. 205). Milgram’s 
experiments supported Arendt’s and Hilberg’s thesis that ordinary people are capable of 
committing extremely evil acts when placed in extraordinary circumstances. These 
experiments once again emphasized the external determinants of behavior. Milgram’s 
experiments suggest that violence, according to Vestlsen’s interpretation (2005), is: “an – 
often unintended – by-product of obedience to authority. [Harm-doing] has more to do 
with patterns of social interaction than with the character and motivation of the acting 
individual” (Vestlesen, 2005, p. 5). 
 The fourth study that significantly influenced the field was the Stanford Prison 
Experiment (SPE; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). The simulated experiment showed 
how ordinary young men became susceptible to the power of social conditions once 
placed in a particular environment with particular roles. Stanford Prison Experiment 
reinforced the already established idea that our behavior is best understood as product of 
social influence. Following the Stanford prison experiment, most studies on harmful 
behavior emphasized the power of social context (Berkowitz, 1999). This trend has 
prevailed for over four decades, and as we discuss here, still strongly influences how we 




The Influence of Situationist Perspective in Terrorism Research 
The influence of situationism is equally central in research studying suicide 
terrorism. Social and environmental factors are often emphasized as major determinates 
of terrorist behaviors (see, Atran , 2003; Merari, 2002; Pedahzur, 2005; Pape, 2005; 
Sageman, 2004; Sprinzak, 2000; Taylor & Horgan, 2006). Influenced by the situationist 
perspective, experts for years have attributed the causes of suicide bombings to external 
factors, thus dismissing the role of internal factors and individual differences. As 
Pedahzur puts it, “…most suicide terrorists can be described as ordinary 
people…personality and psychological traits play only a secondary role in the make-up of 
a suicide terrorist.” (Pedahzur, 2005, pp. 123-124). Similarly, Atran (2003) highlights 
situational factors as determinate of suicide attacks: “a legitimate hypothesis is that 
apparently extreme behaviors may be elicited and rendered commonplace by particular 
historical, political, social, and ideological contexts” (Atran, 2003, p. 1536). Equally, 
Merari (2002) sees suicide terrorism primarily as an organizational phenomenon: "The 
key to creating a terrorist suicide is the group process. Terrorist suicide is an 
organizational rather than an individual phenomenon” (Merari, 2002, quoted in 
Kruglanski & Golec, 2005, p. 2).  
These approaches to terrorism are in line with situationism, based on the thesis of 
the banality of evil and the classic social psychological experiments. Many scholars of 
suicide terrorism draw directly upon these, as well as past studies of genocide, the 
Holocaust and other mass killings to provide support for their claims. Scholars rely often 
on Milgram and Arendt’s work when they explain the motivations of suicide terrorists. 
For example, Stern (2003) refers to the thesis of banality of evil, while Atran (2003) 
draws parallels to Milgram’s obedience studies claiming that it is the ‘sense of obligation’ 
in response to authority that drives suicide attacks. Similarly Post (2005) and Post et al., 
(2009) adopt a situationist perspective and draw directly upon Milgram’s thesis of 
obedience and conformity: “As we've come to understand, the terrorists involved in 




charismatic leader, Osama bin Laden said was the right thing to do for the sake of the 
cause was what they would do…” (Voice of America, 20097). 
Nevertheless, the preference for situational explanations is not exclusive to 
suicide terrorism, but is rather equally influential in understanding radicalization and 
terrorism in the West in general. Bandura (2002) argues, for example that: “it requires 
conducive social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce heinous deeds. 
Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can do extraordinarily cruel 
things" (Bandura, 2002, p. 109). Similarly, McCauley proposes that: “we have to face the 
fact that normal people can be terrorists, that we are ourselves capable of terrorist acts 
under some circumstances” (McCauley, 2004). Others argue that situational and 
contextual factors surpass personality traits and individual psychology in their predictive 
power of violent behaviors. For instance, Horgan (2003) claims that: “despite their 
attractiveness (via the simplicity any potential results would imply), personality traits are 
useless as predictors for understanding why people become terrorists” (Horgan, 2003, p. 
114). Furthermore, the most cited and applied models of terrorism and radicalization also 
adopt the situationist perspective by attributing terrorist behavior to external variables. 
The models proposed by the Danish Intelligence Services (PET, 2009), Borum (2003), 
Klausen, Campion, Needle, Nguyen & Libertti (2015), Moghaddam  (2005), Precht  
(2007) and Wiktorowicz (2005) all emphasize situational factors as main factors in 
radicalization. All of these models have a top-down approach, with external factors being 
the primary determinant of terrorist motives. 
In understanding terrorism perhaps we have been so occupied with the idea of 
normality that we have come to overlook the merit of non-clinical individual 
psychological variables. Although the quest for a “terrorist personality” has been doomed 
to be fruitless, according to some, violent radicals may still display certain traits that can 
distinguish them from the general population. We have to bear in mind that individual 
differences and normal personality characteristics may still be relevant in differentiating 
those who commit terrorism from those who do not. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





The Pitfalls of the Situationist Perspective 
We acknowledge that powerful settings and situations can have a strong influence 
on human behavior. Classic social psychological experiments have taught us a lot about 
the origin of deviant behavior (Asch, 1951; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Milgram, 
1963; Sherif, 1935). However, they do not fully explain the psychology of terrorism. 
When psychological variables at the individual level are ignored, terrorism is no longer 
perceived as a multifaceted phenomenon that relies on both social context and intra-
individual level factors. Therefore, the current approach fails to explain why some people 
radicalize while others not, even when they have been exposed to the same social and 
behavioral circumstances. To give but one example the current approach falls short of 
explaining the psychology of homegrown terrorism in the West. Homegrown radicals 
often appear to be self-radicalized, decentralized, loosely organized, operate 
independently and outside of any structure or chain of command (Andersen, 2009; Kirby, 
2007; Vidino, 2009). As Roy puts it: “they usually remain aloof from communal group” 
(Roy, 2008, p. 17; Roy, 2007). In fact self-radicalized individuals have orchestrated many 
terrorist plots in the West. There are innumerable examples of this: Mohmamed Merah 
who killed 11 people in March 2012 in Toulouse, France; Faisal Shahzad who tried to 
blow up a car bomb in New York in May 2010; Muhudiin Mohamed Geele who attacked 
the Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard in his home in Aarhus, Denmark in 2010; Ander 
Breivik who killed 77 teenagers at a youth political camp in Norway; Taimour 
Abdalwahab al-Abdaly who in December 2010 blew up first a car and then himself in 
Stockholm; Lors Dukajev who in September 2010 blew up a letter bomb in a toilet at the 
Hotel Jørgensen in central Copenhagen and injured himself; Major Nidal Malik Hasan, 
who shot and killed 13 and injured 32 at the military base Fort Hood in Texas in 
November 2009; Omar Farouk Abdulmusom, who in December 2009 tried to blow up a 
plane over Detroit with explosives hidden in his underwear; Mir Amal  Kansi who shoot 
and killed two people outside the CIA headquarters in Langely in January 1993. 	  In most 
cases, these individuals did not give up their individuality to the group, clearly suggesting 
that their motivation was influenced by mechanisms other than obedience and strong 
social influence. Further, Ferguson, Burgess & Hollywood (2008) illustrate through 




groups based on rational decision making as opposed to be mindlessly manipulated. A 
similar parallel can be drawn to many perpetrators of the Holocaust. Historical accounts 
of the Holocaust (e.g., Mandel, 1998; Goldhagen, 1996; also Newman & Erber, 2002; 
Haslam  & Reicher, 2006) show that many people engaged in the Holocaust without any 
obvious external pressure. People did not murder Jews because they were forced or 
because they feared punishment if they refused; their decision was based on self-initiation. 
For example, Goldhagen (1996) reported that the perpetrators often acted voluntarily and 
without any pressure from authority figures. Further, in many cases the perpetrators did 
more than what was expected of them. Authority pressure and obedience had little part in 
motivating them. It is important to note that the above examples are not an attempt to 
diminish the power of situational determinates of behavior, but to simply emphasize that 
individual behavior is not entirely dependent on external factors alone. As we shall argue 
in the following individual psychological factors in combination with right social and 
contextual factors are more important determinant of behavior than it has been 
acknowledge by terrorist researchers. 
 
How Important are the Dispositions a Person Brings to the Social Context?  
 The conventional wisdom is that strong settings surpass the influence of 
individual differences (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). However, evidence to support this 
claim is rather ambiguous (see Cooper & Withey, 2009). Further, experimental evidence 
tells a different story. Various studies show that the influence of individual differences 
does not entirely disappear even in strong settings. For example, 35% of subjects in 
Milgram’s experiments did not obey the experimenter (Blass, 1991). Further, individual 
differences in authoritarianism distinguished obedient individuals form non-obedient 
ones. Obedient individuals were significantly more authoritarian than disobedient 
individuals. Similarly, the extent to which people administered the highest level of shocks 
was predicted by feeling of moral responsibility (Staub, 2011). These findings indicate 
that individual differences influence our behavior and that the influence of individual 
differences does not entirely evaporate even under the influence of a powerful 
circumstance.  




and decision to seek out certain context Carnahan and McFarland (2007) revisited the 
Stanford Prison Experiment. They found that, compared to “a psychological study”, 
volunteers for “a psychological study of prison life” scored higher personality related 
measures like authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (SDO) and scored 
significantly lower on dispositional empathy and altruism. Individual differences in 
relational motives such as social dominance orientation and authoritarianism predicted 
people’s likelihood of selectively volunteering for prison study.  
The same degree of self-selection has been observed in study of radical activism 
(eg., Olsen, 2009; Sageman, 2004). Olsen illustrated that radical activist self-recruited 
themselves rather than being manipulated or coerced into the radical movements (Olsen, 
1999). Similarly, della Porta’s work into leftist organization of 60s and 70s shows that 
members of terrorist organization prior to their membership into radical organizations 
possessed a well-established political ideology orientation that resonated with the 
organization they became involved in (della Porta, 1995). Wiktorowicz (2005) in his 
study of Al-Muhajiroun argues that a fit between organization’s values and ideologies 
and individual’s initial interest is a prerequisite for joining a radical network. He argues, 
that recruitment becomes possible when the movement’s schemata resonate with the 
predisposed and already primed individual’s needs.  
 Similarly, Vetlesen (2005) concludes that people are attracted to groups and 
ideologies “on the condition that the ideology in question resonate deeply and 
existentially with psychological dispositions - needs and longings, desires and fears – to 
be found in the individual” (Vetlesen, 2005, p. 50). This is consistent with a number of 
studies demonstrating that individual differences and motives predict the sort of 
situations and environments one chooses to enter. For example, research on SDO shows 
that people who score high in SDO are more selectively drawn to pursue careers in 








The Often-neglected Role of Individual Differences in Terrorism Research 
 In the following we devote our attention to intra-individual level factors by 
highlighting the importance of such variables in known cases of terrorism. Countless case 
studies of radicals document that certain individual psychological traits, regularities, 
attributes and characteristics are overrepresented among radicalized individuals compared 
to the general population. There is reason to believe that certain psychological and 
cognitive factors make some to be drawn toward radicalized networks and certain 
features of social and contextual settings pull them toward such radicalism.   
One recurring theme recorded by various researchers is need for identity and 
belonging (della Porta 1992; Roy, 2008; Crenshaw, 1990b). Crenshaw (1990b) proposes 
that the comfort of belonging to a likeminded group can be an important psychological 
incentive in the process of radicalization. For example, being part of a well-defined group 
has been shown to reduce emotional uncertainty (Hogg, Meehan & Farquharson, 2010). 
Terrorist organization can provide a safe heaven for some marginalized and alienated 
individual. Many radicals may join an extremist organization in search for identity and 
sense of belongingness (e.g., Johnson & Feldman, 1992). Individuals who lack a coherent 
sense of identity may be particularly vulnerable to indoctrination (Post, 1987). Many 
Islamist converts to Islam such as Jamie Paulin-Ramirez8, Michael Finton9 and Zachary 
Chesser10 are assumed to have turned to extremist organizations in quest for identity and 
sense of belongingness (Kleinmann, 2012). For example, the former Islamist Morten 
Storm is an ideal example of someone who experimented with extreme forms of 
identities before embarking on the path to become a Jihadist. Before converting to Islam 
he was a member of the Danish branch of Bandidos where he succeeds in earning the title 
of ”Denmark’s youngest psychopath”. Later he traded his Islamic faith to become an 
undercover agent for Danish Intelligence Services (PET) (Wivel, 2013). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Jamie Paulin-Ramirez, a USA citizen and convert to Islam who was arrested in charged of 
attempt to assassinate a Swedish cartoonist who depicted prophet Muhammad as a dog.  
9Michael Finton also known as Talib Islam, an American convert to Islam who in 2009 attempted 
to bomb the Paul Findley Federal Building in Springfield, Illinois. Later, he was charged with 
attempted murder and attempt to use of a weapon of mass destruction.  
10 Zachary Chesser, an American citizen, an Islamist and a convert to Islam. In 2011 he was 




In addition to identity and need for belonging, scholars have recorded a variety of 
personal rewards and incentives for participating in militant activities (e.g. Atran, 2008; 
Silke, 2008b). One such reward is the belief that martyrs would be reward afterlife. Such 
beliefs have been shown to influence support for suicide attacks (Ginges, Hansen, and 
Norenzayan (2009). Another most cited incentive for participating in militant activities is 
need for adventure and sensation seeking. Stern (2003) found a positive correlation 
between willingness to participate in suicide terrorism and desire to seek out situations 
marked by danger and excitement. In a study of former perpetrators of politically 
motivated organized violence, Olsen (2009) found that the perpetrators described militant 
activities as trilling and entertaining and compared the militant activities to extreme form 
of sports such as bungee-jumping and parachuting. Preoccupation with adventure and 
excitement emerged also as one of the main factors in motivating people to join radical 
Islamist networks in the West (Silber & Bath, 2007; see also Bokhari, Hegghammer, Lia, 
Nesser & Tønnessen, 2006; Roy, 2010). Similarly, Morf (1970) documented how 
members of Front de Liberation de Quebec (FLQ) preferred to live in extremes; they 
loved excitement, were fascinated by spy stories and their decision to become member of 
the militant organization was often coupled with the lure of adventure and trill seeking. 
Morf went on to claim “the six conspirators had lived a real life of adventure, reminiscent 
of that of the high sea pirates of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries as described 
in boys’ books. It seems that the liberation of Quebec had only been a pretext to give free 
rein to those romantic criminal tendencies which may lurk in many people, and to satisfy 
their thirst for adventure and personal independence” (Morf, 1970, p. 37). Further, Morf 
documented that several members of FLQ, prior to their involvement in the FLQ, had 
been attracted and involved in military activities. One had been a former sergeant in the 
French Foreign Legion, served in Canadian armed forces and one was enrolled in the 
Royal Canadian Navy. Furthermore, explicit fascination and attraction to violence and 
military combative lifestyle was a recurring and common theme among members of FLQ 
which led Morf to conclude that violent actions seemed to provide them with feeling of 
enormous empowerment, excitement and liberation (Morf, 1970). A recent example of 
attraction to military activities is the case of Mohammed Merah, who killed four men and 




defense ministry Merah unsuccessfully tried to join the French armed forces and the 
French Foreign Legion before he left for Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
Another pattern of attributes, which is often recorded in the literature and closely 
related to the attraction to combative life style, is prior history of delinquency and an 
overt attraction and socialization into the use of violence (see, Bakker, 2006; Roy, 2008; 
Silber & Bhatt, 2007). In a study of 242 European Jihadist almost one quarter of them 
had a history of criminal offences prior to their arrest (Bakker, 2006). For example, Lors 
Dukajev who tried to detonate a bomb in a hotel in Copenhagen in Denmark had been 
convicted in absentia in Belgium for assault and attempted murder. The former Islamist 
Morten Storm had a career in petty crime at age of 16. As a teenager he had been in and 
out of prisons and had a reputation for terrorizing his hometown (Wivel, 2013). Similarly, 
the mastermind of 2004 Madrid bombing Jamal Ahmidan, and his accomplices all had 
been previously involved in delinquency. Also, Jose Padilla, Richard Reid, Khalid 
Abdul-Latif, Antonio Martinez, Mohamed Mamdouh, and the plotters of the Bronx 
Synagogues all had a lengthy criminal records and had been in and out of prison before 
being radicalized. More recently, several of Paris attackers of November 2015 had a story 
of delinquency and were known by the police for pity crimes.  
The final recurring theme is involvement and previous history of activism in 
various social movements and organizations or what some call “wandreres”. For example, 
Charles Gagnon, member of FLQ, belonged to various leftist parties in Quebec. Omar 
Bakri Mohammed, the founder and worldwide leader of al-Muhajiron had a long history 
of activism in the Middle East before he launched al-Muhajiroun. Many radicals of 60s 
and 70s also had previous history of involvement in various social movements 
organizations (della Porta, 1995). Similar examples of “wandreres” have been also 
recorded in Danish Galsvej case of terrorism. One of the convicted individuals has 
described to be on a shopping spree among different environment in the hope of gaining 
militant belongingness.  
 In sum, by identifying how recurring certain themes, and patterns could be related 
to personality traits and how they relate and interact with background conditions social 
and contextual variables could be of valuable knowledge in research in terrorism. This 




the way for future research. It is important to note that we do not claim that certain 
recurring themes and psychological propensities can be seen in all cases of terrorism, but 
rather it is an attempt to show that intra-individual variables are important and should be 
given more attention in research in terrorism.  
So far we have argued for the importance of individual difference in making some 
people susceptible to be drawn towards radical groups. In the following we will present 
recent empirical studies that lend support to previous sections main claims.  
 
Empirical Evidence in Support of Individual Differences in Terrorism Research 
The idea that general individual differences in psychological traits, needs, 
motivations, feelings, and thoughts predict people’s attitudes towards different social and 
political issues has long been recognized  (see, e.g., Carney, Jost, & Gosling, 2006; Jost 
et al., 2003a, 2003b). For instance, individual differences in emotional uncertainty predict 
people’s attitudes toward a variety of social and political issues (Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, 
Gosling, Palfai & Ostafin, 2007). A plethora of research suggests that individual 
differences in personality, affective, and cognitive style are associated not only with 
social and political orientations (e.g., see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 
2003b) but also predicts attitudes towards extremism (Doosje & van den Bos, 2013; 
Henry, Sidanius, Levn, Pratto, 2005; Hogg & Adelman, 2013; Hogg, Meehan & 
Farquharson, 2010; Levin, Henry, Pratto, Sidanius, 2003; Pyszczynski et al. 2006; 
Victoroff , Adelman & Matthews, 2012).  
Recent research supports the role of normal psychological variables in explaining 
individuals’ degree of attraction to radical orientation. For instance, Doosje and 
colleagues (2013) showed that emotional uncertainty, in combination with experienced 
group deprivation and perceived group threat, was the key determinant of radicalization 
of Muslim youth in the Netherlands. Similarly, strong national identification coupled 
with high context relevant uncertainty emerged as a strong predictor of support for 
intergroup violence in the context of Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Hogg & Adelman, 2013). 
Individual difference in SDO among Lebanese Muslims and Christians in combination 
with identification with less powerful groups strongly predicted support for militant 




Pratto, & Sidanius, 2003). In a similar vein, Henry, Sidanius, Levin & Pratto (2005), 
focused on the dynamic of intergroup conflict and illustrated that the dynamics of the 
intergroup conflict and the status of the perpetrators was important for the relationship 
between SDO and support for violence. Despite the typical feature of SDO such that high 
degree of SDO predicts violence towards outgroup the results showed that this relation 
was reversed for the less advantaged group. That is, those who were low in SDO were 
more supportive of violence toward the West.  
Moreover, scholars have proposed that feelings of guilt, sham, anger, humiliation 
and revenge are potent causes of terrorism (Stern, 2003; Ricolfi, 2005; Khosrokhavar, 
2005; Atran, 2003; however, empirical research investigating role of emotions and 
terrorism is scarce, but see, Tausch et al., 2011; paper IV). Tausch and colleagues found 
that intergroup emotions in response to perceived injustice contributed to the motivation 
of people to support both normative and non-normative action against the outgroup. The 
study demonstrated that feelings of contempt evoked by the British foreign policy 
towards Muslim countries mediated support for violence against both military and 
civilian targets in the West (Tausch et al., 2011). Similarly, paper IV of this dissertation 
shows that anger is a potent predictor of violent behavioral intentions among Danish 
Muslims.  
In sum intra-individual level variables can have a tremendous merit in research on 
radicalization. As research shows both sides have merits that can complement each other 
bringing us a step close to understand terrorism. Meta-analytic evidence suggests that the 
predictability of intra-individual level variables is no lower than social psychology 
varibales (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg (2007). Therefore, it is fruitless to 
pitch these accounts against each other. A more parsimonious approach would be 
integrate them and draw upon on various components of both person and situation.  
One of such concepts that recognizes the importance of both person and situation 
in predicting behavior is the concept of affordance - central in Gibsonian ecological 
psychology. An affordance is a relation between an individual’s abilities and aspects of 
situations that enable those abilities (Chemero, 2003). In other words affordances are 
determined by the fit between properties of the environment and properties of our own 




particular context or environment are dependent on the affordances available for us in 
that particular context. For example, as noted before it appears that people selectively 
engage in their surroundings and selectively seek out certain experiences and certain 
behavioral settings. Which setting people choose to enter is based in part on the 
psychological possibilities that the setting offers to them. In case of Abu Ghraib affair it 
is likely that certain characteristics distinctive of Abu Ghraib prison made that social 
context as a particular location where certain activities could be carried out. American 
guards voluntarily placed themselves in that context based on the kinds of functional 
opportunities or affordances the prison setting extended to them. In other words there was 
a fit between properties of the prison settings and properties of soldiers 
capabilities/proclivities leading to mistreatment of the prisoners.  
The importance and usefulness of affordances in predicting human behavior has 
long been recognized in other areas of psychology (e.g., Jayawickreme & Chemero, 
2008; Jayawickreme & De Stefano, 2012; Chemero, 2003). Indeed, the concept of 
affordance could also be useful in studying terrorism (Taylor & Currie, 2012) – it 
recognizes not only the importance of individual characteristics and traits in predicting 
behavior, but also that such characteristics and traits are elicited in appropriate 
opportunities. Further, because affordances are in part determined by abilities, in a 
particular context different people will perceive different affordances (Jayawickreme & 
Chemero, 2008), clearly recognizing the power of individual difference in determining 
behavior.  
Moreover, future research can concentrate on ISIS’s propaganda campaigns and 
the specific content of such propaganda and the personality of those who are particularly 
susceptible or get drawn to such messages. It is likely that certain people are more 
susceptible to certain messages then others. A vast number of studies show how certain 
individuals are drawn to different settings (Carnahan & McFarland, 2007) and how 
people either excel or fail to excel in settings that are conflicting with their traits (Holland, 
1996). By focusing on personality-based self-selection we might be able to identify traits 







 In this paper we aimed to drawn attention to the often-neglected role of intr-
individual level variables in predicting terrorism. We argued that individual differences in 
combination with social and structural factors might increase an individual’s 
susceptibility to become involved in extremist activities. The reviewed literature suggests 
that individual psychological differences, motives, needs and feelings in combination 
with social and environmental factors may motivate some people to embrace radical 
beliefs and ideology. Further, it suggests that certain psychological characteristics can 
predispose some individuals to seek out certain context that fulfills certain needs. For 
example, propensity for violence and deviant behavior may result in preference for 
settings or environment that offer possibility for such predispositions to be thrived. 
Everything else being equal certain psychological characteristics may prone people to get 
involved in settings compatible with their psychological makeups. Therefore, individual 
psychological variables can be of valuable source of knowledge in solving the puzzle of 
terrorism. 
In sum, it is time to leave the person and situation dichotomy in psychology of 
violent radicalization behind and adopt an integrated model where intra-individual, social 
psychological and external/societal factors are considered in understanding violent 
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Individual Differences in Relational Motives 
Interact with the Political Context to Produce 




The psychology of suicide terrorism involves more than simply the psychology of 
suicide. Individual differences in social dominance orientation (SDO) interact with the 
socio-structural, political context to produce support for group-based dominance among 
members of both dominant and subordinate groups. This may help explain why, in one 
specific context, some people commit and endorse terrorism, whereas others do not. 
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Background and Aim 
We agree with Lankford (2013) that one cannot understand suicide terrorism 
without considering individual factors as well as contextual ones, and must distinguish 
perpetrator from audience effects. Nevertheless, although being willing to kill oneself 
is a necessary condition for executing suicide bombings, this need not imply that what 
really drives suicide bombers, rampage shooters, and other self-destructive killers is 
simply suicidality proper, conveniently disguised as political terrorism in cultural and 
religious contexts that ban individual suicide. Firstly, in the case studies he uses to make 
the latter point, Lankford not only seeks to estimate reliable predictors of suicide – such 
as prior suicide attempts, expressed death wishes, and debilitating depression – but also 
includes many “soft” risk factors such as the deaths of parents or siblings in childhood, 
unemployment, divorce because of infertility, and even disciplinary problems in 
school. Without knowing the base rates of both kinds of factors among the general 
population, it is impossible to evaluate the degree to which they lead people to commit 
suicide, let alone suicide terrorism, particularly when considered in the often wartorn, 
occupied settings from which Lankford draws many cases. Just as a suicidal mental 
condition is insufficient to drive suicide terrorism, so it may likely be unnecessary.   
The case of Anders Behring Breivik – who shot 77 teenagers at a political youth 
camp after seeking to blow up the Norwegian governmental building – demonstrates the 
uncertainty of clinical judgments based on interpretations of written or limited data 
records. Although Lankford concludes that Breivik was clearly suicidal because his 
writings named the plight of conservative “brothers and sisters” being pushed toward 
suicide, and because he anticipated dying during his terror mission, a final forensic-
psychiatric assessment (following extensive clinical interviews and 24 hour observations) 
not only concluded that Breivik was not psychotic, but found absolutely no evidence that 
he was suicidal (NTB, Norwegian News Agency, 2012). Breivik expressed fear of getting 
killed by the police on being taken captive. What clearly is necessary for committing any 
such acts of terrorism is the willingness to kill civilian others. We agree that this 
homicidal intent is likely fueled by rage and that cultural and ideological endorsement 
facilitates suicide terrorism. But both respond to the political reality in which a 




Lebanon ebbed and flowed with the absence and presence of the Israeli occupation 
(whereas suicidal intent presumably remained fairly stable).  
Dismissing this as simply being the result of increased access to weapons and 
enemy targets ignores the role of the political context in fueling rage towards an enemy 
group: relationally motivated moral outrage (Rai & Fiske, 2011) that they are 
subordinating, humiliating, discriminating against, victimizing, persecuting, and killing 
us, or threatening to do so, culminating in the intended killing of perceived enemy 
civilians. Such political context effects may play a role even in cases of remote 
identification with group members suffering at times of conflict or oppression (Sheehy-
Skeffington, 2009). For example, we recently found that support for a variety of 
terrorism-related statements among Muslim citizens living in Denmark, ranging from 
general understanding of terrorism to personal willingness to use violence to defend 
Islam, was predicted by perceptions of general Muslim suffering and was mediated by the 
anger this suffering evoked (Obaidi et al., in preparation). These victimization-by‐ proxy 
effects were even stronger among Danish-born than among foreign-born Muslims 
Sidanius et al., 2013), and held even when controlling for the effects of personal 
experiences of discrimination – a structural factor indicated in radicalization among 
British Muslims (Travis, 2008).  
In understanding how individual factors play into these processes, such that some 
people in a specific context endorse or commit acts of terrorism while others in the same 
context do not, we must go beyond the biographical and psychopathological to the 
relational and ideological/political. The degrees to which people like, want, and seek 
relationships that are communal, hierarchical, or egalitarian 
underpin many psychological phenomena (Thomsen, 2010). One particularly potent 
dimension of relational motives is social dominance orientation (SDO): the motivation to 
create and maintain between-group dominance hierarchies (Pratto et al., 1994; 2006). 
Individuals high in SDO support hierarchical intergroup structures, in which some groups 
dominate others, whereas individuals low in SDO favor intergroup equality. These 
motives, and the cultural context that embeds them, influence both the societal 
endorsement of suicide terrorism, and the attitudes of those willing to commit it 




support for terrorism against the West among Lebanese and Syrians, our work has 
demonstrated that counter-dominance is an important ideological motivation 
undergirding support for terrorism against dominant groups (Henry et al., 2005; Levin et 
al., 2003; Pratto et al., 2014). Conversely, among members of dominant majority groups 
in the West, the desire for group-based dominance increases support for violence, wars of 
conquests, and terrorist acts in retaliation against a threatening group or country (Ho et al., 
2012; Thomsen et al., 2008). Further supporting the crucial interaction of individual 
relational motives and the structural context, the effect of group identification on terror 
support among subordinate groups (e.g., of Arab identification among Lebanese) is 
particularly strong among those who are low in SDO, whereas identification with 
dominant groups (e.g., national identification among Americans) particularly increases 
support for violence among those high in SDO (Kteily et al., in preparation; Levin et al., 
2003; Thomsen et al., in preparation). Again, Breivik’s self described radical 
identification with a Christian in-group and desire to preserve its dominance would fit 
this picture.  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, we concur that it is crucial to consider both the person and the situation in 
understanding suicide terrorism. Research and theory in the social dominance tradition 
explicates how individual differences in relational motives interact dynamically with the 
socio-structural context in shaping people’s attitudes towards actions of group-based 
violence. Just as social psychology involves more than the situation, and individual 
differences are more than the psychopathological, so the psychology of suicide terrorism 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Papers 
Paper III 
Threat Perceptions: 




In a series of seven experimental and correlational studies, we demonstrate a common 
psychology of outgroup hostility among non-Muslims Westerners, Muslims in Europe 
and Arabs in the Levant that is driven by perceived intergroup threat. Across the studies, 
perceived symbolic threat predicted Islamophobic attitudes and behavioral intentions to 
engage in anti-Islam movements among native, non-Muslim Europeans, while both 
symbolic and realistic threats predicted support of, and behavioral intentions to engage in, 
anti-Western terrorism among Muslims and Arabs. Perceived cultural incompatibility 
between Islam and Arab culture and the West emerged as the stronger predictor of 
outgroup hostility in all examined populations. Importantly, these symbolic threat 
perceptions seemed to propel political and cultural conflicts into negative feedback loops, 
exacerbating intergroup hostility. Specifically, our results demonstrated that one group’s 
negative perceptions led to hostile attitudes in another, leading to a vicious circle of 
intergroup hostility. Implications for intergroup research and prejudice reduction are 
discussed. 
 
Keywords: Terrorism, Islamophobia, Threat Perception, Vicious Circle of Hostility, 
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Background and Aim  
Intergroup relations between Muslim and non-Muslim populations have become 
increasingly hostile over the last two decades. For example, since the dramatic attacks of 
9/11, Western non-Muslim majority countries have been the target of several deadly 
attacks, including the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London train and bus bombings, the 
November 2015 Paris massacre and the December 2015 killings in San Bernardino, 
California, to name just a few. For their own part, Western powers have also engaged in 
large-scale violence, typically involving drone strikes and assassinations, cumulatively 
resulting in the slaughter of many hundreds of innocent men, women and children whose 
fate is generally relegated to the status of “collateral damage”. Western terrorists and 
vigilantes have also contributed to this violence: across Sweden, Norway and Germany, 
there have been some 580 acts of arson and murder directed against individual refugees, 
refugee accommodations, and even against housing used to house unaccompanied 
refugee children (Der Spiegel, 2015). Thus, existing evidence indicates that vicious 
cycles of reciprocal violence between Muslims and non-Muslims seems to be occurring 
with ever-greater frequency (Kteily, Hodson, & Bruneau, in press).  
How do these events of terrorism and reprisal impact intergroup relations between 
non-Muslims and Muslims? There is good reason to believe that hostile intergroup 
perceptions and actions serve only to confirm and reinforce each groups’ views of its 
counterpart, and its willingness to engage in violence (Kteily et al., in press). For example, 
in the year following the attacks of September 11th, the number of hate crimes against 
American Muslims increased by 1,700 percent (Anderson, 2002). Similar developments 
have been observed in many European societies (see Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 
2015). This may have radicalized some young Western Muslims (Abbas, 2012), which in 
turn should make them more threatening to Westerners (see also Kunst, Sadeghi, Tahir, 
Sam, & Thomsen, in press). Nevertheless, although examining the macro-level trends 
suggest that reciprocal retributive perceptions may be contributing to ongoing violence, 
these potential negative feedback loops remain largely unexplored at the psychological 
level.  
Here, we aim to demonstrate a common psychology of outgroup hostility among 




similarly driven among both groups by perceived realistic, and, especially, symbolic 
threats to the ingroup (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; 
Stephan and Stephan; 2000; Stephan, Ybarra, Morrison, 2009; Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 
2006). More specifically, we test whether such threat perceptions can explain support for 
anti-western violence and behavioral intentions to commit acts of violence among 
Muslim residents of Europe and Arabs in the Middle East on the one hand, as well as 
support for Islamophobic hostility among native, non-Muslim Europeans on the other. 
Importantly, we propose and test whether these threat perceptions within both groups are 
mutually reinforcing each other, forming a vicious circle of intergroup hostility. Below, 
we develop our prediction that these cycles of intergroup hostility will be driven by both 
realistic and symbolic threats, with the latter taking on particular prominence. 
 
Symbolic Threats as Predictors of hostile Attitudes and Violence towards the 
outgroup 
Symbolic threats are threats to a group’s religion, values, norms, morals, 
philosophy or identity. A broad range of theoretical perspectives highlights the 
importance of symbolic resources, and the hostility that individuals harbor towards those 
who reject or threaten the ingroup’s values. For one, individuals across social groups 
make negative attributions towards groups whose values and worldview are incompatible 
with their own (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014), and react 
strongly to acts that threaten their moral convictions (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; 
Tetlock, 2003; see also Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013). Similarly, research on image 
theory (e.g., Alexander,  Levin, & Henry, 2005) suggests that an important source of 
contempt towards outgroups is the sense that they are culturally inferior, and integrated 
threat theory proposes that when people perceive certain social groups as symbolically 
threating, they express more prejudice and hostility towards them (see Riek et al., 2006 
for a review). Several previous studies empirically confirm the link between perceived 
symbolic threats and negative attitudes toward foreigners (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 
1993; Esses, Hodson, & Dovidio, 2003). For example, symbolic threat has been 
associated with self-reported willingness to expel immigrants across 17 countries 




important source of support for outgroup violence (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; see 
also Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 1990). 
Accordingly, symbolic threat perceptions likely also mobilize Westerners’ 
opposition to Islam and Muslims in powerful ways. In the West, Islamic culture is often 
framed as a symbolic threat (Saeed, 2007), a societal perception highly salient to 
Muslims (Kunst, Sam & Ulleberg, 2013; Kunst, Tajamal, Sam, & Ulleberg, 2012). For 
instance, several leading European politicians have openly expressed concerns about the 
number of Muslim refugees entering Europe, arguing that they pose a threat to European 
Christian identity, values and norms. Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orban, put it this 
way: “Those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically 
different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims (…) This is an important 
question, because Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity” (Mackey, 
2015). Consistent with this, symbolic threats and perceived value incompatibility 
between Muslims and native Westerners predicted greater levels of prejudice towards 
Muslims in previous research (González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008; Pedersen 
& Hartley, 2012). Against this background of research, we expect symbolic threat to be a 
predictor of outgroup hostility towards Muslims among non-Muslim majority populations 
(Hypothesis 1).  
The outgroup hostility of Muslims in Europe towards non-Muslims should 
similarly be grounded in symbolic threats from perceived value incompatibility, public 
criticism of Islamic culture, and from perceiving pressure to reject their culture of origin 
and assimilate into European societies (Kunst et al., 2015, Kunst & Sam, 2013). Although 
the link between symbolic threat and support for violence among Muslims remains 
relatively understudied, there is some suggestive evidence that supports this prediction. 
For example, various Gallup polls in Muslim countries suggest that the notion of a 
fundamental clash between civilizations has widespread support among many Muslims, 
who see Western principles and values as threatening, inferior and fundamentally 
different from their own (Gallup Poll, 2002a; Gallup Poll, 2002b). Documenting a link 
between symbolic threat and violence, Bueno de Mesquita (2007) found that public 
support for terrorism in 14 Muslim countries was positively associated with the belief 




the context of homegrown terrorism in Europe, Doosje and colleagues showed that 
perceived symbolic threat reliably predicted violent intentions among young Dutch 
Muslims (Doosje, Loseman & Van den Bos, 2013; see also van Bergen, Feddes, Doosje 
& Pels, 2015). Thus, to the extent that both ethnic Arabs and Muslims perceive their 
cultural practices and values to be threatened by, superior to, or incompatible with those 
of the West, they may also be more supportive of violence targeting Western societies 
(Hypothesis 2). 
 
Realistic Threats as Predictors of hostile Attitudes and Violence towards the 
outgroup 
Realistic threat is a second category of threat that has predicted outgroup 
negativity in previous research. In contrast to symbolic threats, realistic threats target a 
group’s political, economic and military power, general physical well-being and welfare. 
Realistic threats typically arise from the perception of competition over scarce resources 
such as jobs, land, and political and economic power, but also from threats to the general 
well-being and welfare of a group (e.g., Ashmore & Del Boca, 1976; Bovasso, 1993; 
Bobo, 1983; Quillian, 1995). The role of realistic threats in predicting outgroup hostility 
is well established (Bizman & Yinon, 2001; Stephan et al., 1999). For examples, realistic 
threat has been shown to predict attitudes towards racial out-groups in both African 
American and White samples (Stephan et al., 2002), and negativity towards Asian 
Americans (Maddux, Galinsky, Cuddy, & Polifroni, 2008). Indeed, a meta-analysis by 
Riek et al. (2006) found an average effect size of r = .42 between realistic threats and 
negative outgroup attitudes. Hence, on first sight, one may assume that anti-Muslim 
resentment may also be driven by the concern that Muslim immigration constitutes a 
realistic threat to native Europeans. Yet, while we agree that realistic threat is a potent 
predictor of negativity towards immigrants in general, we do not believe that it underlines 
hostility towards Muslims in particular, given that public discourse mostly frames 
relations between Islam and the West in symbolic terms.   
Among Muslims and Arabs, however, we predict that realistic threat will predict attitudes 
and behavioral intentions of anti-Western violence (Hypothesis 3). From this minority 




a result of perceived cultural incompatibility or symbolic threat, but also as an act of 
counter-dominance behavior based on a rejection of the concrete physical costs imposed 
by the outgroup on the ingroup, such as loss of economic and political opportunities or 
even loss of life (Khosrokhavar, 2009). Consistent with this view, Pape (2005) analyzed 
all documented suicide attacks between 1980 and 2003 and concluded that they were 
primarily a consequence of foreign occupation, domination, and frustrated aspirations for 
autonomy (see also Obaidi, Bergh, Sidanius & Thomsen, 2016) – factors we would term 
counter-dominance motives (Thomsen, Obaidi, Sheehy-Skeffington, Kteily, & Sidanius, 
2014). Similarly, a large-scale study by Mostafa and Al-Hamdi (2007) found strong 
support for a counter-dominance perspective in eight Arab countries: in their work, 
negative attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy were predicted by realistic threats such as 
perceptions of American imperialism, military presence in Iraq, and material support of 
Israel. Moreover, Sidanius et al. (2015) found that support for ‘resistance’ violence and 
groups such as Hezbollah was driven by a drive for counter-dominance among Lebanese 
Muslims and Christians (see also Levin, Kteily, Sidanius, Pratto, & Matthews, in press; 
Levin et al., 2012; Sidanius et al., 2004).  
Overview of Studies 
Across seven studies, we test our general prediction that threat perceptions among 
Westerners/non-Muslims and Arabs/Muslims contribute— in similar ways— to a 
mutually-reinforcing deterioration of relations between these groups. Importantly, we 
examine not only how realistic and symbolic threats may explain negative intergroup 
affect, but also support for highly consequential real-world phenomena such as support 
for violence and behavioral intentions to engage in hostile collective movement or even 
to commit violence. By examining these questions among both advantaged and 
disadvantaged group members, and by using both experimental and correlational 
approaches, our work makes important contributions to a literature that has largely 
employed only correlational methods, and tended to take a one-sided focus on 
advantaged group members. Across all seven studies, we predict that symbolic and 
realistic threats will contribute to out-group hostility. For reasons outlined above, we 
expect symbolic threat to predict hostility among non-Muslim Westerners, while 




and Arabs. Finally, from an exploratory perspective, we were interested in comparing the 




 Due to increasing rates of immigration, minority groups in many countries, 
including Norway and the US, are projected to become the numerical majority groups 
(either nation-wide or in certain geographical areas; Thorenfeld & Meland, 2009; US 
Census, 2008). Members of the current majority groups often perceive such demographic 
shifts as threatening, leading to greater support for conservative ideologies (Craig & 
Richeson, 2014). In Europe, “Eurabia” has become a term often used by individuals 
spreading such dystopian scenarios in terms of Muslim immigration. As Carr (2006) puts 
it, “in the nightmare world of Eurabia, the future will become the past once again and 
Christians and Jews will become oppressed minorities in a sea of Islam” (p. 4). 
In Study 1, we tested the specific prediction that a threat to one’s numerical 
majority status would increase Islamophobic hostility among native Norwegians. Given 
that Muslim immigration is mostly presented as symbolic threat in Western public 
discourse (see Kunst, Tajamal, Sam, & Ulleberg, 2012 for a review) and in line with 
earlier research (González, et al., 2008), we expected especially symbolic threat to 




A total of 96 native Norwegians (Mage = 28.6 years, SDage = 6.5; 79.2% male) 
were recruited through postings on online social networks (e.g., Facebook groups 
unrelated to the topic) for a study on “social issues”.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to either an experimental condition 
highlighting the demographic increase of immigrants or a control condition. In the 




major Norwegian TV channel. In the video, new, statistical reports were cited suggesting 
that ethnic Norwegians may become a minority in Norway within 50 years (and within 20 
years in Oslo) due to immigration. Adult immigrants and children from predominantly 
Muslim countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan were shown while these statistics 
were presented. The video further stated that ethnic Norwegian children are already a 
minority in many schools and kindergartens in Oslo. In the control condition, participants 
watched an unrelated video from the same TV station that was matched in length and 
dealt with the importance of using glasses while driving. After watching the video, 
participants first completed the symbolic and realistic threat measures in randomized 
order and subsequently completed a measure of Islamophobia and other measures 
unrelated to this study. 
 
Measures and Materials 
 Symbolic threat. Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they felt 
that different aspects of the Norwegian culture are threatened by immigration. These 
aspects were Norwegian (1) cultural habits, (2) values and norms, (3) cultural traditions 
and (4) culture in general.  Responses were rated on 5-point scales ranging from 1 (not at 
all threatened) to 5 (threatened to a high degree) and the four-item scale was reliable (α 
= .97). 
Realistic threat. Using the same scale, four items assessed realistic threat (α = .94). 
Here, participants rated the degree to which they felt that the Norwegian (1) labor market, 
(2) welfare system, (3) economic wealth of Norwegian citizens and (4) the Norwegian 
economy in general were threatened by immigration. 
Islamophobia. The 8-item behavioral-affective subscale of the islamophobia scale 
(Lee, Gibbons, Thompson, & Timani, 2009) was used to measure participants’ negativity 
toward Muslims (α = .94). Specifically, on 10-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (totally 
disagree) to 10 (totally agree), participants were asked to indicate their agreement with 
statements such as “I would support any policy that would stop the building of new 
mosques in Norway” and “Muslims should not be allowed to work in places where many 






 Participants on average experienced greater symbolic (M = 2.88, SD = 1.49) than 
realistic threat (M = 2.54, SD = 1.35, t(95) = -3.52, p = .001, 95% CI of the difference [-
.53, -.15]).  We observed that the experimental manipulation affected both symbolic and 
realistic threat, as well as Islamophobia: Participants who watched a video about the 
demographic increase in the number of immigrants perceived higher degrees of symbolic 
(M = 3.21, SD = 1.49) and realistic threat (M = 2.88, SD = 1.40) than those in the control 
condition (symbolic threat: M = 2.56, SD = 1.43, t(94) = -2.20, p = .030, 95% CI of the 
difference [-1.25, -.065]; realistic threat: M = 2.22, SD = 1.22, t(94) = -2.46, p = .016, 
95% CI of the difference [-1.19, -.13]). Moreover, participants in the demographic 
increase condition expressed more Islamophobia (M = 4.11, SD = 3.03) than those in the 
control group (M = 2.84, SD = 2.89, t(94) = -2.09, p = .039, 95% CI of the difference [-
2.46, -.063]). 
 Having established these effects, we used structural equation modeling (SEM) 
with Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimation to test a mediational model in which 
symbolic and realistic threat mediated the effects of the numerical threat condition (0 = 
control, 1 = demographic increase condition) on Islamophobia. In this (fully saturated) 
model, the experimental threat induction predicted both symbolic and realistic threat; of 
these, we observed that only symbolic threat predicted Islamophobia as expected (see 
Figure 1). Analyses using bootstrapping with 5000 random re-samples indicated that, 
whereas there was a significant indirect effect of the experimental condition on 
Islamophobia through symbolic threat (β= .14, 95% CI [.03, .31]), the indirect effect of 


























 Study 1 suggested that symbolic threat in particular fueled Islamophobia among 
majority members. In this study, we wanted to test whether these effects were limited to 
negative attitudes towards Muslims or would also apply to behavioral intentions. 
Specifically, we wanted to test whether religious (e.g., Christian) identity would be 
associated with more support for joining a Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization 
of the West (PEGIDA)-like movement. We further sought to test the degree to which 
realistic and symbolic threats would mediate this relationship, examining whether effects 




A total of 205 Norwegian participants (Mage = 30.26, SDage = 12.11; 56.6% 





Figure 1. Mediation model for Study 1. Standardized coefficients are displayed. *p < .05, 



















Religious identity. Three items from Thomsen, Green, and Sidanius (2008) were 
used to measure participants’ religious identity (α = .92). Specifically, participants rated 
how strongly they identified with their religious group, how close they felt to other 
people of their religious group and how often they thought about themselves in terms of 
their religious group on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (very weakly/not close at all/never) 
to 7 (very strongly/very close/very often). 
Realistic and symbolic threat. We adopted a measure from González et al. (2008) 
to measure realistic (α = .76) and symbolic (α = .93) threat. Each threat was measured 
using three items (e.g., symbolic threat: “Muslims are a threat to the Norwegian culture”; 
realistic threat: “Because of the presence of Muslims, unemployment in Norway will 
increase”) rated on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally 
agree).  
 Support of PEGIDA-like movement. On the same scale, participants indicated 
their agreement with six items denoting different degrees of behavioral support for a 
PEGIDA movement. These items varied in the degree of involvement from more mild 
forms of support (e.g., “I would be positive towards a march against the Islamization of 
Norway”) to stronger forms (e.g., “I would organize a march against the Islamization of 
Norway”), forming a reliable construct (α = .96). 
 
Results and Discussion  
Religious identity was positively related to PEGIDA support (r = .15, p < .05), 
and symbolic (r = .17, p < .05) but not realistic threat (r = .04, p = .54). Both type of 
threats were related to more support of PEGIDA (symbolic threat: r = .34, p < .001; 
realistic threat: r = .20, p = .005).  
In the mediated model using ML estimation, χ2 (3, N = 203) = 4.68, p = .197, 
χ2/df13 = 1.56, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.00, .14], SRMR = .04, the different 
threat measures fully mediated the effect of religious identity on PEGIDA support. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The procedure also included a video manipulation, where participants either watched a video 
portraying Norwegian islamists or a control video. Because the manipulation had no significant 
effect on the dependent variables, we do not treat it as predictor in consecutive analyses but 




Specifically, religious identity had an indirect positive effect on PEGIDA support 
mediated by symbolic threat (see Figure 2). Bootstrapping showed that this indirect effect 
was significant (β = .05, 95% CI [.01, .13]), whereas the indirect effect via realistic threat 
















Study 3a and 3b 
Rational 
The first two studies showed that symbolic threat in general predicted ethnic 
Norwegians’ hostility towards Muslims. Here, we sought to examine whether the same or 
similar processes explained hostile attitudes among low status minority groups. Taking 
the minority and low-status perspective, in Studies 3a and 3b we focused on the attitudes 
and perceptions of Muslim residents of Denmark. The Danish context is of particular 
interest for several reasons, all of which suggest that Muslims might be experiencing high 
levels of symbolic and realistic threat: Specifically, Denmark was embroiled in the 
controversy surrounding Jyllands Posten’s publication of cartoons depicting the prophet 
Muhammad; second, the rise and success of the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party 
in the country has resulted in Denmark adopting what has been called the most restrictive 
.30***
 
Figure 2. Mediation model for Study 2. Standardized coefficients are displayed. *p < .05, 



















immigration policy in Europe (Reimann, 2011), including the recent controversial law 
that seizes valuable items from refugees and a bill to lengthen the amount of time for 
family reunification from one to three years; and third, in the last twelve years, Denmark 
has participated in several wars in Muslim-majority countries. As in Study 2 we 
examined religious (i.e., Muslim) identification given research suggesting that 
identification is an important antecedent of perceived threat.  
 
Method 
Participants and procedures Study 3a. 
 We sampled 257 (68.9% female) Danish Muslims from 32 different Islam-related 
Facebook websites in Denmark (e.g., “Islam the ideology” and “The Danish Muslim 
Community”) from February 15th to May 1st 2013. These websites were selected from a 
pool of 80 identified Islam-related Facebook groups in Denmark. After obtaining 
permission from the administrators of Facebook websites, we invited each person 
individually to participate in the study. Participants received no personal compensation 
for participation; instead, we paid 20 DKK (approximately $4) to a charitable cause of 
their choice. Age was measured in a truncated format to increase anonymity due to the 
sensitive nature of the study. Most participants were between 18 and 34 (88.5% of the 
total sample). We aimed to recruit a diverse sample: For example, we used not only 
Facebook groups consisting solely of well-educated secular Muslim immigrants, but also 
included websites that primarily targeted traditional and practicing Muslims with strong 
religious beliefs and cultural values.  
 
Study 3b. In Study 3b we followed the same data collection procedure as in Study 
3a and sampled 226 (59.3% female) Danish Muslims. Data collection started June 1st 
2013 and was completed August 30th 2013. The majority of participants were between18 









The surveys were conducted in Danish and included measures of Muslim 
identification, symbolic and realistic threats and attitudes toward anti-Western violence. 
Some measures were derived from a prior study based on qualitative interviews (Obaidi, 
2016). All items were answered on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
Muslim identification. Three items measured Muslim identification (e.g., “I feel 
strongly connected to other Muslims”; α = .93, Study 3a; α = .92, Study 3b). 
Symbolic threat. Symbolic threat was assessed using three items (e.g., “Non-
Muslim westerners hold values that conflict with the values of people like me”; α = .76, 
Study 3a; α = .77, Study 3b). 
Realistic threat. Realistic threat was assessed using three items (e.g., “Muslims 
are disadvantaged because the West keeps them down”; α = .83, Study 3a; α = .85, Study 
3b). 
Attitudes towards anti-Western violence. Attitudes toward anti-western violence 
were assessed using three items (e.g., “In general, I understand some Muslim groups’ 
reasons for the use of violence, even though I do not condone the violence itself ”; α 
= .70, Study 3a; α = 74, Study 3b)14.  
 
Results  
Study 3a. Variable descriptives and intercorrelations can be found in Table 1.  
We examined the same path model here as in Study 2. The analysis was performed using 
MLM estimation. This estimation was chosen because it is robust to non-normal data that 
could be expected for the extreme measure of anti-Western violence. We first estimated 
the fully saturated model, and then trimmed a non-significant path between Muslim 
identification and support for anti-western violence.  The trimmed model fit the empirical 
data well (Satorra-Bentler χ2 (1) = 1.65, p = .20, CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = .05, 90% CI 
[.00, .18], SRMR = .02; See Figure 3a). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Table 3a. Descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations in Study 3a. 
Variables M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Muslim identification 4.76 1.81 -    
2. Perceived Realistic threat 4.72 1.65 .35** -   
3. Perceived Symbolic threat 3.62 1.59 .51** .42** -  
4. Anti-Western Violence 3.03 1.77 .17** .30** .38** - 
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. 
 The results of the path analysis showed that both symbolic and realistic threats 
predicted attitudes towards anti-Western violence. Nevertheless, symbolic threat emerged 
as stronger predictor of attitudes towards anti-Western violence. The effect of symbolic 
threat on attitudes towards anti-Western violence was twice the size (β = 0.44, 95% CI 
[.33, .56]) of that for realistic threat (β = 0.22, 95% CI [.11, .33]). Indeed, a model with 
these parameters constrained to equality produced a significant deterioration in model fit, 
indicating a significant difference between the two paths (Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-
Square Difference, TRd (1) = 4.08, p = .04).  Bootstrapping showed that the indirect 
effects of Muslim identification on attitudes towards anti-Western violence via each of 
symbolic threat (β = .18, 95% CI [.11, .25]) and realistic threat (β = .09, 95% CI 




















Figure 3a. Path model and standardized path coefficients (study 3a) for relations between 
Muslim  identification symbolic and realistic threats and positive attitudes toward anti-Western 




















Study 3b. Variable descriptives and intercorrelations can be found in Table 2. In 
Study 3b we set out to replicate the effects from Study 3a. We examined the same path 
model here as in Study 3a, obtaining highly consistent results. All paths were significant 
except the path from Muslim identification to attitudes toward violence. We examined 
the model fit trimming this path, and observed that it fit the empirical data well (Satorra-
Bentler χ2 (1) = 0.44, p = .51, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 90% CI [.00, .15], SRMR = .01; 
see Figure 3b). The effect size of symbolic threat on attitudes towards anti-Western 
violence was greater β = 0.31, 95% CI [0.16, 0.45] than that for realistic threat β = 0.18, 
95% CI [.05, .31]. However, in this case, constraining these parameters to equality did 
not indicate significant model deterioration (Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-Square 
Difference, TRd (1) = 1.33, p = .25), indicating that these paths were statistically 
equivalent.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations in Study 3b. 
Variables M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Muslim identification 5.06 1.71 -    
2. Perceived Realistic threat 4.78 1.64 .38** -   
3. Perceived Symbolic threat 3.80 1.68 .40** .50** -  
4. Anti-Western Violence 3.23 1.80 .32** .44** .56** - 
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. 
 Last, bootstrapping showed that the indirect effects of Muslim identification on 
attitudes towards anti-Western violence via each of symbolic threat (indirect effect β 
= .15, 95% CI [.07, .23]) and realistic threat (indirect effect β = .06, 95% CI [.01, .11]) 
were significant. In sum, Studies 3a and 3b suggested that each of symbolic threat and 
realistic threat play an important role in predicting aggressive attitudes towards the West, 




























The aim of Study 4 was to replicate the findings from Studies 3a and 3b in a 
different context and population. Specifically, we focused on the Middle Eastern context 
of Lebanon because many have proposed a causal relationship between Western foreign 
policy in the Middle East and Arab grievances resulting in negative attitudes toward the 
West. For example, some claim that Western foreign policy toward Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the presence of US military forces on Arab land, and the US’s unconditional support for 
Israel have created a breeding ground for Arab grievances and a potential source of 
support for anti-western violence (Pape, 2003). Similarly, the perception that the West is 
biased and aggressive against Islamic values is prevalent among many in Arab countries 
(Wike & Grim, 2007). Furthermore, many believe that Western values, morals and 
“decadent culture” have a corrupting influence on the local traditional value systems and 
on their society in general (Gallup Poll, 2002b). For instance, various Western cultural 
values are perceived as having greater detrimental influence on Arab societies relative to 
political or economic factors (Gallup Poll, 2002b). 
 As we focused on Lebanon in an international context instead of a classic 
immigration context, we framed realistic and symbolic threat in the context of 
.31***
 
Figure 3b. Path model and standardized path coefficients (study 3b) for relations between 
Muslim identification, symbolic and realistic threats and attitudes toward anti-Western 




















international Islamist extremism. Specifically, realistic threat was operationalized as 
feeling economically exploited and physically threatened by America, while symbolic 
threat was operationalized as incompatibility between Arab and American culture and the 
feeling of American culture being inferior (and thus, a potential ‘contaminant’ of Arab 
culture).  
Method 
Participants and procedures. We conducted interviews with respondents taken 
from random stratified samples in the Spring of 2010, across a number of Lebanese cities. 
Participants were ethnic Arabs primarily belonging to one of the three dominant religions 
and religious sects: Sunni Muslims (n = 61), Shi’a Muslims (n = 29), and Maronite 
Christians (n = 63). The remaining participants were Muslims who did not identify their 
sect (n =11), Orthodox Christians (n = 14), Roman Catholics (n = 9), and Druze (n = 13).  
Thus, our final sample included 200 participants (Mage = 37.57, SD = 15.11; 50.5% 
male)15.  
Using the Kish Grid approach (McBurney, 1988), we inventoried all family 
members among households that agreed to participate and randomly selected one 
individual to be interviewed such that both genders had an equal likelihood of being 
included. The interviews were conducted in Arabic by trained residents contracted by the 
polling firm Zogby International. Participants received the equivalent of $10 for 
participating. All measures were translated into Arabic by Zogby International and 
subsequently back-translated into English by a different group at the firm to ensure 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The analyses presented here uses items drawn from the same dataset (with partial overlap) that 
has been used in Levin et al. (2012, 2015a, 2015b), Sidanius et al. (2015), and Pratto, Sidanius, 
Bou-Zeineddine, Kteily, & Levin, 2014). However, this prior work investigated different 
theoretical questions. 
16 In the current study we re-analyzed data examined in Levin et al., 2012 and Sidanius et al., 
2015. Although these authors examined support for anti-Western violence, they did not address 






The survey included a range of measures meant to assess different research 
questions. For the purposes of the present research, we focus on measures of Arab 
identification, symbolic and realistic threat, and attitudes toward fighting Americans. 
Across the survey, responses were indicated on 1-5 scales, with responses of don’t know, 
not sure, or refusals to respond coded as missing data. 
Arab identification. Arab identification was assessed using five items (e.g., “How 
important is it to you to be Arab?”, α = .91). Responses were provided on a 1= not at all 
to 5= very much scale. 
Realistic threat. Realistic threat was assessed using four items (e.g., “Americans, 
as a group, endanger the physical safety of Arabs”, α = .91)17. Responses were provided 
on a 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree scale. 
Symbolic threat. On the same 1-5 scale, symbolic threat was assessed using three 
items (e.g., “Americans, as a group, possess values that directly oppose the values of 
Arabs”, α = .68).  
Anti-American violence. Violence towards the U.S. was assessed using three 
items forming a reliable scale (α = .75). The first item was “Arabs should fight 
Americans”, assessed on a 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree scale. The final 
two items were preceded by the stem “How much do you support or oppose the following 
actions against Americans. The specific actions were “Attacking military targets” and 
“Killing civilians”. These two items were assessed on a 1 = strongly oppose to 5 = 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 There were some further items reflecting perceptions about what goals Americans wanted their 
government to pursue, some of which are potentially relevant to realistic threat.  These items 
were: “Americans want their government to maintain control over the oil resources in the Middle 
East”, and “Americans want their government to dominate Arab societies”. We decided to 
exclude these variables as they did not capture realistic threat as cleanly or directly as the 
variables we include. However, we note that results were very similar when these variables were 





Results and Discussion 
Variable descriptives and intercorrelations can be found in Table 3. We examined 
our hypotheses using structural equation modeling. Consistent with our theorizing, we 
treated Arab identification as an exogenous variable predicting both realistic and 
symbolic threat, as well as anti-American violence. We also modeled paths from 
symbolic and realistic threat to anti-American violence, as well as a covariate between 
symbolic and realistic threat (see Figure 4). 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations in Study 4. 
Variables M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Arab identification 3.65 .89 -    
2. Perceived Realistic threat 4.01 1.02 .30*** -   
3. Perceived Symbolic threat 3.23 1.02 .62*** .55*** -  
4. Anti-American Violence 2.50 1.18 .47*** .56*** .71*** - 
 
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. 
 
 The analysis was performed using MLM estimation in Mplus. The model was 
fully saturated. As can be seen in Figure 4, Arab identification was strongly related to 
both symbolic and realistic threats, which were inter-correlated. Most importantly for our 
purposes, we observed that symbolic threat and realistic threat were each unique 
predictors of support for anti-American violence, where symbolic threat appeared as the 
strongest predictor. Indeed, when taking into account the effects of symbolic and realistic 
threat, the direct path from Arab identification to anti-American violence was no longer 
significant, indicating full mediation. When we trimmed this path from the model, we 
observed that the model fit the data well (Satorra-Bentler χ2 (1) = 1.497, p = .22, CFI 
= .998, RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.00, .20], SRMR = .011). Bootstrapping showed that Arab 
identification had significant indirect effects through realistic threat (standardized indirect 
effect= .07, p = .001) as well as symbolic threat (standardized indirect effect = .36, p 

























 To explore the question of relative predictive power of realistic and symbolic 
threat more formally, we set the paths from symbolic and realistic threats to anti-
American violence to equality and examined the subsequent deterioration in model fit. 
Indeed, when we constrained these paths, we observed significantly poorer model fit 
(Satorra-Bentler χ2 (2) = 13.556, p = .001, CFI = .962, RMSEA = .17, 90% CI [.09, .26], 
SRMR = .038; Satorra-Bentler chi-square difference = 11.67, df = 1, p < .001), suggesting 
that the pathway from symbolic threat to anti-American violence was significantly 




Study 4 demonstrated that perceiving the culture of the (Arab) ingroup to be 
superior to that of the (Western) outgroup, which is seen as morally inferior and direct 
opposition to the ingroup, relates strongly to support for anti-Western violence among 
Arabs in Lebanon. Returning to the Scandinavian context, in Study 5 we sought to test 
whether the (meta)perception that the (Western) outgroup sees one’s own (Muslim) 
culture as inferior and incompatible with Western culture will also lead to support for 
.53**
* 
Figure 4. Structural equation model predicting anti-American violence support among 





















violence against it. To examine this question, we directly manipulated the perception that 
one’s culture and lifestyle is seen as incompatible and inferior to the dominant group in 
society and assessed its effects on support for violence.   
 
Method 
Participants and procedures. We followed the same data collection procedure as 
in Studies 3a and 3b, randomly sampling 152 Muslim respondents (63.8% female). Most 
participants were in the 18-34 age range (82.4%).  
Measures and materials. 
Experimental manipulation.  A random half of the participants were presented 
with a scenario that described ethnic Danes as feeling symbolically threatened by 
Muslims because they perceive Islamic culture, norms and values as incompatible with 
and inferior to Danish culture, norms and values. The other half was presented with a 
non-threatening control condition describing Danes’ preference for various TV programs 
(see SOM for full details). Both scenarios were followed by a filler task in which 
participants rated their preference for a series of graphical icons. 
Dependent variable. After the experimental manipulation and filler task, 
participants completed a three-item anti-western violence scale (α = .70) from Studies 3a 
and 3b. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Participants in the threat condition expressed greater support for anti-Western 
violence (M = 2.96, SD = 1.75, 95% CI [2.6, .3.3]) than did participants in the control 
condition (M = 2.28, SD = 1.29, 95% CI [1.9, .2.6], F(1, 149) = 7.273 , η2 = .05, p = .008. 
Whereas prior studies assessed how the ingroup perceived the outgroup (i.e., as 
realistically or symbolically threatening), the current study was distinguished by the fact 
that it examined meta-perceptions (i.e., how the ingroup was perceived by the outgroup). 
Consistent with our earlier studies, symbolic threat (here manipulated by making 
participants feel that their values were rejected by the outgroup) increased support for 







We had several aims in Study 6. First, we wanted to replicate our effects in a 
different context, among Muslim residents of Sweden; second, we sought to use meta-
perceptual primes to induce realistic as well as symbolic threats, allowing us to compare 
these two types; finally, whereas earlier studies assessed attitudes towards violence, we 
here measured behavioral intentions to commit terrorism. Behavioral intentions are better 
predictors of actual behavior than mere attitudinal support (see De Weerd & 
Klandermans, 1999). 
Similar to Denmark, Sweden has seen a recent rise in right-wing rhetoric and 
political representation. Indeed, the country has witnessed an increase in anti-Muslim and 
immigration rhetoric, and hate crimes against Muslims have been increasing in recent 
years across different Swedish cities (Reuter, 2015). This made Sweden an ideal context 
in which to examine our predictions, and increased the plausibility and ecological validity 
of our meta-perceptual manipulations of threat.  
 
Method 
Participants and procedures. We followed data collection procedures similar to 
those in Study 6. From a pool of 10 randomly selected Swedish Islam-related Facebook 
websites, we randomly sampled 161 Muslim respondents (57.4% women). Most 
participants were in the 18-34 age range (86%).  
 
Measures and materials.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions (see 
SOM for full content). In the symbolic threat condition, we used the same material from 
Study 5 (with minor adjustments for the Swedish context). In the realistic threat condition, 
participants were presented with a scenario that described ethnic Swedes’ support for 
Western foreign policy in Muslim countries. In a control condition, participants were 
presented with a text describing ethnic Swedes’ preference for various TV programs.  
 After the experimental manipulation, participants completed a six-item scale (α = 




commit terrorism in defense of Muslims (e.g., “I will personally use violence against 
people harming other Muslims that I care about.”). 
 
Results  
We used ANOVA to test the effect of the threat manipulation on behavioral 
intentions to commit terrorism. The analysis showed that the overall effect of the threat 
manipulation was significant, F (2,155) = 7.07, η2 = .08, p < .001. Participants in the 
symbolic threat condition expressed stronger behavioral intentions to commit terrorism in 
defense of Islam and/or Muslims (M = 3.09, SD = 1.62, 95% CI [2.7, 3.5]) compared to 
those in the realistic threat (M = 2.64, SD = 1.59, 95% CI [2.3, 3.0],) or control conditions 
(M = 1.95, SD = 1.30, 95% CI [1.5, .2.4]). Post hoc analyses using the Scheffé test 
indicated that the only significant difference was between the symbolic threat and the 
control conditions (p =.01). In line with Study 6, then, the perception that ethnic, non-
Muslim Swedes saw Muslim culture as culturally inferior and in opposition to Swedish 
culture had a significant effect on Muslims’ behavioral intention to employ violence in 
defense of Muslims.  
 
General Discussion 
In a series of six studies, combining correlational and experimental techniques 
across various contexts, we demonstrate a common psychology of outgroup hostility 
among both non-Muslims, Muslims in Europe and Arabs in the Levant— one that is 
driven by perceived intergroup threat, and symbolic threat in particular. As expected, 
similar patterns emerged among Muslims and Arabs on the one hand, and among non-
Muslim Westerners on the other, providing evidence of similar drivers of hostility across 
all three groups. Moreover, our research suggested ways in which vicious cycles of 
mutually reinforcing hostility and violence might unfold among real groups.  
In our studies, we hypothesized that non-Muslim Europeans might see Muslim 
culture and practices not only as incompatible with, but also as clashing with and inferior 
to Europeans’ cherished values and way of life. We expected that this would lead to more 
Islamophobia and mobilization against Muslims. We further hypothesized that the same 




could function as powerful rallying forces among Muslims in Europe and Arabs in the 
Levant. For example, we expected that many Arabs would see American culture and 
practices as inferior and opposed to their own culture, which would be associated with a 
greater willingness to support violence against American; we expected a similar process 
would lead Muslims in Europe to indicate more violent behavioral intentions towards the 
West. Notably, the existence of such a process might lead to a vicious cycle of hostility: 
for example, Muslim and Arab support for violence might confirm Europeans’ 
impression that these groups pose a threat, provoking some Europeans to respond with 
aggression, and so on (see also Kteily et al., in press). We attempted to explore whether 
there was evidence for a process fundamental to such a vicious cycle in a series of seven 
correlational and experimental studies across various contexts and populations.  
The first two studies suggested that symbolic threat was a potent driver of 
Westerners’ anti-Muslim attitudes and behaviors. Specifically, it was the only predictor 
of Islamophobia and support of PEGIDA-like movements. These findings are consistent 
with previous research demonstrating that perceived symbolic threat is a stronger 
predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes than are realistic threats (McLaren, 2003; see 
Hainmueller and Hopkins. 2014 for a review): Thus, the hostile reaction among 
Europeans to the influx of Muslim immigrants into Europe seems to be rooted primarily 
in the fear of ‘cultural contamination’ that mass immigration from Muslim countries 
potentially brings with it, rather than fear of economic competition. Our findings concord 
with real-world events: For example, the Charlie Hebdo attacks coincided with a 
publication of the bestseller “Submission”, whose plot presents a France no longer 
governed as a secular society with democratic principles, but overtaken by Muslims and 
Sharia law.  
One possibility that might account for the non-significance of realistic threat as a 
predictor of Islamophobia in the European context is that ethnic Europeans may not 
perceive immigrants as serious contenders for scarce resources such as jobs and social 
and political power: Many immigrants, and refugees in particular, have experienced 
considerable downward mobility upon their arrival to their host countries often arriving 
with little material resources or social support. At the same time, it is important to note 




did in our work because of the substantial uptick in welfare costs that the recent refugee 
influx has imposed on European countries. For example, Sweden had to cut spending 
from schools, health and job sectors and foreign aid budget in order to cover the extra 
costs of the refugee crisis, which might increase anti-refugee hostility rooted in economic 
threats (Dickson & Ahlander, 2015). 
Switching to the low-power group’s perspective, in three studies we wanted to 
test whether the same social psychological processes observed among majority members 
would also be discernible among low power groups’ attitudes and behavioral intentions 
towards violence against the West. Whereas the vast majority of research that 
investigated support for anti-western violence has been conducted in the context of 
Middle East (e.g., Levin, et al., 2015; Sidanius et al., 2015; Sidanius et al., 2004) in this 
paper we included Muslims living in Denmark and Sweden, and Arabs living in Lebanon. 
Realistic threat of Western foreign policy and military interventions predicted support for 
anti-western violence for Muslims in Denmark and Arabs in Lebanon despite differences 
in their social contexts and in their exposure to foreign policy and military intervention18. 
Nevertheless, and consistent with the European samples, symbolic threat generally 
emerged as the stronger predictor of attitudes towards anti-western violence in all three 
contexts. This is consistent with the observation that the rapid rise and dissemination of 
Western culture via globalization seem to have spread Western culture to all parts of the 
world. Often this development has confronted many Muslims with values and practices 
that they might subjectively experience as in conflict with Islamic culture (Barber, 1996, 
Khosrokhavar, 2009). Western foreign policy and military interventions might be 
perceived as a temporary phenomenon that will eventually come to an end. On the other 
hand, it is possible that Muslims and Arabs perceive the cultural forces of Westernization 
as difficult or even impossible to stop, rendering them especially threatening.  
From the Western perspective, large parts of the European public perceive the 
growing number of Muslim population to Europe as an invasion. Although, many 
Europeans see the co-existence of different ethnic minorities as appealing and enriching, 
many others genuinely perceive it as a major threat to Europe, where they feel that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 We observed that the effect of realistic threat was somewhat larger among Arabs in Lebanon. 
One possible explanation might be that the long ongoing conflict between the Arab nations and 




European values and traditions give way to an Islamic way of life, leading potentially to 
the disintegration of secular values (see, Roy, 2008; Keple, 2004). For example, some 
perceive certain demands from the Muslim population such as serving halal meat in 
public schools as Islamic values overrunning and gaining momentum over the European 
way of life. The fear of being culturally alienated within their own societies and 
potentially subjected to Islamization leads many Europeans to reject Islamic culture 
(Parekh, 2009). This fear is particularly pervasive among those who believe that 
European culture is superior to Islamic culture and the mobilization of these individuals 
is a reality in many European countries now (Erlanger & Bennhold, 2015). 
Another consistency among high and low-power groups was the fact that ingroup 
identity played a role. We reasoned that ingroup identity would be a reliable predictor of 
perceived group threat because it is well established that ethnic and religious 
identification promote the feeling of experienced threat towards the in-group (Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 2002). In fact, in all four studies in which it was included— among 
Muslims in Denmark, Arabs in Lebanon and ethnic Europeans — ingroup identification 
exerted indirect effects on support for anti-Western violence and Islamophobia 
respectively, mediated by symbolic and realistic threats. These results again support the 
notion of a common psychology predicting intergroup aggression among low and high 
power groups  
A Pew Global Attitudes project in 2006 investigated the way Muslims and non-
Muslims in the West and elsewhere perceived each other (Wike & Grim, 2007). The 
results demonstrated that both groups held highly negative attitudes towards each other, 
where each group ascribed a wide array of negative characteristic to one another, such as 
being immoral, violent, selfish and arrogant. The important question is: what are the 
intergroup consequences of such outgroup negativity on both sides? In the last two 
studies, we aimed to answer this question and demonstrated how threat perceptions 
expressed by one group could reinforce negative attitudes in the other group, hence, 
fomenting a vicious circle of intergroup hostility (see also Kteily et al., in press; Kunst et 
al., in press). The rise of far right parties in Europe in the recent years has resulted in a 
negative image of Muslims as invaders. This perception of threat among Europeans has 




some Muslims to respond with increased aggression. In line with this proposition, our 
results demonstrated that threat perceptions among ethnic Danes and Swedes led to high 
degrees of support for violence and behavioral intentions to commit violence in defense 
of Muslims among these subpopulations. One group’s negative perceptions led to hostile 
attitudes in another, leading to a vicious circle of intergroup hostility. It is likely that such 
processes are quite general, and not only applicable to the relationship between Muslim 
and non-Muslims, making it all the more important to understand them well. For example, 
future work could examine the extent to which reciprocal perceptions of symbolic and 
realistic threat are contributing to tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims in many 
countries. 
 
Strengths and Limitations 
Our manuscript has a number of strengths. For one, it simultaneously examined 
the role of both symbolic and realistic threats. Previous work, particularly in the area of 
Islamic terrorism, has focused on one form of threat only and mainly in the context of 
Middle Eastern countries (but see Levin et al., in press; Sidanius et al., 2015), leaving 
uncertainty regarding the unique role of each type of threat, and the generalizability of 
the effects. Determining the relative contributions of realistic and symbolic threat has 
broad implications for policy making and improving the intergroup relations between the 
Muslim world and the West. Learning that both the symbolic and realistic (particularly 
physical) forms of threat are important contributors— with the symbolic threats being 
predominant— suggest that those interested in intergroup harmony will need to focus 
both on changing perceptions of cultural incompatibility and highlighting shared values, 
as well as working to correct any overestimates on both sides of the physical threat posed 
by the counterpart.   
 Another strength of the current work is its experimental approach, and its focus on 
highly consequential outcome variables. In a recent meta-analysis, Riek et al. (2006) 
commented that one of the major limitations in the domain of realistic and symbolic 
threats is the shortage of experimental studies. A similar concern applies in the domain of 
terrorism research, which has documented only correlational evidence for drivers of 




important because it allowed us to establish causality between symbolic threat and 
aggression. We were in fact able to show that priming symbolic threat increases self-
reported behavioral intentions to engage in terrorism among Muslims in Sweden, 
highlighting just how pressing it is to address this issue. 
 With this in mind, it should be acknowledged that although our work has 
highlighted various contributors to violence, it did not put forward effective solutions. 
Recent work has suggested that providing individuals with information that the outgroup 
humanizes them can be effective in reducing outgroup dehumanization (Kteily et al., in 
press), while highlighting the genetic overlap between groups in conflicts (e.g., Jews and 
Arabs) may reduce intergroup aggression (Kimel, Huesman, Kunst, & Halperin, in press). 
It is possible that the positive effects of such messages might extend to reducing symbolic 
(and even possibly realistic) threats. Alternatively, giving individuals statistics on the 
very small proportion of outgroup members who actually engage in violence or pose 
physical threats might contribute to a reduction in (at least certain forms) of realistic 
threat. Finally, highlighting shared values across the various Abrahamic religions might 
help to attenuate mutual feelings of symbolic threat that result out of categorization 
mechanisms (Kunst & Thomsen, 2015; Kunst, Thomsen, & Sam, 2014). Whichever 
approaches turn out to be effective in attenuating these threats, our work makes it clear 
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Table 1. Study 1. 
Threat Manipulation and Items Used to Assess Symbolic and Realistic Threats and Islamophobia. 
Symbolic and Realistic Threats Were Assessed Using a Scale of 1 = Not at Threatened to 5 = 
Threatened to a High Degree. Islamophobia was measured on a scale of 1 = Totally Disagree to 
10 = Totally Agree.  
Threat Manipulation  
• Participants were randomly assigned to see either a news video citing statistical reports 
suggesting that ethnic Norwegians may become a minority in Norway within 50 years 
(and within 20 years in Oslo) due to immigration or a control video. Then in randomized 
order 1 and 2. 
 
Symbolic Threat 
1. To which degree do you feel the following aspects of Norwegian culture as threatened by 
immigration? [Response format: 1 not at all threatened – 5 threatened to a high degree] 
• Cultural habits 
• Values and norms 
• Cultural traditions  
• The Norwegian culture in general 
 
Realistic Threat 
1. To which degree do you feel the following aspects of the Norway as threatened by 
immigration? [Response format: 1 not at all threatened – 5 threatened to a high degree] 
• Labor market 
• Welfare system 
• Economic wealth of Norwegian citizens 
• The Norwegian economy in general 
 
Islamophobia 
1. I would support any policy that would stop the building of new mosques in the Norway. 
2. If possible, I would avoid going to places where Muslims would be. 
3. I would become uncomfortable speaking with a Muslim. 
4. Just to be safe, it is important to stay away from places where Muslims could be. 
5. I dread the thought of having a boss that is Muslim. 
6. If I could, I would avoid contact with Muslims. 
7. If I could, I would live in a place where there were no Muslims. 










Table 2. Study 2. 
Items Used to Assess Religious Identity, Symbolic and Realistic Threats and Support of 
PEGIDA19. All items were answered on 7-point likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree).  
Religious Identity 
1. How strongly do you identify with other people of your religious group?  
2. How close do you feel to other people of your religious group? 
3. How often do you think about yourself in terms of your religious group?  
 
Symbolic Threat 
1. Norwegian norms and values are being threatened because of the presence of Muslims. 
2. Muslims are a threat to the Norwegian culture. 
3. The Norwegian identity is being threatened because there are too many Muslims. 
 
Realistic Threat 
1. Because of the presence of Muslims, Norwegians have more difficulties in finding a job. 
2. Because of the presence of Muslims, Norwegians have more difficulties in finding a house. 
3. Because of the presence of Muslims, unemployment in Norway will increase. 
 
Support of PEGIDA-like movement  
1. I would be positive towards a march against the Islamization of Norway.  
2. I would like a Facebook-group that is against the Islamization of Norway.  
3. I would sign a petition against the Islamization of Norway. 
4. I would donate money to an organization that is against the Islamization of Norway. 
5. I would participate in a march the Islamization of Norway.  












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Studies 3a and 3b 
 
Given the difficulty in reaching our samples, studies 3a, 3b, 4, 5 and 6 were part of a 
larger battery of variables, collected to answer different research questions within the 
same surveys. See below the complete list of items for each study (table 7, 8, 9 and 10). 
 
Items for studies 3a and 3b were translated to Danish from English.  
 
Table 3. Studies 3a and 3b. 
Items Used to Assess Symbolic and Realistic Threats, Muslim Identification and Attitudes towards 
Anti-western Violence. (Studies 3a/3b). All items were answered on 7-point likert scales ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Symbolic Threat  
1. Non-Muslim westerners hold values that conflict with the values of people like me.  
2. Non-Muslim westerners threaten the way of life of people like me.  
3. The West is threatening Muslims’ religious identity.  
 
Realistic Threat  
1. I think Muslims are disadvantaged because the West oppresses them. 
2. Muslims are disadvantaged because the West keeps them down.  
3. The foreign policy of Western countries harms Muslims worldwide. 
 
Muslim Identification 
1. I feel strongly connected to other Muslims. 
2. I strongly identify with other Muslims. 
3. I feel very connected to my religious community 
 
Attitudes towards Anti-western Violence  
1. Those who harm Muslims should be subjected to the same treatment. 
2. In general, I understand some Muslim groups’ reasons for the use of violence, even though I do 
not condone the violence itself. 
3. I can understand why some Muslims might have wanted to commit acts of violence in Europe, 








Items for study 4 was translated to Arabic from English.  
 
Table 4. Study 4. 
Items Used to Assess Symbolic and Realistic Threats, Arab Identification and Attitudes towards 
Violence.  Items for study 4 was translated to Arabic from English. All items were assessed on a 
1=strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree scale 
Symbolic Threat  
1. Americans, as a group, possess values that directly oppose the values of Arabs.  
2. Americans, as a group, hold values that are morally inferior to the values of Arabs.  
3. In general, how do you perceive the culture of Arabs and Americans? (Reponses format: 1 = 
strongly oppose to 5 = strongly support) 
• Arab culture is far superior to American culture. 
• Arab culture is somewhat better than American culture 
• American and Arab cultures are equal. 
• American culture is somewhat better than Arab culture. 
 
Realistic Threat  
1. Americans, as a group, take economic resources away from Arabs. 
2. Americans, as a group, limit the economic opportunities available to Arabs.  
3. Americans exploit Arabs for resources and keep all the profits for themselves. 
4. Americans, as a group, endanger the physical safety of Arabs. 
 
Arab Identification 
1. How important is it to you to be Arab? 
2. How close do you feel to other Arabs? 
3. How much do you have in common with Arabs across the Arab world? 
4. How important is it to you to be a member of the Arab world? 
5. How close do you feel to other members of the Arab world? 
 
Attitudes towards Anti-American Violence  
1. Arabs should fight Americans. 
2. How much do you support or oppose the following actions against Americans: 
• Attacking military targets. Assessed on a 1 = strongly oppose to 5 = strongly support 
scale  













Table 5. Study 5 
Threat Manipulation and the Measure of Attitudes towards Anti-western Violence. Attitudes 
toward Anti-western Violence was measured on 7-point likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Attitudes Towards Anti-western Violence  
1. Those who harm Muslims should be subjected to the same treatment. 
2. In general, I understand some Muslim groups’ reasons for the use of violence, even though I do 
not condone the violence itself. 
3. I can understand why some Muslims might have wanted to commit acts of violence in Europe, 
even though I do not condone the violence itself. 
 
Threat Manipulation  
The following section is a summary of the most recent poll about ethnic Danes attitudes towards 
Muslim immigrants in Denmark. Please read the summary and answer the following questions. 
 
• “The majority of native Danes see the presence of Muslim immigrants in Denmark as a 
problem, and they see Islamic culture and religion as backward. They see Islamic values, 
norms and traditions as incompatible with Danish values, norms and traditions. Because 
of this, native Danes believe that Muslim immigrants pose a threat to Denmark. 
Furthermore, the study shows that Danes do not think that Muslims belong to Danish 
society”.20 
Control Condition 
• “The majority of people in Denmark in average watch between 3 to 5 hours of television 
a day. The majority of hours spent in front of the television, are concentrated between 
the hours of 7 pm to 11 pm. In terms of program preferences, the study shows that elder 
generations prefer programs with traditional cultural contents while younger generations 
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Table 6. Study 6 
The Content of Realistic and Symbolic Threat Manipulation, Control Condition and the Measure 
of Behavioral Intentions to Commit Terrorism in Defense of Islam and/or Muslims. Violent 
Behavioral Intentions was answered on 7-point likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree). 
Violent Behavioral Intentions  
1. If nothing else helps I'm prepared to use violence to defend Muslims. 
2. As a last resort I’m personally ready to use violence for the sake of other Muslims. 
3. I will personally use violence against people harming other Muslims that I care about. 
4. I’m ready to go and fight for Muslims in another country. 
5. I'm not prepared to use violence in any situation. (R) 
6. I will not personally use violence to help Muslims. (R) 
7. Even as a last resort, I will not use violence for the sake of others Muslims. (R) 
 
Symbolic Threat Manipulation  
The	  following	  section	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  poll	  about	  ethnic	  Swedes	  and	  Western-­‐
influenced	   politicians’	   attitudes	   towards	   Muslim	   immigrants	   in	   Sweden.	   Please	   read	   the	  
summary	  and	  answer	  the	  following	  questions	  
	  
• “The majority of native Swedes and Western-influenced politicians in the country see 
the presence of Muslim immigrants in Sweden as a problem, and they see Islamic culture 
and religion as backward. They see Islamic values, norms and traditions as incompatible 
with Swedish values, norms and traditions. Because of this, native Swedes believe that 
Muslim immigrants make Swedes feel uncomfortable in their own country. Further, the 
study shows that ethnic Swedes do not think that Muslims belong to Swedish society”. 
  
Realistic Threat Manipulation 
The following section is a summary of the most recent poll about ethnic Swedes attitudes towards 
Western foreign and military interventions in Muslim countries. Please read the summary and 
answer the following questions 
• "The majority of native Swedes support Western foreign and military policies in Muslim 
countries. They consider intervention in Muslim countries useful in terms 
of exploiting Muslim resources and maintaining Western military and economic 
domination over Muslims. Swedes believe that Western foreign policy and military 
intervention in Islamic countries will benefit Sweden as a nation economically 
from greater access to resources in Islamic countries (such as oil), and militarily, 
by allowing Sweden to maintain a military advantage over Muslim world”. 
Control Condition 
• “The majority of people in Sweden in average watch between 3 to 5 hours of television a 
day. The majority of hours spent in front of the television, are concentrated between the 
hours of 7 pm to 11 pm. In terms of program preferences, the study shows that elder 




generations of Swedes prefer reality shows”.  


































The Mistreatment of My People: 
Victimization-by-proxy and Behavioral Intentions to 
Commit Terrorism among Muslims in Denmark and Sweden21 
 
Abstract 
Islamist radicalization is often explained by the suffering of Muslims in Islamic countries 
during Western-led wars. However, many terrorist attacks have been carried out by 
European Muslims with no personal experiences of war. Across three studies among 
Danish and Swedish Muslims we tested if victimization-by-proxy processes motivate 
behavioral intentions to commit acts of terrorism. We used Muslim identification, 
perceived injustice of Western foreign policies, and group-based anger to predict violent 
and non-violent behavioral intentions. More importantly, we compared path models of 
those Muslims who came from conflict zones and those Muslims who did and did not 
have direct personal experience of Western-led occupation, and we found similar effects 
in all three groups. That is, vicarious psychological responses mimicked those of 
personally experienced adversity. In fact, participants born in Western Europe were, on 
average, more strongly identified with Muslims, perceived Western foreign policy as 
more unjust, reported greater group-based anger, and were more inclined to help Muslims 
by non-violent, but not violent, means. 
 
Keywords: Homegrown terrorism, Victimization-by-proxy, Social identity, Group-based 
injustice and emotion, Western foreign policy  
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Background and Aim 
 Documents from the inner circles of the Islamic State surfaced on April 18, 2015 
in one of Europe’s biggest newspapers. The article in der Spiegel outlined “the blueprint 
for this state” (Reuter, 2015). One such calculated strategy was to use inexperienced 
foreign radicals alongside Chechens and Uzbeks in the civil wars in Syria and Iraq, rather 
than domestic fighters. This strategy presents a perplexing reality to scholars and experts 
studying terrorism. Among academics and policy-makers, many have argued that Muslim 
terrorism results from the experience of direct exposure to Western-led military 
interventions/occupation/drone attacks and foreign policies in Muslim countries (e.g., 
NEWS BBC, 2010; Bergen, 2011; Erlanger, 2013; Gerges, 2005; Kepel, 2004; 
Mearsheimer, 2011; Nesser, 2006; Pape, 2003 & 2006; Sageman, 2004). Presumably, 
however, the Islamic State did not consider it necessary that their fighters had personal 
experience from wars or Western occupation. Instead, they believed that they could 
simply import radicalization that had sprung to life elsewhere, for example within the 
West. By the summer of 2014 the Islamic State was proven right. Using their foreign 
fighters, they had conquered vast territories (e.g., Reuter, 2015) and inspired terrorist 
attacks in Europe committed by radicalized European citizens. Here, we demonstrate the 
effects of what we refer to as victimization-by-proxy processes on such homegrown 
Islamist radicalization and behavioral intentions to commit terrorism in Europe.   
When Muslim radicals in the West provide reasons for their attitudes or actions, 
they often refer to wrongdoings toward Muslims in the Islamic world at the hands of the 
West. Khosrokhavar (2005) describes this in terms “humiliation-by-proxy”.  Lickel, 
Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, and Schmader (2006) similarly argued that vicarious 
retaliation is a phenomenon where a “member of a group commits an act of aggression 
toward the members of an outgroup for an assault or provocation that had no personal 
consequences for him or her but which did harm a fellow ingroup member” (p. 372). The 
present work also stresses vicarious processes.  However, we broaden the focus beyond 
that of previous studies. First, not all acts in defense of a group are retaliatory or violent, 
so we anchored our inquiry within the broader collective action literature to also 
encompass non-violent outcomes (Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). Second, based 




literatures, we did not limit our focus to feelings of humiliation, but we rather focused on 
an interplay of group identification, perceived injustice, and group-based anger (Smith, 
1993).  
The proposed victimization-by-proxy argument rests on three interrelated ideas. 
The first is based on the social identity literature (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The second 
idea is that the foreign policies of Western countries are not only triggering factors for 
seeing the world in terms of “us” and “them”, but also a driving force of group 
mobilization among Muslims, native and war-zone-born alike.  Third, we argue that 
different group-related events trigger emotional and behavioral reactions that largely 
mirror the expected consequences if people had experienced the events personally 
(Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2002). We begin by briefly reviewing the extant literatures 
related to each of these ideas.  
Social identity theory outlines how the pursuit of self-esteem at the group level is 
linked to prejudice and discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Expanding these analyses, 
self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) describes 
the cognitive processes and consequences associated with social identity salience or, 
more informally, a “group mode” of thinking. In situations where groups are perceived as 
fairly distinct and group membership appears informative for understanding the social 
dynamics at hand, the theory suggest that people will enter a group mode of thinking – 
especially when they have goals, previous experiences, et cetera that are associated with 
the particular group categorization. When this happens, the self and fellow group 
members are perceived as a unified entity – “us” (Turner et al., 1987) – and group 
identification will subsequently influence individuals’ reactions to the group (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979).  
Now consider the case of Muslim identity in the West. Many scholars discuss a 
developing “clash of civilizations” between Muslims and non-Muslims (Huntington, 
1996 & 1993; Lewis, 1990), and from the perspective of self-categorization theory, this 
should make Muslim identity highly salient among members of this group. Some have 
also commented that the extremist ideologies propagated by Islamic radicals aim to 
indoctrinate Muslims into thinking similarly in order to unite them (Loza, 2007) and to 




when Western Muslims consider themselves as agents on behalf of the global Muslim 
community or Muslims living under occupation (rather than on behalf of the Danish or 
Danish immigrant community, for example), Muslim identity processes should be an 
important contributing factor. This should especially be the case for Western-born 
Muslims because their link to the people that suffer in Muslim conflict zones precisely 
rests on Muslim identification (rather than on being born into the countries that suffer 
occupation or drone attacks by the West).  
Research suggests that highlighting the ways in which people are similar to the 
victims of unjust treatment leads to increased feelings of injustice, anger and a stronger 
tendency to act against the perpetrator (i.e., Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001). More 
broadly, intergroup emotions theory suggests that appraisal of situations that affects other 
members of the in-group, but not the person herself/himself, may trigger intergroup 
emotional and behavioral responses (Smith, 1993; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007; 
Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000). For example, witnessing members of the ingroup being 
unjustly treated leads people to respond vicariously with anger and aggression. These 
emotional and behavioral reactions further depend on how strongly people identify with 
the victims (e.g., Gordijn et al., 2001; Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006; 
Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003). 
Hence, according to the social identity and intergroup emotion literatures, group 
identity should strengthen the individual’s perception that his or her ingroup is a target of 
unjust treatment, which in turn should intensify the group’s emotional and behavioral 
reactions to such perceived injustice (Grant, 2008). Feelings of injustice and group-based 
emotions, in turn, should increase the individual’s likelihood of participation in collective 
action against the transgressors (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999).  
 
The Present Research 
When it comes to research on radicalization and terrorism, as opposed to 
collective action research in other areas, the literature is rich in theory but rather poor in 
empirics (Silke, 2004). For example, even if several scholars have stressed vicarious 
processes in many group behaviors, a fundamental prediction in this reasoning remains 




people born and raised in the West and for those who have directly experienced Western-
led military intervention in their countries. The aim of this paper was to directly test this 
hypothesis. That is, we did not solely propose a model of victimization, but we focused 
on directly testing if a model based on vicarious processes would mimic one based on 
direct experience. We first, in studies 1 and 2, tested the victimization-by-proxy argument 
in a path analytic framework where we compared Muslims born in Denmark with those 
who immigrated to Denmark from Muslim countries targeted by Western countries 
foreign policy and military interventions such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan 
(henceforth referred to as native- versus foreign-born Muslims). Second in study 3 we 
wanted to validate the results from studies 1 and 2 by comparing Muslims born in 
Sweden with those with direct personal experience of Western foreign policy.  
Inspired by previous research, we examined a model exploring violent and non-
violent behavioral intentions based on key predictors from the social identity literature 
(Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Simon et al., 1998), perceived injustice 
literature (Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin & Bialosiewicz, 2012) and intergroup emotions 
theory (Smith, 1993; Smith et al., 2007). Specifically, we modeled Muslim identification 
and perceived injustice (against Muslim countries by the influence of the West) as 
independent variables, group-based anger as a mediator, and the two types of behavior 
intentions as final outcomes.   
A few things are worth noting about the model in itself. First, the order of the 
variables in the model was meant to reflect the cumulative insights in the literature on the 
causal relations between identification, cognitive appraisals, group-based emotions, and 
behavioral intentions (Smith, et al., 2012). Specifically, a number of studies suggest that 
both group identification and cognitive appraisals (e.g., perceived injustice) influence 
attitudes and behavioral intentions (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2008; Dumont, Yzerbyt, 
Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003). Research also indicates that group-based emotions mediate 
these effects (Gordijn et al., 2006).  
Second, we focus on behavioral intentions rather than attitudes or support of 
violence, because the former tend to be better proxies of behaviors (see De Weerd & 
Klandermans, 1999; Klandermans, Sabucedo, & De Weerd, 2002; see also Ajzen & 




suggests that there are different psychological factors associated with violent versus non-
violent group mobilization and collective action (Tausch et al., 2011; Livingstone, Spears, 
Manstead, & Bruder, 2009); consequently we wanted our model to account for this 
possibility. Fourth, whereas previous research has documented somewhat different 
effects of group-based anger and group-based contempt, we found these two variables to 
be highly correlated in our samples (r = .87), so we focused on anger alone to reduce 
multicollinearity.  
However, the most important question in this paper concerned the differences 
versus similarities between native- and foreign-born Muslims. Thus, using a multi-group 
approach (native- versus foreign-born Muslims), we directly tested whether the factors 
underpinning Muslim (violent and non-violent) mobilization differed based on direct 
experiences from Western foreign policies and occupations. A victimization-by-proxy 
argument would suggest that this is not the case, and that the explanatory models should 
be quite similar in both groups. Importantly, this is not to suggest that there are no 
psychological differences between these two groups, but if the model for native-born 
Muslims would mimic the one for foreign-born Muslims, we would, at the very least, 
have evidence for the claim that several key predictors of extremism operate in a 
vicarious fashion.  
 A second aim of the paper was to examine potential mean differences between 
native and foreign-born Muslims on Muslim identification, perceived injustice, group-
based anger as well as violent and non-violent behavior intentions. From a personal 
experience account, it would be reasonable to expect higher levels of, for example, 
intergroup anger and perceived injustice among foreign-born Muslims who have directly 
experienced the consequences of foreign occupation. However, a victimization-by-proxy 
position perspective would rather predict that perceived injustice, group-based emotions 
and corresponding actions tendencies can be elicited even when Muslims have not 









Participants study 1 
We sampled 226 (134 women) Muslims from 32 different Islam related Facebook 
websites in Denmark from February 15st to May 1st 2013. We selected these websites in 
such a way so as to provide demographic and ideological diversity. For example, we 
included websites for practicing Muslims with strong religious beliefs and adherence to 
traditional Islamic values, but also other websites with more moderate and secular 
Muslims.  
 
Table 1. Demographic Information for Each Sample. 
 Study 1 Study 2 
 













































































   
Of the total sample, 71 were born in Denmark, 125 in conflict zones and 24 
outside the conflict zones (the last category of participants were excluded from further 




for participation, but instead we paid 20 DKK (approximately $4) to a charitable cause 
chosen by each participant. Respondent ages ranged from 16 to 74, with the majority 
between 18-34-age (i.e., 88.5% of the total sample). Importantly, this age distribution 
matches those who join terrorist organizations in Europe (e.g., Bakker, 2006; Roy, 2007; 
see Table 1). 
The surveyed Muslim residents in Denmark constituted a prime example of a 
“hidden” and “hard-to-reach” population (see Heckathorn, 1997). In many cases, 
immigrant group membership involves low visibility with strong privacy concerns (e.g., 
many have little trust in the socio-political system of their host countries, and may hold 
uncertain legal status). Further, the media coverage of recent terrorist attacks in Europe 
linked to Muslims added additional difficulties to the data collection. Considering these 
factors, the sample size was determined by the amount of data that could be collected 
within the time frame of three months (the same was true in Study 2). Power 
considerations are discussed in the results section.  
 
Participants study 2 
Study 2 involved the same data collection procedure as in Study 1 from June 1st to 
August 30th 2013. We sampled 257 Muslims (177 women), where 114 were born in 
Denmark, 100 in conflict zones and 41 outside the conflict zones. The majority was in the 
18-34-age (82.9% of the total sample).  
 
Measures 
The surveys for Studies 1 and 2 included measures of Muslim identification, the 
perception of Western countries’ foreign policy and military interventions, group-based 
anger, and violent and non-violent behavioral intentions to defend and/or support 









Table 2. Items, Reliabilities, Mean Levels and Standard Deviations for Muslim 
Identification, Perceived Injustice, Group-based Anger, Violent and Non-violent 
Behavioural Intentions for Native- and Foreign-born Muslims Study 1 and 2. 
Instruments  Items 
Muslim identification 
Study 1 
(α = .87, M = 5.83, SD = 1.32) 
(α = .91, M = 4.64, SD = 1.73) 
Study 2 
(α = .86, M = 5.86, SD = 1.27) 
(α = .93, M = 4.80, SD = 1.79) 
 
(1). Being a Muslim is important to me.  
(2). I feel strongly connected to other Muslims.  
(3). I strongly identify with other Muslims. 
(4). I feel very connected to my religious community. 
 
Perceived injustice 
Study 1  
(α = .82, M = 5.39, SD = 1.18) 
(α = .84, M = 4.88, SD = 1.32) 
Study 2 
(α = .88, M = 5.23, SD = 1.34) 
(α = .88, M = 4.98, SD = 1.43) 
 
(1). Western military interventions in Muslim countries are immoral. 
(2). The foreign policy of Western countries harms Muslims 
worldwide.  
(3). The foreign policy of Western countries is anti-Islamic 
worldwide.  
(4). Muslims benefit from Western military interventions in Muslim 
countries. (R) 
(5). The foreign policy of Western countries towards Muslim nations 
cannot be justified. 
(6). Muslims in Muslim countries suffer because of the foreign policy 




(α = .89, M = 4.90, SD = 1.72) 
(α = .89, M = 4.13, SD = 1.67) 
Study 2 
(α = .90, M = 4.65, SD = 1.81) 
(α = .92, M = 4.34, SD = 1.82) 
 
(1). I feel angry when I think of Western countries’ foreign policies 
towards Muslim countries 
(2). I feel outrage when I think of Western countries’ foreign policy 
towards Muslim countries.  
(3). I feel furious when I think of Western countries’ foreign policy 
towards Muslim countries. 
 
 
Violent behavioral intentions 
Study 1 
(α = .90, M = 1.87, SD = 1.39) 
(α = .80, M = 1.64, SD = 1.27) 
Study 2 
(α = .68, M = 1.57, SD = 1.22) 
(α = .79, M = 1.47, SD = 1.01) 
 
Non-violent behavioral intentions 
Study 1 
(α = .90, M = 5.30, SD = 1.92) 
(α = .80, M = 4.90., SD = 1.87) 
Study 2 
(α = .68, M = 5.77, SD = 1.62) 
(α = .79, M = 5.19, SD = 1.88) 
(1). I am ready to use violence against other people in order to achieve 
something I consider very important.  
(2). I am ready to use violence against other people in order to change 





(1). To improve the disadvantaged position of Muslims I would sign a 
petition to the government. 
(2). I will sign a petition to change Western countries’ foreign policy 
towards Muslim countries. 
Note. (R) = reverse coded.  
  
Given the difficulty in reaching our sample, the present study was part of a larger 




survey. Variables not included here concerned, for example social dominance orientation 
and ethnic identification. Bivariate correlations between all focal variables for both 
studies and for all respondents are presented in Table 3.   
 
Table 3. Correlations between Variables for Native- (Below Diagonal) and Foreign-Born 
Muslims (Above Diagonal).  
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
Study 1      
      
1. Muslim identification - .32** .39** .12 .32** 
2. Perceived injustice .47** - .67** .01 .38** 
3. Group-based anger .41** .74** - .29** .44** 
4. Violent behavioral intentions .21 .06 .15 - .09 
5. Non-violent behavioral intentions .22 .36** .47** -.00 - 
      
Study 2      
1. Muslim identification - .42** .52** .23* .35** 
2. Perceived injustice .49** - .75** .26** .42** 
3. Group-based anger .38** .67** - .41** .43** 
4. Violent behavioral intentions .17 .23* .34** - .17 
5. Non-violent behavioral intentions .55** .48** .37** .19* - 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01. 
 
Statistical Considerations 
In our main analyses we tested the extent to which a model of violent and non-
violent behavioral intentions would differ between native- and foreign-born Muslims in 
Scandinavia. Specifically, if the model fit would not deteriorate when we assume all 
paths to be equal for native and foreign-born Muslims, we would have support for the 
victimization-by-proxy perspective. Importantly, this is a no-difference hypothesis, but 
structural equation modelling (and path analysis) provides a comparably rigorous way of 
testing such claims. Specifically it is well-known that models with many parameters 
easily turn into a significant misfit to the data (MacCallum, Browne, & Cai, 2006). In our 
case, we tested for the significance for differences between the two groups for all paths in 
the model. Thus, we compared a model with free estimates for all paths in both groups 
with another model where all paths were set to be equal across groups (14 df).  
If the equality-constraints, as compared to the free model, would deteriorate the fit 
from being close (RMSEA = .05) to acceptable (RMSEA =.08) then the power would 
be .97 to detect the difference (Preacher & Coffman, 2006). Also, if the RMSEA would 




MacCallum et al., 2006, for a discussion about the irony that poor fitting models are 
associated with better power). Finally, throughout all analysis of this paper, we used the 
robust maximum likelihood estimator in Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2012) to account for 
missing data (< 3%) and skewed distributions in, for example, violent intentions. 
 
Results 
Preliminary Path Analyses 
To examine the notion of victimization-by-proxy we first wanted to establish that 
our theoretical path model fit the data in Study 1, and could be replicated in Study 2 
(disregarding whether participants were born in Denmark or came from conflict zones). 
Thus, we first modeled all estimated coefficients as free to vary across both studies, and 
in a second model all coefficients were constrained as equal in the two studies. That is, 
we examined whether the results of the path analysis could be replicated across studies. If 
the model was indeed replicable, then we should not suffer any significant deterioration 
in model fit when constraining the model parameters to equality across studies. 
In fact, constraining the paths as equal across studies did not affect the fit 
compared to the free model, scaled Δχ2(9) = 8.91, p = .45. This indicates a lack of 
systematic differences between Studies 1 and 2, and that the overall model was 
replicable. Indeed, the constrained model, assuming all paths to be identical in Study 1 
and 2, had excellent fit overall, scaled χ2(11) = 10.82,  p = .46, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 
90% CI [.01, .07], SRMR = .03. Thus, in a follow-up analysis, we combined all available 
data. Here we found that Muslim identification and perceived injustice was unrelated to 
violent behavioral intentions (βs < 0.11, ps > .07). Nonetheless, we kept them in the 
model so that we could compare native- and foreign-born Muslims in the main analyses. 
The other standardized effects ranged from 0.17 to 0.64 (ps ≤ .01). We also tested 
whether these relations were robust to the introduction of demographic variables for age, 
gender and education. All paths that were significant without these control variables 







Multigroup (Native- versus Foreign-Born) Path Analyses 
The main question of this paper was whether the psychological underpinning of 
violence and non-violence would differ depending on the experience of Western 
countries foreign policy and military interventions in the Muslim world. To examine this 
question, we ran a similar multi-group path analysis as in the preliminary results, but 
instead of comparing Studies 1 and 2, we focused on comparing native- and foreign-born 
Muslims in Denmark (see participant section for details on this categorization). That is, to 
gain more reliable estimates in the native and foreign-born groups, we combined the data 
from the two samples (see preliminary path analyses, Figure 1). 
Compared to the unconstrained model, the fit did not deteriorate when we 
assumed that all paths were identical across native- and foreign-born participants, Δχ2(9) 
= 5.69, p = .77. In fact, the constrained model had excellent fit;  χ2(11) = 6.40, p = .85, 
CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 90% CI [.01, .04], SRMR = .02. This indicates that the 
empirical relationships in the model, for example between Muslim identification and 
endorsement of violence, are not strongly influenced by the fact that one comes from 
Muslim countries targeted by Western sanctions and military interventions22. The results 
from the unconstrained model, showing the (minor) variation across the two groups, are 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  We	  measured	  violent	  behavioral	  intentions	  with	  two	  items.	  Nevertheless,	  for	  conceptual	  reasons	  
we	  ran	  additional	  analyses	  where	  we	  only	  included	  the	  item	  that	  was	  directly	  related	  to	  violent	  
behavioral	  intentions	  in	  defense	  of	  Islam/Muslims	  (see	  Table	  2).	  The	  results	  of	  path	  model	  analysis	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  that	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  relations	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Figure 1. Standardized results of a multi-group (native- versus foreign-born) path 
analysis to predict violent and non-violent intentions to defend Islam and other Muslims. 
† p = .055 (perceived injustice -> non-violence), and p = .075 (anger -> non-violence).* p 
< .05. 
 
Next we tested the indirect effects of Muslim identification and perceived 
injustice (via group-based anger) on violent and non-violent intentions among both native 
and foreign-born Muslims. For that purpose we derived bootstrapped confidence intervals 
for these effects based on 5000 draws. There was a marginally significant indirect effect 
of Muslim identification on non-violent intentions for foreign-born Muslims (β = .05, 
95% CI [0.01, 0.10]), and this dropped to a non-reliable effect among native-born 
Muslims, β = .01, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.04]. There was a similar trend for violent intentions, 
(β = 0.09, [0.04, 0.15]), and (0.02 [-0.02, 0.06]). In addition, there was an indirect effect 
of perceived injustice on non-violent intentions among foreign-born participants (β = 0.15, 
95% CI [0.05, 0.25]), and a weaker, unreliable indirect effect among native-born 
participants (β = 0.11 [-0.01, 0.24]). Finally, the most noticeable indirect effects were 
found for perceived injustice in relation to violence, both within the foreign- (β = 0.27, 
[0.14, 0.39]) and native-born groups (β = 0.19 [0.07, 0.31]). Overall, the indirect effects 
were typically stronger among native-born Muslims, but as expected from the overall 
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Mean Differences between Native- and Foreign-born Muslims 
Finally, we examined mean differences between native and foreign-born Muslims 
on all variables in our model in a series of ANOVAs (see Figure 2).  Native-born 
participants in fact scored higher on Muslim identification (F[1, 407] = 53.09, p < .001, 
η2 = .12), group-based anger (F[1, 403] = 8.99, p = .003, η2 = .02), perceived injustice 
(F[1, 406] = 7,94, p = .005, η2 = .02), and non-violent intentions (F[1, 404] = 9,38, p 
= .002, η2 = .02). We found no significant difference with regards to violent behavioral 
intentions, F(1,406) = 1.05, p = .31, η2 = .003, indicating that even the endorsement of 
violent behavioral intentions does not differ between native-born Muslims and foreign-
born Muslims who came from countries that have been the target of Western foreign 
policy and military interventions. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean levels of study variables for participants born in Denmark versus coming 
from countries targeted by interventions by Western powers. Error bars represent 95% 




















As first studies on the thesis of victimization-by-proxy, we found support for the 
notion that vicarious psychological process could explain behavioral intentions among 
Danish Muslims to use violence in defense of Islam and/or Muslims. In two studies the 
psychological process motivating Muslim violence against the West did not differ 
between those coming from countries that have been the target of Western foreign policy 
and military interventions and those born in Denmark. Further, we also examined mean 
differences between native and foreign-born Muslims and the results showed that native-
born Muslims on average, more strongly identified with Muslims, perceived Western 
foreign policy as more unjust, reported greater group-based anger, and were more 
inclined to help Muslims by non-violent, but not violent, means.  
 
Participants Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 showed that the key mechanisms in extremism operate in 
vicarious fashion – that is, mimicking the effects of direct experience. One of the 
limitations of studies 1 and 2 is that we cannot be sure that participants born in conflicts 
zones actually count themselves as having direct personal experiences of Western foreign 
policies and military interventions. This is important because the entire argument of 
victimization-by-proxy rest on the idea that those who have not personally experienced 
Western foreign policy would be as inclined to commit terrorism against the West as 
those who have. Therefore, in study 3 we assessed the direct personal experience of 
Western foreign policy to validate our results from studies 1 and 2. In study 3 we 
sampled people who have had direct personal experience of Western foreign policy and 
compared them with people with no personal experience of Western foreign policy. If 
victimization-by-proxy process account for Muslim extremism then we should not find 
any difference between these two groups in their intentions to commit act of terrorism 
against the West as response to Western foreign policy and military interventions. 
Another aim of the study 3 was to use a more specific measure of violence and non-
violence in defense of Muslims and/or Islam to improve the predictability of behavioral 
intentions (see table 5).  




different context (among Swedish Muslims) and second, we used different measures (e.g., 
violent and non-violent intentions). Study 3 was conducted in Sweden and involved the 
same data collection procedure as in Studies 1 and 2. We sampled 161 (88 women) 
Muslims from 10 different Islam related Facebook websites. Due to the difficulties of 
obtaining respondents from this population, it took over 6 months to complete the data 
collection.   
Of the total sample, 86 indicated that they have had personally experienced 
Western foreign policy such as wars and occupation. Participants received no personal 
compensation for participation, but instead we paid 20 SEK (approximately $3) to a 
charitable cause chosen by each participant. Respondent ages ranged from 18 to 68, with 
the majority between 18-34-age (i.e., 86% of the total sample). (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Demographic Information for Each Sample. 
 Direct personal experience of 
Western foreign policy 
 
No personal experience of 
Western foreign policy  
Variables n (%) n (%) 
Experience of Western  

















































































The surveys for Study 3 included measures of Muslim identification, the 
perception of Western countries’ foreign policy and military interventions, group-based 
anger, violent behavioral intentions and non-violent  behavior to defend and/or support 
Muslims or/and Islam (see Table 5 for all items, means, standard deviations and 
reliabilities).  
 
Table 5. Items, Reliabilities, Mean Levels and Standard Deviations for Muslim 
Identification, Perceived Injustice, Group-based Anger, Violent and Non-violent 
Behaviour Intentions for Personal Experience and no-experience of Western foreign 
policy, Study 3. 
Instruments  Items 
 
Muslim identification 
No experience  
(α = .93, M = 5.11, SD = 1.87) 
Direct personal experience 
(α = .91, M = 5.11, SD = 1.84) 
 
(1). Being a Muslim is important to me.  
(2). I feel strongly connected to other Muslims.  
(3). I strongly identify with other Muslims. 
(4). I feel very connected to my religious community. 
 
Perceived injustice 
No experience  
 (α = .96, M = 4.51, SD = 1.96) 
Direct personal experience 
(α = .95, M = 4.26, SD = 1.86) 
 
(1). Western military interventions in Muslim countries are immoral. 
(2). The foreign policy of Western countries harms Muslims 
worldwide.  
(3). Western foreign policies and military interventions in Islamic 
countries are intentionally anti-Muslim. 
(4). Western foreign policies and military interventions in Islamic 
countries oppress Muslims.  
(5). Western foreign policies pose a threat to Muslims’ wellbeing. 
 
Group-based anger 
No experience  
(α = .94, M = 4.94, SD = 2.02) 
Direct personal experience 
(α = .91, M = 4.54, SD = 1.98) 
 
(1). I feel angry when I think of Muslim sufferings caused by Western 
foreign policies 
(2). I feel outrage when I think of Muslim sufferings caused by 
Western foreign policies. 
(3). Muslims suffering caused by western countries' foreign policies 
makes me angry. 
 
Violent behavioral intentions 
No experience  
(α = .85, M = 2.67, SD = 1.59) 
Direct personal experience 






Non-violent behavior intentions 
No experience  
(α = .91, M = 4.55, SD = 3.43) 
Direct personal experience 
(1). If nothing else helps, I'm prepared to use violence to defend 
Muslims. 
(2). As a last resort I’m personally ready to use violence for the sake 
of other Muslims. 
(3). I would personally use violence against people harming other 
Muslims that I care about. 
(4). I’m ready to go and fight for Muslims in another country. 
(5). I'm not prepared to use violence in any situation (R). 
(6). I would not personally use violence to help Muslims (R). 
 
(1). Taken part in a public debate defending Muslims/Islam. 
(2). Signed a petition defending Muslims/Islam. 
(3). Written a letter to an authority defending Muslims/Islam. 




(α = .84, M = 3.81, SD = 2.75) 
 
(5). Post a pro-Muslim comment on social media (for example 
Facebook or Twitter). 
(6). Donated money to help a Muslim charitable organization (before 
this study). 
Note. (R) = reverse coded.  
  
Given the difficulty in reaching our sample, the present study was part of a larger battery 
of variables, collected to answer different research questions within the same survey. 
Variables not included here concerned, for example perceived symbolic and realistic 
threats, perceived dehumanization and Islamophobia. Bivariate correlations between all 
focal variables for both studies and for all respondents are presented in Table 6.   
 
Table 6. Correlations between Variables  
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Muslim identification - .50** .52** .29** .43** 
2. Perceived injustice  - .72** .29** .51** 
3. Group-based anger   - .23** .45** 
4. Violent behavioural intentions    - .25** 
5. Non-violent behavioral intentions     - 
Note. **p < .01 
 
Results 
Path model for predicting violent and non-violent behavioral intentions 
We followed same analysis procedures as in studies 1 and 2. In our first analyses, 
we examined a path model testing the hypothesized relations between Muslim 
identification, perceived injustice, group-based anger and violent and non-violent  
behavior. The model fitted the empirical data well scaled χ2 (4) = 2.00, p = .73, CFI = 
1.00, RMSEA = .00, 90% CI [.00, .09], SRMR = .02). Hence, the final model including all 
estimated relations is presented in Figure 3. With the exception of one path from 
perceived group-based anger to non-violent behavioral intentions we replicated the 
victimization model proposed in Studies 1 and 2. Any further trimming resulted in poorly 







Figure 1. Standardized results of a multi-group (personal- versus no-expereince) path 
analysis to predict violent and non-violent intentions to defend Islam and other Muslims. 
† p = .067 (Muslims identification -> group-based anger),* p < .05. **p < .01. ***p 
< .001 
 
As in studies 1 and 2 we found that Muslim identification and perceived injustice 
were unrelated to violent behavioral intentions (βs < 0.07, ps > 0.5). The other 
standardized effects ranged from 0.22 to 0.60 (ps ≤ .002). Similar to studies 1 and 2 we 
also tested whether these relations were robust to the introduction of demographic 
variables for age, gender and education. All paths that were significant without these 
control variables remained just as strong in this analysis (βs > 0.21, ps ≤ .003). 
 
Multi-group path analysis for direct experience and no experience of Western 
foreign policy  
A multiple group path analysis was performed to see whether the model proposed 
above applied to those who with direct personal experience of Western foreign policy and 
those with no experience. We first ran a baseline model in which we allowed all relations 
between the variables to vary between the two groups. This model had excellent fit to the 
data Scaled χ2 (8) = 6.50, p = 0.59, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 90% CI [.00, .12]. Next, 
we tested a model in which all relations between the variables were constrained to be 
equal across both groups. This model also provided good fit Scaled χ2 (14) = 12.9, p = .54, 




models was non-significant  (Scaled Chi-Square Difference TRd (6) = 6.6, p = 0.4) 
indicating that the relationships between the variables appear to be highly consistent 
across the two groups.  
In addition to direct personal experience of Western foreign policy we also asked 
our participants whether any of their family members have personally experienced 
Western foreign policy to test whether the psychological underpinning of violence and 
non-violence would differ depending on family members’ direct personal experience of 
Western countries foreign policy and military interventions. Some argue that grievances, 
particularly caused by the loss of loved ones due to military action can be a potent factor 
of terrorism (Monahan, 2010). This is important because among native-born Muslims 
there might be people whose family members have personally experienced Western 
foreign policy. Therefore, although native-born Muslims have not personally experienced 
Western foreign policy their family member might have, which can indirectly victimize 
these individuals leading to behavioral and intentional consequences. To make sure that 
the victimization of some native born Muslims were not the consequence of family 
members experience of Western foreign policy, but was caused by vicarious process, we 
ran additional multi-group path analysis where we compared people with and without 
family members who have personally experienced Western foreign policy. Consistent 
with previous analyses our results showed that the relationships between the variables 
appeared to be highly consistent across the two groups (Scaled Chi-Square Difference 
TRd (6) = 7.11, p = 0.3) lending additional support to the thesis of victimization-by-proxy.  
To further examine the indirect effects of Muslim identification and perceived 
injustice (via group-based anger) on violent and non-violent behavioral intentions among 
those with direct personal experience versus no experience, we derived bootstrapped 
confidence intervals for these effects based on 5000 draws. There was a marginally 
significant indirect effect of Muslim identification on violent behavioral intentions among 
those with no direct experience of Western foreign policy (β = .09, 95% CI [0.03, 0.17]) 
and this dropped to non-significant effect among those with direct personal experience of 
Western foreign policy (β = .05, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.13]. The most noticeable indirect 
effects were found for perceived injustice in relation to violence, both within both groups 




Western foreign policy (β = 0.15 [0.02, 0.13]). Overall, in line with studies 1 and 2 the 
indirect effects were typically marginally stronger among those with no direct experience 
of Western foreign policy, but as expected from the overall model results the 
discrepancies were typically rather small.  
 
Mean Differences between direct personal Experience- and no-experience of 
Western foreign policy 
Finally, we examined mean differences between direct personal experience- and 
no-experience on all variables in our model in a series of ANOVAs (see Figure 4).  
Participants with no direct experience of Western foreign policy in fact scored higher on 
group-based anger (F[1, 154] = 1,60, p = .2, η2 = .01), perceived injustice (F[1, 154] 
= .654, p = .4, η2 = .00), non-violent  behavioral intentions (F[1, 155] = 2.27, p = .1, η2 
= .01). However, participants with direct experience of Western foreign policy scored 
higher on violent behavioral intentions (F[1, 154] = .120, p = .7, η2 = .00) and we found 
no difference in Muslim identification between the two groups (F[1, 151] = .0, p = .9, η2 
= .00). Nevertheless, it is important to note that none of these results were significant, 
indicating that there was no significant difference between those with direct personal 






Figure 4. Mean levels of study variables for participants with direct experience of 




The present studies tested if victimization-by-proxy processes could explain 
behavioral intentions to use violence in defense of Islam and/or Muslims. To do so we 
tested a model based on existing insights on collective action, social identity as well as 
intergroup emotions theories, and we ran multi-group path analyses to compare results 
among foreign- and native-born Muslims in Denmark and Sweden.  In this way, we 
compared the processes that affect intentions to use violence among Muslims with, 
versus without, personal experience of Western-led war/occupation. We also examined 
mean differences between native and foreign-born Muslims in both countries for all the 
variables in the model. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study that directly 
tests whether key mechanisms in extremism actually operate in vicarious fashion – that is, 




Following a victimization-by-proxy account for Muslim extremism, we predicted 
that behavioral intentions to defend Islam and Muslims should be underpinned by 
perceived injustice, Muslim identification, and group-based anger among people from 
conflict areas (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan) people with direct experience of Western 
foreign policy and for people born and raised in the West without experience of Western 
foreign policy. Across our three studies, the multi-group path analyses revealed similar 
results for all three groups of participants, indicating that inclinations to commit violence 
in defense of Islam and Muslims, for example, need not be anchored in personally 
experienced adversity – vicarious psychological responses can have the same effects. 
Among participants born in Denmark and Sweden, personal experience of wars, for 
example, could not possibly account for their Muslim identification, perceptions of global 
wrongdoings by the West, or subsequent anger and behavioral intentions. Even so, we 
found these variables to be linked to each other in a similar way as they were among 
participants who had migrated from areas targeted by military interventions or sanctions 
from the West. As such, these studies provided initial evidence for the victimization-by-
proxy perspective.  
Discussing the path model it should be noted, as a caveat, that we did not 
individually test every single path for differences between the two groups. This also 
implies that there could be more than mere statistical noise to some of the discrepancies. 
Still, running tests for individual paths would require a priori knowledge about which 
ones to focus on in particular (i.e. equivalent to planned contrasts), and they would also 
be associated with reduced power (see MacCallum et al., 2006). Also, as the constrained 
models fit the data so well, even in absolute terms, a generic model would seem 
preferable in terms of parsimony, as compared to unique models for native and foreign-
born Muslims.  
Beyond the path model, additional results from studies 1 and 2 showed that native-born 
participants were more identified with Muslims, perceived Western foreign policies as 
more unjust, felt more group-based anger and showed stronger intentions to support 
Muslims by non-violent means. Similarly, in study 3 we found the same trends although 
these results were not significant. This finding is striking giving that it is directly opposite 




in line with other propositions that second and third generation European Muslims 
particularly struggle with identity crises, feelings of alienation and anger, which makes 
them particularly vulnerable to extremist ideologies (Roy, 2005). Further, most likely the 
perception of Muslim suffering caused by Western foreign policy may resonate with their 
personal of discrimination in European societies where many second and third generation 
of Muslim Europeans experience on a daily basis. Further, personal grievances can be 
combined with group grievances leading to higher degree of Muslim identification, anger 
and alienation (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011). 
Besides demonstrating victimization-by-proxy processes on Muslim behavioral 
intentions to commit political violence, the current paper speaks to another issue that has 
been well-debated, but empirically understudied in the literature. Specifically, many have 
emphasized the role of emotions, and especially anger, for predicting Islamist terrorism. 
Nevertheless, these accounts are often based on anecdotal evidence (e.g., Atran, 2003; 
Gerges, 2005; Richardson, 2006; Ricolfi, 2005; Stern, 2003). Also, while some have 
shown that anger is related to violence (e.g., Livingstone et al., 2009), Tausch et al., 
(2011) have found that the predictive power of anger weakens as the criterion actions 
become more extreme. In this paper we asked about anger specifically in relation to 
foreign policy of Western countries, and we found that anger does indeed predict support 
for the use of violence in all three studies.   
 Overall, an important lesson from this inquiry is that the current focus on the 
relation between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Middle East must be complemented 
with a stronger focus on the intergroup dynamics within Western societies. Research 
suggests that ethnic identity has become increasingly salient in the West with public 
discourse dividing the population into  ‘us’ (ethnic Westerners) and  ’them’  (particularly 
Muslims; e.g. Dittrich, 2006; Hervik, 2004, see also Massad, 2015). From this 
perspective, increases in Muslim identification and accompanying group-based emotions 
might result in feelings of alienation and exclusion. Evidence suggests that Muslims in 
Europe, but also globally, face not only socioeconomic inequalities, but also political and 
cultural isolation (Stewart, 2008). Specifically, second-generation immigrants in 
Denmark are likely to feel deprived because they see themselves as Danes, but 




and third-generation Muslim Europeans, in particular, perceive themselves as second-
class citizens and feel disenfranchised within a society that does not fully accept them. 
Many may identify as Muslims, rather than Dane or German, because of blocked social 
mobility (Franz, 2007). Such native-born experiences and perceptions could perhaps 
explain why our native-born participants scored higher on non-violent intentions and 
higher on all the examined predictors of violent and non-violent collective action and 
protest. It is also possible that the mean differences reflect that foreign-born Muslims find 
it easier to appreciate how Denmark has offered their families a new home, and that they 
subsequently feel less mistreated, and so on. Either way, there is a need to direct more 
focus on how Muslim extremism at global scale may originate from within the West. 
Belmi, Barragan, Margaret, and Cohen (2015) recently suggested that situations 
involving a social identity threat easily generalizes to a global sense that one’s group is 
maltreated in society, which in turn leads to anti-social attitudes, intentions and disruptive 
behaviors. Our argument here is similar, but we extend it by noting that perceived 
mistreatment of one’s group does not only generalize to an idea of how a particular 
society works (in this case Danish society), but rather how the world as a whole works. 
Thus, while we could not argue that experiences in one’s closest surroundings are 
irrelevant, we find it interesting just how far these generalizations seem to go. 
Specifically, the current findings indicate that Muslims born in Denmark do not merely 
experience feelings specifically tied to Danish Muslims and mobilization in order to 
change that society in particular (by violent or non-violent means) – they seem to think, 
feel and act on behalf of a global Muslim community. From a social identity perspective, 
it can be argued that increasing hostile intergroup relations between Muslims and non-
Muslims may lead to a distinctiveness threat to which Muslim Europeans may respond by 
reasserting their threatened Muslim identity (Brewer, 1991). Because of a heighten sense 
of Muslim identity, Muslims most likely identify with both the suffering of Muslims in 
Europe and the suffering of Muslims abroad and, as a result, feel obliged to act on the 
basis of their Muslim identity. From a perspective stressing direct experience that makes 
little sense. However, it fits with the victimization-by-proxy argument. Clearly, a “strong” 
victimization-by-proxy argument, that is entirely blind to personal experience, seems 
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The Normal Personalities of Extremists – 
Examining Violent and Non-violent Defense of Muslims23 
 
Abstract 
Individuals becoming terrorists are often described as either “mentally ill”, or as 
“most anyone” under the pressure of contextual circumstances. We argued that 
extremists might be “normal” in a clinical sense while nonetheless bearing 
certain personality signatures. Indeed, results from two studies (N = 188 and 
193) suggest that both violent and non-violent behavioral intentions among 
European Muslims are predicted by basic personality traits. Violent intentions 
were related to low openness to experience and low emotionality, whereas non-
violent intentions were primarily related to empathy/altruism. When substituting 
non-violent intentions with actual behaviors the results were similar, suggesting 
that the findings are not merely self-report artefacts. Overall, the personality 
model explained 13-23% of the individual differences in these intentions, which 
matches the predictive power of social psychological models. The findings show 
that extremism is no exception to the principle that both person and situation 
factors influence human thoughts, feelings and behavior.  
 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Background and Aim 
In light of recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Beirut it is natural to ask who would 
do such things. Within the psychology literature that question has received two schematic 
answers. The first answer is ‘someone who is mentally ill’. The second answer is ‘most 
anyone’, at least when a person’s social surroundings are set up in a certain way. 
Illustrating the first position, Lankford (2014) commented that “suicidal motives, mental 
health problems, and personal crises are the most significant reason why fewer than 300 
suicide terrorists usually blow themselves up each year” (p. 352). In stark contrast, 
Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, and Medin (2011) noted that “in sum, a key difference between 
terrorists and most other people in the world may lie not so much in individual 
pathologies, personality, education, income, or any other demographic factor but in 
small-group dynamics where the relevant trait just happens to be jihad” (p. 517). Today 
most scholars side with Ginges and associates (e.g., Pape, 2003; Post, Ali, Henderson, 
Shanfield, Victoroff, & Weine, 2009; Sageman, 2004). 
In this paper we propose a third and overlooked possibility, namely that many 
people endorsing violence on behalf of a group might be normal in a clinical sense, but 
not necessarily random individuals. We propose that they could have non-pathological 
personality signatures. More broadly, non-clinical personality traits have been found to 
be related to political mobilization and normative collective action (e.g., Gallego & 
Oberski, 2012; Ha, Kim, & Jo, 2013; Opp & Brandstätter, 2010), and here we expanded 
such inquiries to also incorporate violence. We also considered the possibility that 
different personality traits are associated with violence versus non-violence to support a 
group. As simple as these ideas are they have neither been documented nor seriously 
considered. The reason, we will argue, is found in a situationist zeitgeist in the extremism 
literature. 
Personality and Extremism – Absent Effects or Absent Efforts? 
For most parts the person-situation debate in psychology has been resolved like 
the nature-nurture debate – by recognizing merits from both sides and by viewing these 
accounts as complementary rather than contradictive (e.g., Funder, 2006). Today the 




divorces and longevity), is beyond reasonable doubt (e.g., DeYoung, 2010; Roberts, 
Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). Likewise, the impact of the immediate 
situation and the broader context on social behaviors is equally undeniable (Asch, 1956; 
Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Milgram, 1963; Sherif, 1935) However, as illustrated 
in the opening paragraph, there is still a clear “either-or” rhetoric of person and situation 
factors when it comes to explaining extreme group behaviors. Yet if person and situation 
factors usually interact or complement each other, then this “situation only” case would 
be the exception that proves the rule. An alternative view is that the conclusion could 
represent a statistical type II error – a failure to detect actual personality effects because 
of limited data and constrained sampling in terms of study populations and instruments.  
The data speaking against person effects are indeed limited, both in quantity and 
breadth. The lack of breadth is linked to the pre-occupation to discuss normality versus 
abnormality. Work that supposedly address the personality hypothesis confound traits 
with demographics and pathology, or lack data altogether (Gottschalk & Gottschalk, 
2004; Lyons & Harbinson, 1986; Morf, 1970). For example, Gottschalk and Gottschalk 
(2004) suggested that the personality of extremists is marked by “pathological hatred”. In 
addition, the studies have often relied on ad hoc measures (e.g., Schbley, 2003) and/or 
very small samples (e.g., Merari, Diamant, Bibi, Broshi, and Zakin, 2010). Naturally, 
these problems do not prove anything in favor of a trait approach, but they do suggest 
that extremism researchers have jumped to conclusions that are unwarranted by the 
available data. In essence, the extremism literature has overlooked that even “normal” 
people systematically differ from each other, and these differences may also matter for an 
attraction to “abnormal” behaviors (e.g., terrorism). Perhaps this is the simple reason why 
personality effects have not yet been documented. 
The History Repeating Itself 
The rhetoric in the extremism literature is similar to the prejudice literature some 
decades ago, and the historical trajectories are practically parallel. When Adorno, 
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) iniated their authoritarian personality 
project they were looking for pathological characteristics. Their authoritarian personality 




tendencies. Over time, however, this view fell into disfavor and social psychologists 
recoiled to argue that the real explanations should be traced to identification processes 
and intergroup dynamics (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987). This reaction is parallelled by the arguments in the extremism literature 
today (see e.g., Ginges et al., 2011).  
So do group dynamic explanations always get the best of individual difference 
perspectives? We do not think so, and there is a good reason why. When Altemeyer 
(1981) re-introduced the authoritarianism concept, he got rid of the Freudian and 
pathological aspects in the earlier theory.  The result was one of the best predictors of 
anti-minority prejudice ever conceived (e.g., McFarland, 2010). Further, when the 
personality status of authoritarianism was challenged (e.g., Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, & 
Ryan, 2001), others confirmed personality effects for core traits (like the Big-Five) as 
well (e.g., Ekehammar & Akrami, 2003). Today it is difficult to deny that basic 
personality tendencies predict many prejudices (for a meta-analysis, see Sibley & Duckitt, 
2008). As such the prejudice research boils down to a simple lesson: The idea that 
personality would be irrelevant turned out to be empirically false, and it was advanced in 
the first place because researchers were focusing on psychopathology and the wrong 
instruments.  
The same might also be true for other “high-profile” phenomena in social 
psychology. For example, Zimbardo (2007) has argued that there were no personality 
effects at play in his infamous prison experiments, and that participants were normal and 
healthy (just like most terrorists and the prison guards in Abu Ghraib). However, 
Carnahan and McFarland (2007) demonstrated that a whole range of personality and 
ideological variables explain attraction to a prison study like Zimbardo’s. Quite possibly, 
they found Zimbardo’s missing personality effects because they looked beyond pathology 
and because they had better predictors (as well as better statistical power). If this is 
correct, just as it was in the case of prejudice, then we could expect to repeat the 







The Current Research 
The aim of this paper was to examine to what extent non-clinical personality 
variables predict violent as well as non-violent behavioral intentions among European 
Muslims to support their religious group. Because of practical and ethical difficulties of 
reaching Muslims engaged in terrorism, we focused on behavioral intentions for group-
based violence and non-violence in the general population of European Muslims. 
Noteworthy, if personality predisposes individuals for violence then these inclinations 
should still show up in non-extremist samples. Further, intentions tend to be better than 
attitudes as proxies of behaviors (De Weerd  & Klandermans, 1999; see also Ajzen  & 
Fishbein, 1977), so the external validity should at least be on par with studies focusing on 
attitudinal support for violence in normal populations (e.g., Ginges, Hansen, & 
Norenzayan, 2009).  
As for the personality variables in focus we were especially resolute not to let 
specific traits speak to the role of personality at large. Instead, we aimed to cover a wide 
gamut of human personality. For that reason we used the HEXACO personality model 
(Ashton & Lee, 2007). Until recently it has been a widely endorsed viewpoint that five 
broad personality dimensions provide good coverage of human personality (e.g., McCrae 
& Costa, 2008). The HEXACO model was introduced to account for observations that in 
many languages there is evidence of six dimensions (Ashton & Lee, 2007). Our interest 
in the HEXACO model was also guided by recent research suggesting that the last 
extracted factor, honesty-humility, is an important predictor of various group attitudes 
(e.g., Sibley, Harding, Perry, Asbrock, & Duckitt, 2010). It could also bridge basic 
personality research with the claim in (some) clinical research that extremists have 
psychopathic traits (Cooper, 1978); honesty-humility is inversely and strongly related to 
such tendencies (e.g., Lee & Ashton, 2014). The remaining factors of the HEXACO 
model are agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotionality, extraversion, and openness to 
experience.  
Among the HEXACO variables our clearest expectations were to find an 
association between low openness and endorsement of violence. This prediction follows a 
long line of research suggesting that dogmatism is associated with intolerance toward 




critical submission to authorities (e.g., religious ones, Duckitt, 2001). We predicted that 
narrow-mindedness regarding values would be associated with violence, rather than the 
aspects of openness that deal with intellectual capacities (for a discussion on this 
distinction, see DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007). To test this hypothesis we included 
additional items specifically focusing on these different nuances.   
 
Study 1 
Study 1 took place in Denmark, the country of the (first) Muhammad cartoon 
controversy. Besides from Belgium, Denmark has also been the European country 
producing most homegrown Muslim fighters per capita since 2012 (Neumann, 2015).  
 
Method 
Participants and Power Analysis. We aimed to use sample size around 200 based 
on a power analysis assuming personality correlates of .20, α = .05, and a power of .80. 
The effect size estimate was (conservatively) based on meta-analytic data on personality 
correlates in group attitudes (see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Thus, we recruited 213 
participants from a range of Danish Facebook groups related to Islam. Given that the 
participants came from a hard-to-reach population, it took us two months to collect this 
amount of data. Only those reporting to be Muslim (practicing or non-practicing) were 
kept for the analyses (N = 188; 69% women).  
To avoid indirect identification on a sensitive topic like this the demographics 
were sparse and we asked for age in bins of five years (and18-20/>76). The type age was 
20-25, and 83% were between 18 and 30. This age distribution was a slightly lower than 
the age of European Muslims convicted for terrorist crimes (e.g., Bakker, 2006). 14% had 
completed high school, 48% were enrolled in university studies, and 24% had earned a 
university degree, and 14% gave miscellaneous answers to the question about education. 
No compensations were given directly to the participants. Instead we asked each 








To assess personality, we used the Danish translation of the 100-item HEXACO-
PI-R inventory (Lee & Ashton, 2004; Zettler, 2015). Each of the six factors includes 16 
items, such as “I tend to be lenient in judging other people” (agreeableness,  
α = .78), “I clean my office or home quite frequently” (conscientiousness, α = .79), “I 
worry a lot less than most people do” (reversed emotionality, α = .80), “I avoid making 
‘small talk’ with people” (reversed extraversion, α = .81), “I wouldn’t want people to 
treat me as though I were superior to them” (honesty-humility, α = .80), and “I enjoy 
looking at maps of different places” (openness, α = .82). The 100-item inventory also 
includes an interstitial facet scale labelled altruism (double-loading on honesty-humility 
and agreeableness) of four items (e.g. “I am a soft-hearted person”). To get a better 
measure of altruism/empathy we also included four items from the 200-item HEXACO-
PI-R (α = .70). In addition, we collected a set of items from the International Personality 
Item Pool (IPIP) to assess both intellect and value facets in openness (see Supplemental 
materials; see also De Young et al., 2007). However, because of low reliability in the 
value composite (α = .40), we only examined the intellect composite (α = .72), as 
compared to the HEXACO instrument.   
For the purposes of this study we created three measures to use as dependent 
variables. These included non-violent intentions to defend Islam and other Muslims (α 
= .72), a violent intentions counterpart (α = .87), and intentions to assistant Muslims 
carrying out acts of violence (α = .76). The last items were included because of the 
possibility that those willing to assist violent extremists might have different personalities 
compared to those willing to carry out violence themselves. All items included in the 
behavioral intentions inventories are presented in the Supplemental materials, along with 
basic descriptive statistics. For validation purposes we also included four items to 
measure Muslim identification (α = .86) as previously used among Danish Muslims (e.g. 
“being a Muslim is important to me”, see Obaidi, Bergh, Sidanius, & Thomsen, 2015). 
Three questions asked about conservative attitudes as related to Islam, social and 
economic issues, but these were not analyzed. Finally, we included behavioral reports of 
11 non-violent acts, but they were not included in the main analyses due to having a 





Preliminary Results. Behavior intentions to personally use violence were strongly 
correlated with behavioral intentions to assist violent others (r = .74, p >.001). Thus, we 
combined all items related to violence into the same index (α = .90). The decision to do 
so was also supported by an exploratory factor analysis (see Supplemental materials for 
details). This aggregate for violent intentions was unrelated to non-violent intentions (r 
= .08, p = .28). 
In line with previous research (e.g., Phalet, Baysu, & Verkuyten, 2010), we found 
that both non-violent and violent intentions were related to Muslim identification (r = .27 
and .38 respectively, ps < .001). Addressing discriminant validity, we anticipated men to 
score higher than women on violent intentions but not non-violent ones. Indeed, this was 
the case, t(182) = 4.31, p < .001, d = 0.65 for violence, and t(182) = -0.75, p = .45, d = -
0.12 for non-violence. 
HEXACO Regression Analyses. To test the influence of the personality variables 
on the different behavioral intentions, we ran regression analyses using a robust 
maximum likelihood estimator to obtain unbiased standard errors with missing and/or 
skewed data (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Both non-violent and violent intentions were 
predicted by personality (R2 = .16 and .13, p = .002 and .006 respectively), but in 
different ways. Non-violent intentions were predicted by altruism, agreeableness, and 
marginally by conscientiousness (p = .055). Still, the agreeableness relation seemed to 
reflect a suppressor effect by altruism (β = 0.08, p = .32, without altruism). Violent 
intentions were associated with low emotionality and openness. All coefficients are 
presented in Table 1. 
With the addition of age and gender (dummy coded: Female = 0, Male = 1) as 
covariates24, the personality effects were at least on par with the original model with one 
exception. Specifically, the emotionality-violence relation dropped in strength (β = –0.14,  
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p = .07). As could be expected from the preliminary results, there was a unique effect of 
gender on violent intentions (β = –0.22, p = .004). All standardized results from this 
model are presented in the Supplemental materials. 
Table 1. Standardized Relations between HEXACO Personality Variables and Violent and 
Non-Violent Intentions in Study 1. 
 Violent intentions  Non-violent intentions 
       β 95% CI     p        β 95% CI     p 
Agreeableness 0.00 [-0.18, 0.19] .971  -0.21 [-0.35, -0.06] .004 
Conscientiousness -0.02 [-0.18, 0.15] .854  0.15 [-0.01, 0.30] .056 
Emotionality -0.23 [-0.39, -0.07] .003  -0.06 [-0.21, 0.08] .380 
Extraversion -0.08 [-0.26, 0.09] .359  0.04 [-0.11, 0.19] .597 
Honesty-humility -0.13 [-0.30, 0.05] .139  -0.06 [-0.22, 0.10] .436 
Openness -0.18 [-0.34, -0.02] .028  0.07 [-0.08, 0.22] .380 
Altruism -0.03 [-0.23, 0.17] .753  0.42 [0.24, 0.60] <.001 
Note. Confidence intervals based on bias-corrected bootstraps (5000 draws). All significance testing is 
based on Robust Maximum Likelihood (MLR) estimation. 
 
Openness Facets. In our final analyses we compared HEXACO openness and 
IPIP intellect as predictors of violent and non-violent intentions. As in the main analyses, 
HEXACO openness negatively predicted violent intentions (β = –0.23, 95% CI [-0.41, -
0.05]25, p = .02), but not non-violence (β = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.18], p = .68). Intellect 
revealed an opposite pattern, it positively predicted non-violence (β = 0.21, 95% CI [0.06, 
0.35], p = .005) while being unrelated to violence (β = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.25], p 
= .65). 
Discussion 
As a first study on basic personality and Muslim extremism, we found support for 
the notion that such variables indeed predict behavioral intentions to support Muslims 
with violence. Those endorsing violence scored lower on emotionality and openness. 
That is, these individuals reported, for example, less fear and stress (emotionality) as well 
as less imagination and more mental rigidity (openness). As we further expected, those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




endorsing non-violent support of Muslim were characterized by other traits, most notably 
higher altruism/empathy. 
Study 2 
Study 2 was mainly aimed as a replication of the effects from first study. This 
study took place in Sweden, following closely behind Denmark at the top of the list of 
European countries exporting most fighters per capita to Syria and Iraq (Neumann, 2015). 
In this replication we focused specifically on the characteristics that were most clearly 
predictive of violent and non-violent intentions in Study 1 – that is, altruism, emotionality 
and openness. Another aim of the study was to provide further validation of the notion 
that personality predicts behavioral inclinations among Muslims – and not just self-
reported intentions. Thus, we provided an opportunity to donate a part (or all) of the 
participation reward to the Red Crescent. We predicted that donations would be 
positively related to non-violent support of Muslims, but not violent intentions. We 
further hypothesized that the altruism measure would predict the decision to donate, just 
like it predicted non-violent intentions in Study 1. Finally, since the choice to donate was 
done anonymously we expected donations to relate to honesty-humility (see also Exline 
& Hill, 2012). 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. As in study 1, we aimed for a sample size around 
200 based on our initial power analysis. In this study we recruited participants from a 
yearly Muslim convention in Sweden (“Muslim family days” – the largest meeting place 
for Muslims in Scandinavia). This provided us with a heterogeneous group to sample 
from, and some consider the event to be controversial due to links between invited 
speakers and Hamas as well as the Muslim Brotherhood (Gudmundson, 2014). 
260 surveys were handed out, 225 were returned. Participants who were missing 
more than one third of the responses (one whole page in the survey) for the independent 
(personality) variables were excluded, leaving 185-187 for the different analyses (62% 




were enrolled), and 13% had earned a university degree (32% were enrolled in university 
studies). The remaining 2% had no education beyond elementary school. 
At the convention our research assistants gave each participant a survey, an 
envelope and two 20SEK bills (~$5). Participants were requested to put the surveys in the 
envelope, and they were also informed that they could also put any of the money in it and 
we would subsequently donate it to the Red Crescent. Although bills provided a more 
crude measure of donations (0, 20 or 40 SEK), we chose this alternative to prevent the 
possibility to tell from the sealed envelopes if participants had put any money in it. To 
further reduce social desirability effects the participants were sent off to complete the 
survey and they were requested to only return with enclosed envelopes.  
Materials.  
As the study was conducted with a paper-pencil questionnaire at a convention 
center, we kept it short by using the 60-item version of HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2009; 
αs = .64, .60 and .61 for emotionality, honesty-humility, and openness respectively). The 
interstitial altruism facet (α = .76) and the additional intellect (openness) items (α = .65) 
were measured as in Study 1, and so were the non-violent (α = .6426) and violent 
intentions27. Again we combined the items for violence and violence-assistance into one 
index (α = .84). 
Results 
Preliminary Results. In this case the relation between violent and non-violent 
intentions was weakly negative, r = –.19, p = .01. As in Study 1, we also examined 
gender differences in violent and non-violent intentions as an initial validation of our 
construed (and now translated) measures. As predicted, men scored significantly higher 
than women on violent intentions, t(177) = 2.46, p = .02, d = 0.38. On the other hand, 
women scored higher on non-violent intentions, t(177) = 2.17, p = .03, d = 0.33. 
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HEXACO Regression Analyses. All the effects from Study 1 were replicated in 
this sample using HEXACO-60 variables. Again, both non-violent and violent intentions 
were predicted by basic traits (R2 = .23 and .21 respectively, ps < .001), and the different 
outcomes had different personality signatures. Altruism was rather strongly and 
positively related to non-violent intentions, but it was also negatively related to violent 
intentions. The openness relationships revealed a similar pattern, but with a stronger 
(negative) effect on violence. Finally, emotionality was only related (negatively) to 
violent intentions. All coefficients are summarized in Table 2.  
Table 2. Standardized Relations between HEXACO Personality Variables and Violent 
Intentions, Non-Violent Intentions, and Non-Violent Behavior in Study 2. 
 Violent intentions  Non-violent intentions  Non-violent behavior 
   β 95% CI p  β 95% CI p  β 95% CI p 
Emotionality -0.21 [-0.36, -0.07] .003  -0.03 [-0.16, 0.10] .646  0.06 [-0.12, 0.24] .490 
Openness -0.26 [-0.41, -0.12] <.001  0.16 [0.02, 0.31] .031  0.10 [-0.08, 0.27] .292 
Altruism -0.18 [-0.31, -0.06] .004  0.40 [0.28, 0.53] <.001  0.22 [0.00, 0.44] .048 
Note. Confidence intervals based on bias-corrected bootstraps (5000 draws), except in the logistic 
regression for non-violent behaviors. Such results are not available in Mplus for standardized effects 
and maximum likelihood estimation. All significance testing is based on Robust Maximum 
Likelihood (MLR) estimation. 
As in Study 1 we also tested a model including age and gender as covariates. The 
inclusion of these demographic variables did not change the magnitude or interpretation 
of any of the personality relations. In this case, there were no unique gender or age effects 
once the role of personality had been considered (see Supplemental materials for details). 
Openness Facets. Comparing the predictability of HEXACO openness and IPIP 
intellect we again found that the latter was positively associated with non-violent 
intentions (β = 0.24, 95% CI [0.09, 0.39], p = .002), but not the violent counterparts (β = 
–0.05, 95% CI [–0.22, 0.12], p = .55). Further, as in study 1, HEXACO openness was 
negatively related to violent intentions (β = –0.31, 95% CI [–0.48, –0.14], p <.001), but 
only marginally to non-violent intentions (β = 0.14, 95% CI [–0.02, 0.30], p = .08). 
Behavioral Validation. 31% of the participants chose to donate their entire reward, 




no donation, 1 = donation) as nobody donated half. As expected, donations were 
positively related to non-violent intentions (point biserial r = .16, 95% CI [.01, .29], p 
= .02). Donations were also negatively related to violent intentions (point biserial r = –.18, 
95% CI [–.01, –.31], p = .01). Finally, we ran a logistic regression with donations as the 
dependent variable and the HEXACO variables as predictors. As in the case of non-
violent behavioral intentions, altruism was the strongest predictor of donations. In fact, 
that was the only significant predictor (β = 0.22, p = .05, see Table 2 for all results). 
However, adding honesty-humility to the model this variable turned out to be a better 
predictor (β = 0.33, p < .001) and the empathy relationship dropped to non-significance 
(β = 0.06, p = .59). 
Discussion 
This study replicated all the personality relations observed in Study 1, but in this 
case there was also evidence of an inverse relationship between endorsing violent and 
non-violent behaviors. This was true for the simple correlation between the two classes of 
intentions, but it was also evident in the personality relations. Further, actual behavior to 
support Muslims by non-violent means, assessed through donations to a Muslim charity 
organization, was positively related to non-violent behavioral intentions and negatively 
related to violent intentions. Although the correlations were modest, they provide some 
buttress against the idea that the findings would merely be methodological artifacts 
stemming from the use of self-reports. As expected on conceptual grounds, there was a 
fairly strong relation between self-reported altruism, and especially honesty-humility, in 
relation to donating behaviors.  
General Discussion 
Research on extremism tends to pitch person and situation explanations against 
each other as if they were mutually exclusive. In this paper we aimed to show that the 
dominant (situationist) interpretation, which disregard any influences of person 
characteristics (e.g., Ginges et al., 2011), provides an incomplete picture of extremism. 
Indeed, our two studies provide evidence that violent behavioral intentions among 
European Muslims are associated with two non-clinical personality traits – low openness 




altruistic/empathic dispositions and to a lesser extent higher openness, at least some 
aspects thereof. Further, the overall explained variance (13-23% in the main analyses) 
suggest that a basic personality model fairs just as good as social psychological models of 
extremism and collective action (using similar dependent variables and populations; see 
e.g,,  Tausch et al., 2011). 
Given our results we would not conclude that personality variables are better 
explanations for extremism than situational ones, they rather capture complementary 
effects. For example, Atran (2010) argued that the making of a terrorist is primarily 
traced to the social dynamics of friends and family, but personality factors could help 
explain why certain circles of families and friend are susceptible to violence when other 
ones are not. Indeed, the simple fact basic personality is heritable (e.g., Jang, Livesley, & 
Vernon, 1996), could partly underpin the family effect.  Also, people choose friends 
based on personality (Selfhout et al., 2010), which could underpin the friendship effect. 
On the other hand, the expressions of personality are always bounded by situational 
factors (extraversion, for example, is hard to express in solitude; Funder, 1991). In this 
case the situational specificity remains undetermined; it could be rather narrow 
(personality predicts violent intentions among some Scandinavian Muslims) or rather 
broad-spanning (personality predicts most any counter-dominance violence).  
In terms of the different personality effects both the emotionality and openness 
relations with violence are worth further attention. First of all, emotionality/neuroticism 
is the basic personality trait that figures most in the clinical literature as a risk factor for 
mental problems related to, for example, anxiety and depression (e.g., de Moor et al., 
2015). However, mental health problems are for most part associated with high 
emotionality or neuroticism, and our participants endorsing violence were rather found at 
the opposite end of the spectrum. The negative relation was in part accounted for by 
known gender difference in both emotionality (women higher; e.g., McCrae  et al., 2005) 
and violence (men higher; see e.g., Eley, Lichtenstein, & Stevenson, 1999), but not fully 
so. As such, our findings stand in contradiction to Lankford’s (2014) suggestion that 
terrorists are predisposed for psychological problems known to be associated with high 
emotionality or neuroticism. These results rather suggest that Muslims endorsing 




we have tapped into a mentality of entirely absent emotionality – a psychopathic nature. 
However, this perspective is contradicted by the lack of relations with honesty-humility, 
the best basic personality predictor of psychopathy (e.g., Lee & Ashton, 2014). Indeed, 
one of the reasons why we chose to assess personality with HEXACO rather than a Big 
Five inventory was that we would have the best possible leverage to test the notion of a 
“psychopathic extremist”. These data showed no evidence thereof. 
Perhaps the most interesting findings for openness was the fact that aspects 
related to intellect revealed quite distinct results as compared to the HEXACO with more 
focus on values and interests (Ashton & Lee, 2007). Specifically, it would seem difficult 
to predict violent intentions based on a person’s intellect, but all the more easy with 
measures including inflexible values and conventional interests. Higher scores on 
intellect rather seem to imply that the individual endorses non-violent means to support a 
group.   
Discussing the measures and populations used, the most obvious limitation of our 
inquiry is that self-reports in the “normal” populations can be questioned for validity 
when predicting actual terrorist acts. Also, despite that we could expect to see personality 
signatures at the early stage of a radicalization process (and hence detectable in normal 
population samples) our data do not speak to the possibility that other factors nudge or 
divert people from actual violence. Still, these criticisms are hardly confined to these 
studies; they could nullify a long list of other psychology papers as well (see e.g., Ginges 
et al., 2009; Tausch et al., 2011). Nonetheless, we took some tentative steps to address 
this concern by incorporated actual behaviors to validate the findings for non-violent 
group mobilization; those who scored higher on empathy and non-violent intentions also 
donated money to a higher extent. Also, just like the violent and non-violent intentions 
were weakly and inversely related in Study 2, the same was true for the relation between 
violent intentions and donating behaviors. Still, for natural reasons we did not have a 
behavioral counterpart for the violent intentions.  
With the caveat that self-reported attitudes intentions may not always imply actual 
violence, the take home message of this paper is that personality predictors deserves be 
taken serious, just like their social psychological counterparts. In countless domains of 




peoples’ thoughts and feelings and actions (e.g., Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003; 
Roberts et al., 2007). The current findings suggest that neither violent nor non-violent 
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Openness Intellect and Values 
In addition to the HEXACO personality variables we sampled additional openness 
items from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) to assess aspects of the factor 
specifically related to intellect and values 
(http://ipip.ori.org/newIndexofScaleLabels.htm). Considering that our participants were 
Muslims we chose items without political or cultural contents being specifically 
associated with the Western World. We also chose items that would not involve language 
skills as Danish and Swedish would be a second language to many participants. The 
















Table S1.Items Used to Assess Intellect versus Value Aspects of Openness (Study 1/2).   
Intellect (M = 3.70/3.73. SD = 0.56/0.60. α = .72/.65) 
1. I like to solve complex problems.  
2. I can handle a lot of information.  
3. I enjoy thinking about things.  
4. I am not interested in abstract ideas.  (R) 
5. I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.  (R)  
6. I tend to analyze things.  
7. I learn quickly.  
 
Values (M = 2.54/ – . SD = 0.69/ – . α = .40/ – ) 
1. I believe that there is no absolute right or wrong.  
2. I believe that criminals should receive help rather than punishment.  
3. I believe in one true religion.  (R)  
4. I believe that too much tax money goes to support artists.  (R)  
Note. (R) = Reverse scored. The value items were not included in the analyses, nor included in 







Items Measuring Behavior Intentions 
 
Table S2. Items for Assessing Behavior Intentions to Support Muslims Using Violence, Assisting 
Others Using Violence, and Non-Violence (Descriptive Statistics Study 1/2).   
Violent intentions (M = 2.11/2.62, SD = 0.93/0.94, α = .87/.82) 
1. If nothing else helps I'm prepared to use violence to defend Muslims. 
2. As a last resort I’m personally ready to use violence for the sake of other Muslims. 
3. I will personally use violence against people harming other Muslims that I care about. 
4. I’m ready to go and fight for Muslims in another country.  
5. I'm not prepared to use violence in any situation. (R) 
6. I will not personally use violence to help Muslims. (R) 
7. Even as a last resort, I will not use violence for the sake of others Muslims. (R) 
 
Violence-assistance intentions (M = 1.95/2.45, SD = 0.85/0.94, α = .76/.53) 
1. I'm prepared to assist others carry out acts of violence to defend Muslims. 
2. If I can help Muslims by assisting people using violence, I will do so. 
3. I'm not prepared to aid someone who is using violence to defend Muslims. (R) 
4. No matter what the situation is, I will not assist someone harming others in defense of Muslims. (R) 
 
Non-violent intentions (M = 4.19/3.93, SD = 0.59/0.83, α = .72/.64) 
1. To help Muslims, I will sign petitions. 
2. I’m prepared to stand up for Muslims by peaceful means. 
3. I will express my support for Muslims by taking parts in public debates. 
4. I’m not prepared to take part in a peaceful demonstration for Muslims. (R) 
5. I will not express my support for Muslims in public. (R) 
6. I am not prepared to take part in debates to defend Muslims. (R) 
Note. (R) = Reverse scored. The first two scales were combined in the analyses due to their high 





Correlation Matrices and Descriptive Statistics 
Table S2. Means (M), Standard Deviations (SD) and Correlations between Study Variables in 
Study 1. 
Variable M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1.   Agreeableness 3.13 0.52 1.00 
         
2.   Altruism 4.28 0.48 .44** 1.00 
        
3.   Conscientiousness 3.58 0.51 .15* .20** 1.00 
       
4.   Emotionality 3.35 0.55 -.07 .37** -.07 1.00 
      
5.   Extraversion 3.40 0.54 .32** .16* .19** -.20** 1.00 
     
6.   Honesty-humility 3.78 0.56 .29** .52** .31** .07 .07 1.00 
    
7.   Openness to Experience 3.31 0.60 .09 .15* .01 -.02 .20** .08 1.00 
   
8.   Openness - Intellect 3.70 0.56 .09 .21** .25** -.13 .25** .19* .41** 1.00 
  
9.   Non-Violent Intentions 4.19 0.59 .00 .32** .19** .08 .09 .14 .12 .22** 1.00 
 
10. Violent intentions 2.05 0.85 -.07 -.23** -.06 -.23** -.08 -.19* -.21** -.05 .08 1.00 











Table S3. Means (M), Standard Deviations (SD) and Correlations between Study 
Variables in Study 2. 
Variable M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1.   Altruism 4.01 0.71 1.00 
       
2.   Emotionality 3.19 0.58 .29** 1.00 
      
3.   Openness to Experience 3.20 0.61 .24** .10 1.00 
     
4.   Openness - Intellect 3.73 0.60 .32** .08 .50** 1.00 
    
5.   Honesty-humility 3.50 0.64 .44** .10 .19** .22** 1.00 
   
6.   Non-Violent Intentions 3.93 0.83 .43** .13 .30** .32** .28** 1.00 
  
7.   Violent intentions 2.56 0.85 -.31** -.30** -.34** -.20** -.24** -.19** 1.00 
 
8.   Donation - - .21** .09 .13 .11 .32** .16* -.17* 1.00 








Exploratory Factor Analysis for Behavior Intentions 
For the purposed of our studies we created items to assess non-violent and violent 
behavior intentions, as well as a willingness to help others carrying out violence. 
However, an exploratory factor analysis in Study 1 (using robust maximum likelihood 
[MLR]) suggested that only two factors had eigenvalues above chance level. Specifically, 
this was concluded in a parallel test with 50 random datasets (see e.g., Fabrigar, Wegener, 
MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). Also, from a one- to two-factor solution the RMSEA 
dropped from .11 (poor fit) to .08 (acceptable fit), and beyond that the fit improvements 
were smaller (.07 for a three-factor solution). A scree-plot including the results of the 
parallel test is presented in Figure S1. Geomin rotated loadings (for the two-factor 
solution) are presented in Figure S2.  
 
 
Figure S1. Scree plot from parallel test with 50 random datasets, the analysis are based 





Figure S2. Mplus screenshot showing the rotated loadings in the two-factor solution for 















Regression Analyses with Demographic Covariates 




Figure S3. Standardized results (standard errors) from the main regression results with 





Study 2 results 
 
 
Figure S4. Standardized results (standard errors) from the main regression results with 







































General Discussion  
This dissertation explored the social psychological factors behind motivation of 
some Muslim Europeans to support and commit terrorism against Europe. Broadly 
speaking, this dissertation began to explore the premises that the potential for 
participating in asymmetrical collective violence must be understood as interplay 
between individual potential, and external and societal factors. This is different from 
existing literature, which tends to focus exclusively on either situational factors or 
psychopathology.  
 
Theoretical papers  
Paper I in this dissertation argued that the dichotomy between personal and 
situational determinate of radical behaviors needs to be readdressed. As argued here, the 
phenomenon as complex as terrorism and radicalization cannot be attributed to either 
situational or individual level factors alone. Nevertheless this has been the trend for 
decades in the field of terrorism. Previous explanations of terrorism have tended to 
emphasize individual explanations and the current trend, on the other hand, is strongly 
influenced by the situationist perspective.  
However, the current approach does not only cloud our understanding of terrorism, 
but it falls short of explaining the phenomenon adequately. First, to a large extent, it 
disregards the personality variables in explaining terrorism, rendering the 
conceptualization of terrorism as a multifaceted phenomenon irrelevant. The importance 
of individual variables has been recognized in other areas of psychology and it is widely 
accepted that individual variables influence an individual’s behavior (Webster , 2009). 
Second, the current approach fails to explain why some young Muslims participate in 
terrorism when others do not, even when they are exposed to the same social and 
behavioral settings. Therefore, in paper I a widespread adaptation of an interactionist 
approach for understanding terrorism is encouraged. Evidence from social psychological 




dynamic interplay between personal, situational and right societal factors. Person and 
situation factors usually interact or complement each other (Webster , 2009).  
Further, paper I argues that an interactionist approach - besides serving as a 
framework for research - will provide us with avenues to understand how relevant traits 
and situational factors interact causing some to radicalize; help researchers to better 
understand differences among radicals; and to identify why some people become 
radicalized, but not others; or why some might participate in terrorism in a certain context, 
whereas others will refrain from it. Finally, evidence from social psychological research 
is reviewed and presented to make a case for a model that emphasizes the interplay 
between personal, situational and right societal factors. The core ideas from paper I is 
elaborated and exemplified in paper II and empirically tested in paper III, IV and V of 
this dissertation.  
 Paper II is a response to Lankford’s (2014) assumption that “suicidal motives, 
mental health problems, and personal crises are the most significant reason why fewer 
than 300 suicide terrorists usually blow themselves up each year” (p. 352). By responding 
to Lankford I did not only address the long existing “either or” rhetoric concerning 
psychology of terrorism, but also the reemerging assumption that mental health is the 
core explanation of terrorism. The take-home message from paper II is that extreme 
behavior is more than the sum of psychopathologies and external factors. Thus, paper II 
offers a complementary argument and empirically supported theoretical perspective 
suggesting that in understanding terrorism and radicalization we must go beyond the 
dichotomy of person and situation and broaden our focus by including not only intra-
individual level factors, but also social, relational, ideological and political explanations 
(see also, Taylor & Horgan, 2006). By focusing only on internal factors we will run the 
risk of omitting the role of ideology and social factors. Social context may matter just as 
much as individual psychology. Thus, the risk factors that Lankford argues cause suicide 
attacks cannot alone explain why some people become suicide bombers while others do 
not. These examples illustrate the need for a unified model of radicalization, which 
includes both the person and the situation in understanding such extreme acts as terrorism. 




psychopathology, but are nevertheless of central importance to how different people 
consider an act of terrorism. 
   
Empirical papers  
 The three empirical papers of this dissertation make individual contribution in 
filling some of the gaps in our understanding of terrorism. Each paper draws on different 
approaches to terrorism focusing on different causal factors that can make a person 
receptive to engage in extremism, as discussed under in chapter two.  In the following I 
will mainly focus on major findings of each paper and how they relate to the proposed 
integrated model. 
 
Major Findings - Relations to the Three Approaches and Integrated Model 
Social Psychological Variables  
Following the SIMCA model by van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) in 
paper III I mainly focused on social psychological variables of collective action. In a 
series of seven correlational and experimental studies across various contexts I 
demonstrated a common psychology of outgroup hostility among both non-Muslims and 
Muslims in Europe and Arabs in the Levant that is driven by perceived intergroup threat, 
and symbolic threat in particular. As expected, similar patterns emerged among Muslims 
and Arabs on the one hand, and among non-Muslim Westerns on the other, giving 
evidence to this common psychology. Further, I demonstrated the social psychological 
processes that propel political and cultural conflicts into negative feedback loops among 
various groups. These studies mainly drew upon social psychological component of the 
integrated model. These studies demonstrated two key findings based on the integrated 
model. As predicted our results demonstrated how various variables not only predicted 
but also complemented each other in explaining both attitudes and behavioral intentions 
to commit terrorism against the West among Muslim in Sweden and Denmark and Arabs 
in Lebanon as well as Islamophobic attitudes and support of anti-Islamic movements 
among native, non-Muslim Europeans. For example, in studies where group 
identification was included as exogenous variable it was shown that group identification 




model group identification was indirectly related to various outcome variables through 
the effect of perceived symbolic and realistic threat, indicating full statistical mediation. 
Threat perceptions mediated the relationship between identity and various forms of 
collective action.  
Furthermore, in study 1 it was experimentally shown how objective factors related 
to social psychological variables in explaining outgroup hostility. Study 1 tested the 
specific prediction that a threat to one’s numerical majority status (objective variable) 
would increase Islamophobia among native Norwegians. As expected, the experimental 
manipulation affected both threat measures (symbolic and realistic threats) as well as the 
Islamophobic measure. Moreover, participants in the demographic increase condition 
were more Islamophobic. In the SEM model, experimental threat predicted both symbolic 
and realistic threat, of which only symbolic threat in turn predicted Islamophobia, clearly 
showing how objective variables can complement social psychological variables in 
explaining Islamophobic attitudes.  
Although paper III has demonstrated that various social psychological variables, 
the cognitive (threat perceptions) and social (social identity) components in particular 
seemed to be associated with outgroup hostility, one limitation is that we did include the 
affective component of the integrated model, which can bring us a step further explaining 
the extent to which some people (but not others) under certain circumstances would 
endorse violent tendencies. The perception of injustice is often emphasized in models of 
radicalization (e.g., Moghaddam, 2005), but these models do not always distinguish 
between the cognitive and affective dimensions of injustice and as a result these models 
only focus on cognitive dimension of deprivation. In paper IV I extended the previous 
research and the findings of paper III. In paper IV I included not only the affective 
component of injustice, but also how objective variables relate and complement the social 
psychological variables.   
 
Objective and Social Psychological Variables  
In paper IV using two correlational studies, I investigated how objective factors 
(native/foreign distinction) relate to social psychological ones (perceived injustice, group-




terrorism. Here, across two studies I tested if victimization-by-proxy processes motivated 
behavioral intentions to commit acts of terrorism among Danish Muslims with migrant 
backgrounds. More importantly, I compared path models of those Muslims who did and 
did not have personal experience (native- and foreign-born) of Western-led occupation 
(objective factors). In the main analyses I examined whether the psychological 
underpinning of violence and non-violence would differ depending on direct experience 
of Western countries foreign policy and military interventions in the Muslim world. Thus, 
I examined how objective factors (personal experience versus no personal experience of 
Western foreign policy) impinge on the psychological variables in the integrated model. 
Logically, one might assume that individuals who have personally experienced Western 
military intervention and policy would be more prone to regard Western foreign policy as 
unfair and express more emotional and behavioral intentions to change it than those who 
do not have such personal experience. However, results showed that perceived injustice 
(e.g., perception of Western foreign policy), group-based emotions and corresponding 
actions tendencies can be elicited without Muslims necessarily having personally 
experienced Western foreign policy and military interventions. In other words, I 
illustrated that being aware that members of their group suffer abroad, European-born 
Muslims may be victimized-by-proxy and react accordingly, such that the general pattern 
of psychological reactions among foreign and native-born Muslim citizens did not differ 
demonstrating the influence of immediate contextual factors on Muslim-Europeans’ 
behavioral intentions regarding violence.  It is important to note that these studies go 
beyond proxy processes shown in intergroup emotions theory (IET, Smith, 1993; Mackie, 
Devos & Smith, 2000). Whereas, most previous studies have focused on lab-based 
manipulation among student samples in this study we investigate the role of 
victimization-by-proxy in a real population.  
The current paper also addressed another central variable: namely group 
identification. This variable is central in various studies in this dissertation. I proposed 
that Muslim identification has both direct and indirect effects on both violent and non-
violent behavioral intentions and attitudes (see also Phalet et al., 2010). In general, strong 
group identification leads to strong-shared understanding of social phenomena and vice 




and appraise Western countries’ foreign policy (paper IV) and perceive threats to their 
group (paper III) should be affected by their shared Muslim identity. According to the 
social identity model of collective action (SIMCA), Muslim group identification 
underlies the perception of Western countries’ foreign policy and group threat because it 
provides the basis for the group-based perception of victimization and perceived threat. 
Results from paper III and IV showed that Muslim identification did not predict attitudes 
towards violence and violent behavioral intentions directly. The effect of Muslim 
identification was mediated through other social psychological variables. These results 
are important because they disconfirm the popular belief in the West that Muslims and 
Islam as a religion are inherently violent  (Wilders, 2013, see also Jolly, 2011).   
Further, in paper IV, I focused not only on the cognitive but also affective 
component of perceived injustice. In this paper I asked about anger specifically in 
relation to foreign policy of Western countries, and I found that anger does indeed predict 
support for the use of violence. These results show that combining various factors of the 
integrated model can bring us a step further in explaining under which circumstances 
some but not others would endorse violent tendencies.  
 
Individual Psychological Variables  
In previous papers (III and IV) I established the importance of social, objective 
social psychological variables in explaining attitudes and behavioral intentions to 
comment terrorism among Muslims in Europe and Arabs in the Levant and anti-Muslim 
attitude and intention among non-Muslims in Europe. In paper (Paper V) I proposed that 
many people endorsing violence on behalf of a group might be normal in a clinical sense, 
but that they could have non-pathological personality signatures. In this first study I 
investigated the relation between basic personality traits and extremism. Hence, paper V 
addressed one of the common misconceptions about the role of personality traits in 
predicting terrorism. Paper V showed that non-clinical personality traits predict 
behavioral intentions among Muslims to support their group with violence. For example, 
violent behavioral intentions were associated with low emotionality and openness. On the 
other hand non-violent behavioral intentions were predicted by higher degrees of 




probability of some individuals to engage in extremist violence and those who engage in 
violence might have discernible personality traits. Paper V illustrated that a basic 
personality model fairs just as good as social psychological models of extremism and 
collective action (using similar dependent variables and populations; see e.g,, Tausch  et 
al., 2011). Given our results I would not conclude that personality variables are better 
explanations for extremism than situational ones, but they capture complementary effects. 
General findings of empirical papers 
 The studies in this dissertation extend existing psychological research on 
terrorism in a number of ways. First, placing this dissertation in the broader literature on 
terrorism and radicalization it is also important to note that there is much theory, but very 
little empirical data (Ranstrop, 2006 and 2009; Silke, 2004). The empirical work we do 
have suffer from major methodological and substantive shortcomings (for a 
comprehensive critique of empirical work see Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).  Our results, 
along with a relatively small number of social psychological studies (e.g., Tausch et al., 
2011), provides an important step toward an empirically grounded literature on, for 
example, why some Muslims come to support the use of violence, whereas others do not.	  
Second, most of the literature on Islamist terrorism has focused on attitudinal 
outcomes (e.g., Ansari, 2013; Cherney  & Povey, 2013; Cinnirella  et al., 2013; Fair  & 
Shepherd, 2006; Levin, Henry, Pratto, & and Sidanius, 2003; Tausch, et al., 2011; 
Yougov, 2005). In contrast, this dissertation moves beyond the issue of attitudes towards 
terrorism and focuses on those predicting violent as well as non-violent behavioral 
intentions to defend and support Muslims and/or Islam. This is an important move 
forward because behavioral intentions are often better predictors of actual behavior than 
are attitudes (e.g., De Weerd and Klandermans, 1999; Klandermans et al., 2002; see also 
Ajzen  & Fishbein, 1977).  
An important note about the findings throughout this dissertation is their 
robustness. By including various measure of terrorism I aimed to establish robustness of 
the integrated model. For example, in paper III I included both attitudes and behavioral 
intentions toward terrorism. I showed that various forms of outcome variables were 
predicted by the same processes and not only among Muslims, Arabs but also non-




Furthermore, I empirically distinguished between violent and non-violent 
outcomes, and included behavioral intentions for both and actual behavior for non-violent. 
To our knowledge, there is only one study of Islamist terrorism comparing extreme (often 
violent) and non-extreme outcomes as explained by, for example, group-based emotions 
(Tausch et al., 2011). Still, the extreme outcome in their paper was attitudinal (support for 
violence). I hypothesized that some antecedents are common to both types of intentions, 
whereas other antecedents are unique to one or the other. As predicted, anger was a better 
predictor of violent behavior intentions (paper IV) and different personality traits were 
related to different behavioral intentions (paper V).  
A novel aspect of this dissertation is that it relies on both correlational and 
experimental methods. For example, in paper III we include both correlational and 
experiential methods to investigate the role of symbolic and realistic threats in predicting 
outgroup hostility. In a recent meta-analysis Riek et al. (2006) commented that one of the 
major limitations in the domain of realistic and symbolic threats is the shortage of 
experimental studies. The existing studies manipulating threats have also shown weaker 
effects on out-group attitudes than those found in correlational studies. Riek and 
associates (2006) cautioned against premature conclusions regarding this discrepancy as 
it was based on as few as three experiments. Nonetheless, these findings and the 
cautionary advice given by Riek et al. (2006) suggest a need for more experimental 
studies on this topic. A similar concern can be raised in the domain of terrorism research. 
To our knowledge, most studies investigated the homegrown terrorism in the West 
cannot establish the causality between the examined variables (e.g., Doosje et al., 2013). 
Despite their important contribution to the field of homegrown terrorism research, 
previous studies are correlational and often involve only a single sample, providing 
limited bases for causal influence. Examining these questions experimentally is important 
for several other reasons. First, a mixed methods approach can produce results that are 
more robust and compelling compared to single method studies. Second, although 
experiments are recognized as important in research on ‘terrorism’, they are rarely 
implemented (Arce et al., 2011). This problem compounded by the fact that this area of 
research relies heavily on secondary data and frequently eschews empirical tools. Indeed, 




inferential analysis (Silke, 2004). To address these limitations, in the current dissertation, 
I used both experimental and correlational data to examine support for terrorism, 
behavioral intentions and actual behavior among Muslims, residing in Europe, Arabs 
residing in the Middle East and non-Muslims in Europe.  
Another limitation of previous research on Islamist terrorism is that the majority 
of studies have been conducted in the context of the Middle East among Arab populations. 
Hence, given the emerging discourse on “homegrown terrorism” and the recent Islamist 
attacks in many European countries, it is important to identify predictors of European 
Muslims’ attitudes and intentions towards violence, and to compare these to findings in 
the Middle Eastern context. This distinction is important because differing social context 
influences the perception of threat and injustice. This is particularly important because 
different sources of threat and deprivation may underlie different social context. 
According to integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), which type of threat is 
the dominant predictor of outgroup prejudice and hostility may vary across different 
contexts (Bizman & Yinon, 2001).  
Key Limitation 
 I faced a number of limitations while conducting the studies included in this 
dissertation. One of the major challenges was the task of gaining access to my research 
participants. The group of native and foreign-born Muslim residents in Denmark and 
Sweden that I surveyed for my studies constitutes a prime example of “hidden” and 
“hard-to-reach” populations (see Heckathorn, 1997). In many cases, immigrant group 
membership involves low visibility and strong privacy concerns (e.g., many have little 
trust in the socio-political system of their host countries, and may hold uncertain legal 
status; Agadjanian & Zotova, 2013). Pre-migration experiences add additional layers of 
complexity to data collection since many are persecuted in their respected countries. Such 
circumstances often make this population suspicious of any kind of inquiry concerning 
their background and socio-political matters of any nature. The recent terrorist attacks in 
Europe and media coverage of incidents of terrorism linked to Muslims have made this 
particular population even more suspicious about studies of this kind. Illustrating this 




complete. Facing such difficulties and the limited funding put a great deal of restriction 
on study design and testing additional hypotheses and the conclusions I could draw. 
  Further, because of the sensitive nature of this topic I faced a great deal of 
challenges conducting the studies. It made it difficult to conduct advanced experiments 
and face-to-face interviews since the use of anonymous surveys to protect participants’ 
anonymity was crucial. Similarly, because of the sensitive nature of the survey I had to 
avoid asking identifying questions about participates backgrounds to ensure and protect 
their anonymity. In addition I was forced to avoid posing questions about direct use of 
violence for ethical reasons. Furthermore, research shows that the predictive power of 
various social psychological variables weakens as the criterion actions become more 
violent (Tausch et al., 2011). In line with this many of my dependent variables (measure 
of violence) suffered from floor effect, which posed a statistical challenge to analyze the 
data. This had implication for the conclusions I could draw from my data.  
 To give a specific example of the challenges I faced during my data collection 
was the process of validating some of my results obtained from a “normal” sample in a 
sample of de facto radicalized Muslims. Taken together, findings from this dissertation 
have clear and potentially fundamental implications for terrorism prevention. For 
instance results from paper V could provide information about “risk factors” for 
becoming an extremist.  The use of violence seems more appealing to people who are 
more dogmatic and less fearful and stress-tolerant, so cues to such dispositions could be 
things to look for in prevention efforts. Also, with knowledge about different personality 
dispositions of violent and non-violent behaviors could help avoid harmful stereotypes 
that all Muslims would be potential extremists. Avoiding such stereotypes does not only 
have practical utility, but it could be considered a basic principle in a democratic and 
civilized society. Broadly speaking, in the guessing game of who might become a 
terrorist, my findings suggest that knowledge about an individual’s personality is 
important. As important as I think that these findings could be in combating terrorism, it 
is a critical issue in this kind of research to make sure that they are validated by the 
highest standard possible. My findings seem quite clear as far “normal” samples go, but 
as I mentioned these studies have been conducted among Muslim population without any 




willingness to use violence to defend Muslims, but we do not know if people with these 
dispositions also turn this willingness into actual extremist behaviors. For that reason it 
would be important to know if people who are known to associate or flirt with terrorist 
organizations have the same personality dispositions as those who “only” show a 
willingness to use violence. If so, we would have strong proof that personality predicts an 
actual inclination for violence. Thus, in a planned third study I wanted to validate these 
results in sample of radicalized individuals, but it was unfortunately impossible to gain 
access to a radicalized sample despite my multiple inquiries and requests and contact 
with various governmental agencies. In some cases I never received a reply to my inquiry 
and in some cases I had to wait ten months to receive a discouraging reply. This is 
problematic in a filed where first hand data is a rare commodity and much of anti-
radicalization policies and the writing on the terrorism is still built on piecemeal 
anecdotal evidence (see Lum  et al., 2008; Sageman, 2015).   
Another limitation of this dissertation is the use of self-report measures. 
Conducting research about sensitive topics involves the risk of social desirability bias, 
which can introduce a systematic error in responses. One could of course reduce social 
desirability bias by use of indirect measure such as peer ratings or implicit measures such 
as Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). 
Nevertheless, these measure are not without their limitations. Indirect measure such as 
peer rating requires from participants to answer question from the perspective of another 
person. However, it is unclear to what extent the information obtained about another 
person represents information about oneself. Furthermore, based on some evidence it 
seems that incongruence exists between the prediction obtained about others and the 
information if the respondents had been asked directly (Hoch, 1988). In this sense 
indirect measures may produce unbiased responses, but they may be invalid as it may 
introduce attitude-irrelevant variance (Robert, Fisher & Gerard, 1998 ). Further, both tests 
come with ethical dilemmas, such as involuntary screening procedures and “reporting” on 
one’s friends. IAT can be used diagnostically, that may tempt some people (e.g., 
government officials at the airports) to use it screening passengers from the belief that it 




Finally, it is important to note that the endorsement of violence in all studies of 
this dissertation is low among the populations I investigated. Further, it is important to 
note that I do not claim that support and behavioral intentions to commit terrorism 
translate into act of terrorism and that radical beliefs are a proxy for actual act of 
terrorism. Most people who hold radical ideas (e.g., support terrorism and extremism) do 
not engage in act of terrorism. However, at the same time holding radical ideas can be 
problematic to the extent that such beliefs may result in action. I acknowledge that there 
is a gap between these two constructs, as many Muslim Europeans experience adversaries 
and grievances in European societies, which may prone them to support terrorism as a 
just response, yet only a fraction of them becomes terrorists. I also acknowledge that a 
great deal of variability exists in the degree to which attitudes predict behavior (Ajzen, 
2000). Furthermore, due to correlational nature of studies in this dissertation one should 
be careful in making claims about causal inferences.  
Although, the mean correlation between attitudes and actual behaviors ranges 
from – .20 to .73, (indicating a high degree of attitude-behavior consistency: Glasman & 
Albarracin, 2006) and a medium-to-large change in intention (d = 0.66) leads to a small-
to-medium change in behavior (d = 0.36) (Webb & Sheeran, 2006) one cannot claim with 
certainty that the violent and non-violent attitudes and behavioral intentions will translate 
into actual behaviour. Such claim needs to be validated by measure of actual behavior. 
For example, in paper V I included measure of actual behavior to validate the findings for 
non-violent group mobilization. However, due to practical and ethical difficulties, as 
mentioned above, I could not include measure of actual violent behavior. Nevertheless, I 
took certain measures to assure a higher degree of attitude-behavior consistency. For 
example, attitudes based on direct experiences have been shown to be better predictors of 
behavior compared to indirect attitudes (for a meta-analysis, see Kraus, 1995). In this 
dissertation the various dependent variables were closely related and measured in relation 
to my participants direct experiences. For example in papers III and V I investigated the 
direct experience of Western foreign policy. Similarly, violent and non-violent attitudes 
and behavioral intentions were measured in relation to Western policy. My participants 
indicated to what extent they wanted to support or use violence to change Western 




 Future Research - An Integrative Dynamic Approach 
This dissertation showed that in order to adequately understand radicalization and 
terrorism we need to identify how factors from the different domains relate, and more 
importantly, complement each other in shaping circumstances, which will make 
radicalization more or less likely to occur.  Future studies should focus more on the role 
of individual level variables, particularly non-clinical variables. Several prominent 
scholars of radicalization and terrorism have argued that there is no personality effects at 
play in making people prone to violence (e.g., Horgan, 2003; Silke, 2003). Nevertheless, 
as discussed in paper I and V the data speaking against person effects are indeed limited, 
both in quantity and breadth, suggesting that terrorism researchers have jumped to 
conclusions that are unwarranted by the available data. However, paper V showed that 
between 15 and 25% of the individual differences in violent inclinations could be traced 
to differences in peoples’ personalities illustrating that a basic personality model fairs just 
as good as social psychological and sociological models of terrorism. Based on this and 
virtually no existing data on the person effects of terrorism it is time to pay more 
attention to individual variables along side of social psychological and external/societal 
ones.   
Further, future studies should investigate the extent to which different factors 
from various different line of research potentially interact with each other in making 
some receptive to terrorism. As it was argued in paper I and empirically shown elsewhere, 
individual differences interact with social context explaining various social phenomenon. 
For example, Thomsen et al., 2008 demonstrated that individual differences in SDO and 
RWA interacted with social context in explaining ethnic prosecution for fundamentally 
different reasons. One research design could be a longitudinal study of terrorism focusing 
on the dynamic interaction of individual differences and social context over time, 
demonstrating how various individual, social and group level determinates of extremism 









To conclude, understanding what motivates terrorism among some people against 
the West is both theoretically important and practically consequential. For example, 
radicalization of minorities can harm the coexistence of different cultural groups.  In 
order to prevent such harmful developments it is important to know what motives some 
people in first place to radicalize. In this dissertation I aimed to fill some of the gaps in 
our understanding of radicalization and terrorism. It is important to note that I do not 
claim that my results and the causal variables investigated in my studies are the core 
causes of homegrown radicalization in Europe. Causes of radicalization and terrorism are 
broad and vary from person to person and from context to context. To make matters 
worse person and situation factors usually interact, which adds additional layer of 
complexity to the phenomenon. So “one-size fits all” model does not exists. But my 
results tell a clear story that in understanding radicalization and terrorism we need to 
broaden our understanding of these concepts and avoid relying on “either or” approaches.  
The current dissertation seems to bring up more questions than it answers because 
it illustrates the complexity and the multidimensionality of terrorism and radicalization. 
In some ways, it makes a “bold” move by focusing and granting intra-individual variables 
same acknowledgment a long side of social, group and contextual determinates of 
extremism. This work calls for more empirically based research on effects of person in 
the area, although it may appear as a bold and controversial move by some, particularly, 
those who do not see any merit in individual level variables. Nevertheless, I hope that 
these results can be seen as step in the right direction and hopefully be used as a steeping-
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